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The dominant discourses on young Chinese middle-class transnational migration, 
especially in the form of educational migration to developed western countries, view 
such movement as part of personal and family strategies to accumulate various 
types of capital (Bourdieu 1986), maintain and enhance social mobility, and achieve 
“flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999; Ley 2010; Tsang 2013). Existing literature 
celebrates fluid hypermobility and considers it an essentially positive experience for 
young migrants. This thesis contributes a more nuanced analysis by exploring how 
visa-induced temporalities restrict migrants’ mobility, divert their plans and 
aspirations, and structure their everyday lives and life transitions, even for those 
who are considered to be relatively well-resourced. 
This thesis examines the complex trajectories of young middle-class temporary 
migrants from mainland China and Hong Kong to the UK, including their class-
related aspirations and experiences of multiple transitions across marital and 
immigration statuses. It challenges common assumptions in scholarly work about 
the transnational mobility of middle-class young people, including that consolidating 
class status is merely a goal and expected outcome of their trajectories (Tu 2016; 
Tsang 2013; Waters 2002). It argues that class has a temporal element (Wright and 
Shin 1988); class is an embodiment of both the past and possible future in the 
present. The temporalities of migration and the temporality of class simultaneously 
shape Chinese temporary migrants’ class identity in the UK, where there are 
different rules of attaining class status, and different perceptions of the values of 
social, cultural, and symbolic resources than in China or Hong Kong. This thesis 
unpacks migrants’ reflections of class, their self-fashioning, and how this process of 
constructing class identity is constrained by a set of socially acceptable categories 
and definitions.  
Drawing on data from in-depth qualitative interviews, this thesis reveals that the 
ways in which migrants seek to build capital or achieve goals are highly gendered. It 
focuses on marriage as a migration and class strategy utilised primarily by female 
migrants. However, contrary to a significant number of studies centred on the 
entanglement of interest and emotion in the romantic relationships of migrants from 
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a lower socio-economic background (Brennan 2004; Cheng 2010), this research 
contributes to discussions of middle-class sexuality as a site of ambivalences where 
love and pragmatism intersect (c.f. Charsley 2005). 
My research findings demonstrate that the British visa regime, the institution of 
marriage, and the Chinese state-sponsored gender discourse of sheng nu (“leftover 
women”) together shape migrant women’s desire for, timing of, and decisions 
relating to marriage and family formation. Moreover, this research advances 
empirical understanding of the intersections between institutional, biographical, and 
everyday timescales (Robertson 2018) in producing specific experiences for 
migrants. This study examines how the temporal dynamics of migration have a 
fundamental effect on the choices available to middling migrants in employment and 
life transitions, shaping the rhythms of romantic relationships, and accelerating 
discussions about marriage and the future with their partner. 
This thesis further argues that young migrant women’s negotiations of marriage and 
class status are related to the modern notion of Chinese feminine respectability, 
which requires them to fulfil familial, societal, and self-imposed expectations to 
become a respectable middle-class individual and family member. It discusses the 
paradoxes embedded in the feminisation of success (Lahad 2013) and migrants’ 
conflicted desires to achieve physical mobility, social mobility and security through 
transnational marriage and to become a liberal, independent, professional woman. It 
investigates how women resist the stigma surrounding the notion of “marriage 
migrant” and (re)establish their middle-classness through the discourses of love and 
sacrifice, and by asserting their cultural and moral ascendancy over women who 
they perceive as lower class. Moreover, it examines how migrants’ class 
background, lifestyle, and ability to draw on financial resources from family 
members are significant in negotiating power within their relationship and 
compensating for a potential status loss as a “sponsored spouse”, especially for 
those who also fail to thrive in the British labour market. This work joins the scholarly 
literature that addresses the contradictory demands on middle-class women today 
to construct successful portfolios in both family life and careers, and adds to broader 





This thesis presents a study of young middle-class Chinese temporary migrants to 
the UK from mainland China and Hong Kong, who often begin their migration 
journeys as international students or working holiday makers. Based on data 
collected during 67 in-depth interviews with migrants, it traces the various routes 
taken when they extend their stays in the UK for longer than their original visas 
permit, and discusses the difficulties faced in achieving their aspirations through the 
visa-sponsored employment path, despite high levels of education and family 
resources.  
A common assumption within the rich literature on transnational migration is that 
migrants aim and expect to achieve enhanced social mobility through migration. 
However, this thesis argues that migration in fact changes the way that individuals 
understand and experience class, as they tend to perceive forms of capital, such as 
lifestyle and qualifications, differently in a new country. It demonstrates that 
migrants’ class trajectory is a constant work-in-progress that requires them to look 
backward and forward, and compare themselves to their immobile peers “back 
home” or those born or settled permanently in the UK, who are perceived to take on 
more fixed, conventional pathways. 
This thesis reveals that the ways in which migrants seek to build capital or achieve 
goals are highly gendered. It focuses on marriage as a migration and class strategy 
utilised primarily by female migrants. However, contrary to a significant number of 
studies that examine the instrumental sexual relationships of sex workers or those 
of a lower socio-economic status, this research seeks to contribute to the more 
limited body of work on middle-class migrants, who are often perceived to have 
more resources and higher capabilities. 
Migration and life-course journeys are interwoven. This thesis argues that marriage 
is more than just a gendered migration strategy for middle-class migrants, but is 
related to their age, life stage, and personal goals, particularly in relation to career, 
social mobility, romance, and family. It argues that visa policy, the institution of 
marriage, and Chinese state-supported ideas surrounding gender roles together 
shape migrant women’s desire for, timing of, and decisions relating to marriage and 
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family formation. The British visa regime determines the duration of time that a 
temporary migrant is allowed to stay; the institution of marriage facilitates a social 
expectation to marry; and the Chinese state’s gender discourse sheng nu 
stigmatises women’s singlehood and directs them towards the goal of marriage. 
This thesis examines how the time-related dynamics of migration have implications 
for the choices available to migrants, forcing them to undertake careful planning and 
calculation regarding employment and life transitions, and shaping the rhythms of 
romantic relationships, such as by accelerating discussions between partners about 
marriage. 
This thesis proposes that young migrant women’s desires to fulfil familial, societal, 
and self-imposed expectations to become a respectable middle-class individual and 
family member are related to the modern notion of Chinese feminine respectability. 
It discusses migrants’ conflicted goals of achieving physical mobility, social mobility 
and security through transnational marriage and becoming a liberal, independent, 
professional woman. It investigates how women resist the stigma surrounding the 
notion of “marriage migrant” and (re)establish their middle-classness by justifying 
marriage migration to the UK as a choice rather than a necessity, distancing 
themselves from women whom they perceive as manipulative, lower-class and not 
respectable, and asserting a higher moral ground through the discourses of love 
and sacrifice. Moreover, it shows that despite the perceived dangers of lowering 
their status by becoming a “sponsored spouse” in the visa system and generally 
experiencing failures and disappointment in the British labour market, migrants’ 
class background, lifestyle, and ability to draw on financial resources from family 
members allow them to negotiate power within their relationship and compensate for 
a potential status loss. This work examines middle-class migrants’ aspirations, 
constraints, and capabilities in constructing successful portfolios in both their family 
life and careers, and adds to broader knowledge of the different tensions and 
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PROLOGUE: THE WEDDING 
 
On a sunny morning in early September 2017, my partner and I attended Kelly and 
Sam’s wedding at a Chinese church in Edinburgh, Scotland. I met Kelly, a mainland 
Chinese postgraduate student of a Scottish university when I was conducting my 
anthropological fieldwork in late 2016. Kelly was introduced to me by one of my 
informants, Sarah. We have been in touch since then.  
Stepping into the reception hall, my partner and I were quickly received and 
surrounded by Kelly and Sam’s Chinese friends. They welcomed and directed us to 
sign the guest book. Most of the signatures and messages were written in Chinese, 
including one of the most common Chinese wedding wishes, Bai nian hao he, yong 
jie tong xin (Wishing you a lifetime of happiness. May the knot be tied forever). On 
the table beside the guest book sat a small photo frame containing the engagement 
photo of the bride and the groom, a white wooden perpetual calendar showing the 
date of the wedding, and small bunches of flowers. The atmosphere was warm and 
busy with footsteps and laughter all around. After being given the order of service, a 
few chocolates and a pink gift bag, I put a red envelope which contained a small 
contribution towards the newlyweds’ honeymoon into a white wooden box. The box 
was already full of red and white envelopes - wedding gifts that the bride and groom 
had requested. 
Soon afterwards, my partner and I were instructed to stand before a nicely 
decorated table where a photo display stand was placed for photo-taking. About 
twenty photos of the bride and groom were displayed here. Some were pre-wedding 
photos taken in the countryside of Scotland. I could see the couple’s lovely smiles 
against the backgrounds of green fields and the iconic architecture of Edinburgh. 
From these photos, I could also tell where they had travelled to for holidays in the 
early days of their relationship. It occurred to me that this was a western-styled 
wedding with Chinese middle-class characteristics. 
After the photo of my partner and I was taken, we were invited to enter the main hall 
where the wedding ceremony would be held. I was very familiar with the main hall 
as I had visited it regularly since March 2016 when I had begun my PhD research. I 
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attended numerous Sunday services and met some of my informants here, who 
were also friends of Kelly. After exchanging greetings with other wedding guests, my 
partner and I sat down and took a look at the hall, with its vast stained-glass 
windows depicting some of the famous scenes from the Bible. Today, the hall 
looked a bit different than it did at Sunday services. It was decorated with ribbons 
and ornaments that featured “Mr and Mrs” on them. The guests were mostly young 
Chinese. Apart from the bride and groom’s mutual Chinese friends from church, the 
wedding was mainly attended by Kelly’s friends from university and Sam’s friends 
from work. There were a few white, middle-aged local faces whom I assumed were 
church friends of the bride and groom. 
Figure 1 Reception hall 
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Figure 2 Photo display table 
 
At 12.30pm, the wedding ceremony started. As the music gracefully echoed in the 
hall, the bride was slowly led down the aisle by a Chinese pastor, also a friend of 
mine. Kelly and Sam exchanged their vows in English, with Kelly struggling a bit 
with the language. Knowing that it had not been easy for Kelly to study, live and love 
in the UK, the vows deeply moved my heart. When I heard the Scottish pastor on 
stage pronounce them husband and wife, I had tears in my eyes. It was beautiful.  
(Hymn) 
Be still for the presence of the Lord 
The Holy One is here 
 
A sense of community was felt as we sang the hymn together. I was touched by the 
fact that I was surrounded by people I had been spending time with for months, 
whose stories and struggles I knew well. At the same time, my mind travelled to the 
first time I met Kelly in the winter of 2016, when she told me about her difficulties in 
adapting to life in the UK. She said, 
When I came to this country, I didn’t know anyone. I had no friends. I 
was alone…When other students talk in seminars, I can’t understand 
them. I am not happy with my study life. I get low grades here. I don’t 
have a sense of satisfaction. 
 
Despite all the difficulties and struggles she experienced, it was soon clear to me 
that Kelly’s relationship was the main reason she wishes to stay on in the UK. She 
had found love here – a man who emigrated from China to Edinburgh for work few 
years ago. The development of her relationship had been anything but slow. Kelly 
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and Sam were engaged after having been together for just half a year. They 
registered their marriage at a registry office in Edinburgh in late February 2017, 
which was attended by their friends, including myself. I interviewed Kelly in 
November 2016. At the time, Kelly said to me she knew that she and Sam would 
have to wait until the summer of 2017 to hold a wedding ceremony in church 
because no earlier dates were available. However, for immigration and visa 
application purposes, they decided to register their marriage early. Indeed, Kelly and 
Sam had a clear and detailed schedule of what and when things needed to be done 
for them to stay in the country together as a couple. First of all, Sam needed to 
apply for British permanent residency, which he did in January 2017. Just one 
month later, Kelly and Sam registered their marriage, even though Kelly’s student 
visa was not due to expire until October 2017. Kelly wanted to get married early to 
ensure that she had left enough time to switch to a spouse visa in order to avoid the 
marriage being seen as a rushed or sham marriage by the Home Office. Kelly 
explained her concern to me, 
I knew that if I were to leave the application date of spouse visa too close to 
the expiry date of my student visa, it would look sceptical in the eyes of the 
authorities. I heard from one of my friends that her spouse visa application 
was rejected. She told me it may be because she had left it too late to apply 
for the visa before her current visa expired.  
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Figure 3 Kelly and Sam’s civil ceremony at a registry office 
 
During the interview, Kelly also told me that she had been purposely attending 
social events with Sam so that she had photos which could be useful as evidence of 
their relationship in support of her spouse visa application in the future. I would not 
be surprised if the photos displayed on the reception desk at the wedding were 
some of the “evidence” that could be submitted to Home Office, if needed.  
While Kelly’s and Sam’s feelings for each other were true and strong, to a certain 
extent the civil ceremony in February 2017 and the religious ceremony in 
September 2017 did not happen spontaneously. The timing of such events was 
shaped by immigration procedures and considerations. In the hope of not being 
mistaken for a sham marriage, lots of planning and calculation went into the 
representation of the marriage as genuine according to the Home Office’s standard.  
Kelly was a rich young woman who came from an upper middle-class family in 
China. Sam, on the other hand, was described by Kelly as coming from a relatively 
humble background (for detail, see chapter 6). Kelly admitted to me that had she not 
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left for the UK, she would have looked for potential partners within her own class in 
China. Before moving to the UK, Kelly had a four-year relationship with a man who 
was close in age to Kelly. The relationship was supported by their respective 
families who belonged to a similar socio-economic class. In the end, the relationship 
ended because of Kelly’s plan to study abroad, and her ex-boyfriend’s reluctance to 
have a long-distance relationship. According to Kelly, her ex-boyfriend’s family was 
strongly opposed to her study plan, considering it to be too great a risk to have their 
prospective daughter-in-law wandering on her own in the West for a year.  
After breaking up with her ex-boyfriend, Kelly arrived in the UK in August 2015. 
Soon afterwards, she met Sam. 
(Hymn) 
The earth shall soon dissolve like snow 
The sun forbear to shine 
But God who called me here below 
Will be forever mine 
Will be forever mine 
You are forever mine 
 
As the wedding ceremony ended, there was a formal photo-taking session during 
which groups with different relations to the bride and groom took turns for photos. 
Afterwards, we were directed to the wedding reception for refreshments in the 
Lower Hall. We enjoyed salads, sandwiches, chicken wings, cupcakes and fruits. I 
was delighted to see Sarah, my informant who had also got married recently at the 
same church. She and her husband were both PhD students. After they were 
engaged, they moved into a new house that their families in China had bought for 
them. I then spoke to Biyu, another informant who had a Scottish husband. She had 
given birth to a beautiful son earlier in the year. I was also happy to see Victoria, 
who had recently returned from a long visit to Hong Kong. Despite marrying a 
British-born Chinese man (her husband was second-generation Hong Kong 
Chinese, born in Scotland), Victoria visited Hong Kong frequently to see her friends 
and family. While having refreshments, Kelly told me that her parents and Sam’s 
parents did not come to the wedding because they planned to throw big wedding 
banquets in Kelly’s and Sam’s two home towns in China, which in the eyes of the 
parents, was more important than attending their wedding in the UK. 
As we were all full and contented, it was time to dance. Kelly and Sam invited a live 
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ceilidh band with a caller to guide us through the dance steps. The couple were 
called to perform the first dance, which they were reluctant to do. One of the 
musicians seemed to be unimpressed by how shy and inexperienced the couple 
was, but to me, it was understandable because dancing is not expected at Han 
Chinese weddings. I myself have never attended a wedding in my hometown, Hong 
Kong, in which newlyweds or guests dance.  
After the first dance, the rest of the guests joined in as instructed by the caller. 
There were about 20 of us who were mostly Chinese. My partner and I were one of 
the two interracial couples in the group. We stepped, clapped and spun with the 
music. As I looked around, I took in the scene before me of young Chinese migrants 





The wedding vignette contains all of the themes that this thesis sets out to explore. 
At the centre of the story are the young, well-educated and middle-class Chinese 
temporary migrants who hope to pursue a prestigious foreign degree, opportunities 
for advancement in the English language, the prospect of higher employability, and 
western experiences in the UK. Along with these study-and-work related 
transnational goals, a temporary stay in the UK also offers migrants opportunities to 
explore romance and develop a relationship that may lead to marriage. 
This study concerns a relatively privileged and increasingly typical group of Chinese 
migrants whose socio-economic backgrounds in mainland China or Hong Kong 
have afforded them the opportunity to see transnational migration not as an 
economic necessity, but as a vehicle to modernity, cosmopolitanism and the 
achievement of other aspirations, through the experiences of studying and working 
holiday making. Temporary movement to the UK itself makes these migrants 
valuable as it represents forms of personal achievement and satisfaction, self-
realisation and independence. My research covers both mainland Chinese and 
Hong Kong Chinese, but I typically refer to them generally as “Chinese” in this 
thesis. Unless specifically mentioned, terms such as “Chinese temporary migrants” 
and “Chinese migrant women” refer to both mainland China and Hong Kong 
cohorts. I will justify my inclusion of the two groups in the following section. 
While it is relatively easy for young Chinese migrants to engage in temporary 
migration to the UK, opportunities for them to stay on are much harder to come by. 
Depending on states’ management of immigration, temporary migrants are often 
subjected to time restrictions imposed by various visas that limit the length of legally 
permitted stays. Those who have long-term migration goals in the UK actively 
navigate the possibilities and constraints of achieving higher flexibility and mobility 
for the life that they desire. During their migration trajectories, they may encounter 
immigration constraints and post-study employment barriers that prevent them from 
achieving their goals. Most notably, the Post-Study Work (PSW) visa, which allowed 
students from outside of the European Economic Area (EEA) to spend two years in 
the UK after graduation was cancelled in 2012. Student migrants now have a 
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maximum of four months after the course completion date to switch onto the so-
called skilled immigration path. As what constitutes a “skilled migrant” is solely 
defined by the Home Office, which also sets and raises the income bar for visa 
sponsorship jobs, even well-educated non-EEA migrants may find it difficult to 
become eligible for the visa.  
In fact, the Home Office is not unaware of the situation that non-EEA migrants face, 
and how a narrow path to permanent residency through employment may force 
some migrants to take alternative paths, such as marriage. In describing its 2013 
investigation into sham marriages and civil partnerships, the Home Office states that 
“as the requirements for non-EEA nationals seeking to remain in the UK to work or 
study have become more selective, it has become more attractive for non-EEA 
nationals to try to use marriage or civil partnership as a means to remain and settle 
in the UK” (Home Office 2013).  
The entanglement of interest and emotion in marriage strategies and love 
relationships has been well-studied in the social sciences (see Medick and Sabean 
1984), particularly in migration studies (Brennan 2004; Cheng 2010; Parreñas 
2011). However, the research focus has largely been on the entanglement of 
romantic love and the instrumentality of migrants from a lower socio-economic 
background, not on middling migrants or those who are perceived to have more 
resources and choices (for an exception, Charsley 2005). This research is therefore 
original in examining marriage immigration as a strategy of Chinese migrants who 
may at first appear to possess various forms of capital, and thus contributes to the 
discussion of middle-class sexuality as a site of ambivalences where love and 
pragmatism intersect. As this thesis will show, migrants’ strategies are much more 
complicated than is often assumed; the marriage immigration of middling migrants is 
more than just a means to an end.  
Even in the early stages of the empirical research that underpins this thesis, I 
discovered that migrant women, as opposed to men, tended to make use of the 
institution of marriage to enhance their chances of achieving extended stays, 
engaging in remigration, and obtaining permanent residency. This could be partly 
explained by the nature of the transnational marriage market, which appears to 
follow the familiar logic of global hypergamy (Charsley and Shaw 2006; Constable 
 21 
2003). But more importantly, I realised that migrant women were also more 
motivated than migrant men to explore romantic opportunities, maintain an existing 
relationship, or achieve the goal of marrying, while living in the UK temporally in the 
first place. In contrast, my male informants tended to frame their migration mainly as 
a journey to accumulate cultural capital and financial resources, and achieve higher 
social standing. Male narratives emphasised aspirations in career success and 
prolonged residence through their “own means”, particularly through employment. 
They expressed less concern about relationships or marriage and afforded 
themselves more time to remain single before looking for a spouse. The different 
narratives of female and male informants suggest that migrants’ desires, 
expectations, aspirations and experiences are highly gendered. 
Due to the snowball method of sampling and migrants’ preference in recommending 
potential informants, the number of migrant women that I interviewed was higher 
than the number of migrant men. Repeatedly, interviews with women revealed that 
women’s romantic motivations, experiences and outcomes are significant in shaping 
their migration trajectories. I also discovered that although migrant women’s entry 
into the institution of marriage may help them to qualify for the application of family 
or dependent visas and enhance their chances of achieving extended stays, most of 
these women are by no means “opportunistic husband-seekers1”.  
Chinese migrant women’s motivations for exploring romance in the UK vary. Some 
women in their twenties who were especially concerned about their singlehood felt 
pressured to look for a marriageable partner and did not mind looking while they 
lived in the UK temporarily. But I also came across women whose romantic 
relationships developed spontaneously, and whose entry into marriage was largely 
a serendipitous outcome. Not every relationship facilitated marriage immigration; 
and not all married women wanted to live in the UK permanently. Recognising the 
contradiction and heterogeneity inherent in mobility, I therefore do not wish for this 
research to be read as an over-simplified and stereotypical study of Chinese migrant 
women and their “calculative” and “strategic” marriages (Lin 2011). This is not to say 
that women were unaware of what their relationship could potentially bring, including 
 
1 In my analysis, I rely mainly on informants’ narratives, which involve the selective 
presentation and omission of information. 
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an extension of their time in the UK. However, this potential benefit alone was often 
inadequate to persuade women into marriage. In other words, marriage immigration 
is more than just a gendered strategy. 
After (re)analysing my data, I realised that Chinese temporary migrant women’s 
romantic experiences and struggles are often primary elements in their trajectories 
of migration, class and life. Also, women’s decisions and the timing of important life-
course events, such as marriage, are influenced by three factors: migration 
temporalities, new marriage ideals and familial expectations in Chinese societies, 
and women’s desire to achieve feminine respectability. I will consider each of these 
factors by examining the existing literature and my interview data. In this thesis, I will 
ask the following overarching questions: What are the forms of agency, 
opportunities, strategies and constraints of well-educated, middle-class Chinese 
migrants in prolonging their stays in the UK? How do they navigate different aspects 
of their personal lives, including class, employment, romance, marriage, and gender 
expectations? 
 
EMIGRATION FROM HONG KONG AND MAINLAND CHINA 
 
This thesis studies two groups of migrants – one from mainland China and one from 
Hong Kong. China is the leading source of international students. In 2015, 
international students around the world comprised 4.7 million, among which over 
800,000 students came from China (UNESCO 2017). As a main destination for 
overseas education in Europe, the United Kingdom has received a dramatic 
increase in students from China in the last two decades, from under 3,000 in 1997 
(Nyíri 2010, 36) to over 95,000 in 2017 (UK Higher Education Statistics Agency 
2018). Students from China now form the largest contingent of international 
students in the UK, surpassing all countries of the European Union (EU) and the 
EEA. The number of Chinese students in the UK was five times more than students 
coming from India (16,550) in 2017 (UK Higher Education Statistics Agency 2018). 
In addition to the fast-growing number of student migrants from China, Hong Kong 
Chinese also comprise a significant number of international students in the UK, with 
over 16,000 in 2017 (UK Higher Education Statistics Agency 2018). Since 2010, 
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both China and Hong Kong have been in the top five in terms of countries of student 
origin, with China always in first place and Hong Kong in fourth or fifth each year 
(Ibid.; Universities UK 2017). Considering the relatively small population of Hong 
Kong, with 7 million residents, as compared to 1.3 billion in China, the number of 
Hong Kong students arriving in the UK seems surprisingly high, and continues to 
increase steadily each year. Benefitting from the post-colonial relationship between 
the UK and Hong Kong, Hong Kong nationals are also afforded an additional 
temporary immigration route in the form of working holiday making, which allows 
them to stay in the UK for up to two years. This temporary migration trend appears 
less popular than student migration, with a total of 1,191 Tier 5 Youth Mobility 
Scheme2 (YMS) visas issued to Hong Kong nationals in 2016 (Migration Watch UK 
2017), however this number does not include those who used a British National 
Overseas passport3 for their visa application. 
Hong Kong’s regional and transnational migration regime has a long history, 
whereas outmigration directly from mainland China has been a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Hong Kong has long been a point of transit for would-be migrants and 
a destination for return migration for generations of Chinese (Abelmann, 
Newendorp, and Lee-Chung 2014). Watson (1975) looks at the early migration 
strategies of Hong Kong transnational split families in the first half of the 20th 
century, with men emigrating abroad, leaving their wife and children in Hong Kong. 
In the post-1997 era, after the handover of Hong Kong from the UK to China, 
emigration from Hong Kong has been dominated by middle-class families, economic 
elites and investor migrants. The transnational split family is still a widespread 
migration strategy but now Hong Kong husbands tend to remain in Hong Kong to 
earn money, whilst their wives and children stay living abroad to obtain “flexible 
 
2 A Tier 5 (Youth Mobility Scheme) visa is issued to applicants of certain nationalities who 
want to live and work in the UK for up to 2 years. Hong Kong citizens can use either a British 
National (Overseas) passport or a Hong Kong passport to apply for the visa, providing 
certain criteria are fulfilled. 
3 The British National (Overseas) passport, commonly known as the BN(O) passport, was 
first issued in 1987 after the Hong Kong Act 1985, from which this new class of British 
nationality was created. According to the British government website, “Someone who was a 
British overseas territories citizen by conncection with Hong Kong was able to register as a 
British national (overseas) before 1 July 1997. British National (Overseas) passport holders 
are subjected to immigration controls and do not have the automatic right to live or work in 
the UK. They are also not considered a UK national by the European Union. 
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citizenship” (Ong 1999). These families are called “astronaut families”; the term 
“astronaut” refers to parents (very often husbands) who “shuttle back and forth” 
between Hong Kong and wherever their spouse and children live overseas (Ho 
2002).  
 
In the UK, a lot of early research conceptualising Chinese migration experiences 
with notions such as Chinese diaspora (Ong and Nonini 1997; Benton and Pieke 
1998; Tan 2013) and Chinese transnationalism (Benton 2003), had a focus on the 
settlement processes of Hong Kong Chinese immigrants in Britain, who opened 
catering businesses (Holmes 1988; Watson 1975; 1977), laundry businesses (Jones 
1980), and established Chinatown (Soon 2012). The significant numbers of young 
Hong Kong Chinese migrants in the UK, and the important role of Hong Kong in 
establishing the Chinese diaspora in Britain and developing unique modes of 
emigration, necessitate the inclusion of Hong Kong migrants in this research.  
In contrast to Hong Kong citizens, Chinese nationals were severely constrained in 
their mobility before the 1980s. In the post-1980s era, life-tenure employment 
opportunities were replaced by more contractual jobs; the labour market was 
opened; and national ID cards were introduced, enabling adult Chinese citizens to 
apply for passports (Xiang 2016). All of these significant policies gradually opened 
the door to emigration for ordinary Chinese nationals. Working overseas was seen 
as an alternative employment opportunity for low skilled and unskilled Chinese 
particularly from the northeast. Moreover, China’s economic transformation 
significantly contributes to an accumulation of wealth among Chinese urban 
families, which allows their offspring to undertake transnational student migration, 
especially to Europe and North America, and consolidate intergenerational transfer 
of middle-class advantages (Devine 2004) and social reproduction (Bourdieu 1986), 
just like their Hong Kong counterparts (e.g. Tsong and Liu 2009; Waters 2005). For 
middle-class Chinese, a foreign degree is also considered as an “intergenerational 
aspiration transfer” (Tu 2019), which is materialised through Chinese parents’ 
financial sponsorship. The patterns and flows of Chinese transnational migration 
have changed rapidly over recent decades. Presently, in the UK, wealthy migrant 
investors, highly skilled migrants and international students comprise the dominant 
groups of immigrants from China.  
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Although mainland China and Hong Kong are distinctly different in many ways, and 
young migrants from the two cohorts entering the UK are administered and 
documented differently, their migration aspirations, their education/career 
trajectories and the time-related conditions of their stays are very similar, which can 
be related to the general experiences of elite-dominated and education-related 
migration of Asian migrants in the West (e.g. Robertson 2018). Despite the 
similarities between my mainland Chinese and Hong Kong informants, there are 
also differences in practices and expectations of courtship and marriage, and 
markers of middle-class identity, including career ideals, which are some of the main 
themes of this thesis. The inclusion of both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong 
cohorts helps prevent the problem of essentialism in the understanding of Chinese 
transnationalism. This study contains samples of mainland Chinese who came to 
the UK as students and people from Hong Kong who came as students or under the 
working holiday scheme, a migration path that is not available to the mainland 
Chinese. I have included both groups because I consider both studying and working 
holiday making to be significant forms of youth mobility undertaken by migrants of a 
particular education and class background. 
 
TIME, TEMPORARY MIGRATION AND LIFE-COURSE TRAJECTORY 
 
The majority of Chinese temporary migrants in this study were not first-time visa 
holders, suggesting their unfixed intentions and changing lengths of stays in the UK. 
As mobile actors, these migrants constantly shift and blur the boundaries of 
“temporariness”, “extended temporariness” and “eventual permanence” (Rajkumar 
et al. 2012). They also perfectly illustrate the fact that migration is a multidirectional, 
non-linear and temporally contingent process (Geddes 2015; Jeffery and Murison 
2011; Parreñas 2010; Wallace 2002). 
Theories of space and spatiality have long dominated our understanding of 
contemporary migration, making time and temporality a marginal analytical 
framework (May and Thrift 2001). Traditional understandings of international 
migration have also seen the processes from alien to citizen, and from arrival to 
assimilation in terms of a linear journey (Meeus 2012). But scholars of migration 
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have now recognised that migration is often not a “simple journey from A to B” 
(Schrooten, Salazar, and Dias 2015, 1200–1201); it has varied tempos and rhythms. 
This understanding also changes our perception of the boundaries between 
categories of migrants such as temporary/permanent, and sojourner/settler. 
In recent years, there has been emerging theoretical and empirical interest in the 
temporalities of international migration. As early as the 1970s, Hägerstrand (1970) 
developed the theory of time geography, in which he traced time-paths across a 
range of temporal scales, from one day to a lifetime. Rhythmanalysis, a concept 
originally developed by Lefebvre (2004), has recently been rediscovered and 
adopted by King and Lulle (2015) and Marcu (2017) to understand temporal rhythms 
and patterns in mobility, and the use of time in everyday life. Cwerner's (2001) study 
of the “times of migration”, probably one of the most cited works in the field, 
suggests that all migration processes have complex temporal dimensions and offers 
a comprehensive theoretical review of migration, time and temporalities. “Times of 
migration” concern not only the flows and movements of people, but also the 
rhythms and cycles, the synchronicity and disjuncture, and the future (see Acedera 
and Yeoh 2018; Griffiths, Rogers, and Anderson 2013; Robertson and Ho 2016). 
Among the limited range of empirical work that has focused on temporality and 
migrant experiences, “waiting” in relation to marginal immobility, including asylum 
seekers and displaced people, is one of the central themes (Bendixsen and Eriksen 
2018; Haas 2017; Richards and Rotter 2013; Rotter 2016). Robertson (2018, 173) 
claims that there has been inadequate literature on migration and time in relation to 
the experiences of middling or skilled migrants. While I do agree that we need more 
studies regarding middling migrants, I am not totally in line with Robertson’s 
criticism, which seems to imply that studies of asylum seekers and displaced people 
neglect middling migrants. In my view, she fails to see that this kind of literature also 
includes a large proportion of individuals from middle-class backgrounds. I consider 
that Robertson's (2018) understandings, generalisation and categorisation of 
different groups of migrants is largely based on the economic and social situation of 
their country of origin, but not the social position or education of individual migrants.  
Migrants’ desires are complex, temporary, multiple, and sometimes contradictory. 
Although international education migration and working holiday making are 
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sometimes understood as a particularly “discrete period of life” or a “time out” from 
the life-course, when migrants aim to accumulate certain qualifications or skills for 
the future (Griffiths, Rogers, and Anderson 2013), for some migrants, this temporary 
movement may have greater consequences, shaping life-course events, decisions 
and disruptions (King et al. 2004). A life-course is defined as “a sequence of socially 
defined events and roles that the individual enacts over time” (Giele and Elder 1998, 
22).  
Adopting a life-course approach (Elder and Giele 2009) in migration (for other 
examples see Findlay et al. 2015; Gardner 2009), I consider the mobility of young 
Chinese temporary migrants as situated within a much broader structure of social 
processes. A life-course perspective in migration research concerns how the timing 
of significant life-course events, such as marriage, the birth of a child, moving home 
and the transition of migrants into family life is shaped by the temporalities of 
migration. Scholars have observed that emotional and material needs are strongly 
linked to stages of an individual’s life cycle (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002), and that 
the timing of a life-course event concerns the biography of an individual at that 
particular moment, for example his or her age (Settersten and Mayer 1997). This is 
especially relevant to my study of young Chinese migrants, especially women, who 
during their twenties were in a particular life stage, and tended to be interested in 
developing a relationship with a view to marriage. 
Robertson (2018) argues that research on middling migrants seldom expands 
beyond the model of institutional forms of temporal control in the structuring of these 
migrants’ experiences, an area which this research hopes to address. Following 
Robertson's (2018, 174) concept of “timescale”, which “describes different levels of 
temporal orderings and events that impact on and interact with migrants’ mobilities 
across space”, I will analyse the interplay between the institutional time of 
immigration constraints (Bauböck 2011), migrants’ biographic time, and everyday 
lived time in their migration and romantic trajectories.  
Migrants’ biographic time has a gendered dimension. Cieslik (2013) argues that 
migrant women often negotiate family building decisions alongside transnational 
mobility. Robertson (2018) also states that women may delay the transition from 
singlehood to marriage and motherhood due to the uncertainty entailed in their 
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temporary migration trajectories. In this thesis, I will argue that the gender discourse 
of sheng nu (leftover women) sponsored by the Chinese state, which encourages 
marriage and reproduction through stigmatisation of women’s singlehood, adds an 
additional temporal scale in migrants’ lived experiences.  
Focusing on the complications between individual and institutional framings of time 
(Lingard and Thompson 2017; Robertson 2018), this thesis argues that life-course 
time is structured, gendered and monitored by visa and marital institutions, and 
state bureaucracy (Lauser 2008; Thomas and Bailey 2009). I will scrutinise how 
migrant women are pressured to explore romance, find a partner and decide to 
marry within a limited window of time, both in the sense of the limited time remaining 
on their visas and the prime age bracket to secure a marriageable partner in a 
woman’s life-course. I argue that women’s migration trajectories and state of 
temporariness intersect with their gender identities and marital statuses, shaping 
their everyday lived time and affecting the rhythms of their romantic relationships.  
In this thesis, I will also illustrate the interrelation between the various modalities of 
socially constructed time, for example individual time, family time, historical time, 
and state-controlled time in the context of temporary migration. Lastly, I will show 
that time is conceptualised as forms of commodity, capital, commitment, and reward 
in migration and citizenship regimes, through which migrants are stratified; and 
gender and class inequalities are reinforced.  
 
CHINESE WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND CLASS 
 
Chinese kinship patterns are described by anthropologists, such as Fei Xiaotong 
(1992), as patrilineal and patriarchal, meaning that descent is traced through the 
male line, with men holding more power over women, parents over children, and old 
over young. While these kinship patterns have not changed, some of the radical 
social transformations that have spread through China in the last few decades have 
greatly affected the Chinese patrilineal system in terms of marriage, gender 
relationships, and intergenerational relationships. 
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In China, the 1950 Marriage Law is often considered by social scientists as the key 
law that demonstrates the Communist Party’s ideals of gender liberation, and its 
support of the ideas of romance, divorce, and the abolition of arranged marriage 
(see, for example Cong 2016; Friedman 2006; Zhao 1966). At the end of 1950s, 
“love” became a key ideology in China. Passionate feelings and emotional 
expressions in courtship relationships were appreciated. Young people were given a 
certain degree of freedom to choose their marriage partner. However, premarital sex 
remained a social taboo throughout the 1980s, and women were continuously 
expected to limit sexual intimacy, and were shamed if they lost their virginity before 
marriage or experienced premarital pregnancy (Friedman 2006; Davis 2014). Since 
the post-Mao period, the Communist Party’s “one-child” policy and the market 
culture have driven changes in attitudes to sex and ideologies of marriage and 
intimate behaviours in many ways. An individualist culture of dating became more 
prevalent; sexual intercourse as an expression of love was normalised; and 
premarital sex, breaking up, and cohabitation became socially acceptable (Davis 
2014; Farrer 2014; Yan 2003). However, a woman’s marriage prospects today are 
still related to her sexual conduct (Fang 2013).  
The revision of the Marriage Law in 1980 designated minimum marriageable ages 
for men and women, which according to scholars, such as Cai and Feng (2014), 
and Zhang and Sun (2014), marked the beginning of the “late marriage” era. They 
argue that the “late marriage” era was at first a product of the state’s intervention in 
the institution of marriage, but later on young Chinese men and women chose to 
marry later due to the expansion of higher education, and the highly competitive 
global environment and job market. However, for most women and men in this 
study, marriage and family formation are still considered to be life goals that are 
expected to be fulfilled.  
In Hong Kong, the expectations and realities of marriage have changed dramatically 
over the past fifty years because of changing socio-economic circumstances under 
a neoliberal and market-oriented economy, making the city in many ways parallel 
what scholars have observed in Europe and North America (Ting 2014). Since the 
1960s, young people in Hong Kong have had greater autonomy in choosing a 
potential spouse (Mitchell 1972). The expansion of tertiary education in the post-
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1980 era has contributed to an increase in the number of women completing post-
secondary studies and lower rates of marriage in Hong Kong. 
In both mainland China and Hong Kong, marriage remains a key site through which 
class status is made and performed. Although the rise of individualisation and the 
normalisation of “romantic love” have made “free-choice” marriages a social ideal 
(Yan 2003; 2013), the choice of marriage continues to be related to problems of 
stratification and socio-economic differentiation based on material interests (Farrer 
2002), household registration (hukou) status, educational level, and appearance 
(Wang and Nehring 2014).  
Previous research has looked at how China’s hukou system creates a segregated 
and hierarchical context that makes it rare for rural-urban intimate interactions to 
happen (Lui 2017). Introduced in the 1950s, hukou status is a form of household 
registration attached to places assigned by the state. The hukou system categorises 
people according to their parents’ place of origin into “agricultural” or “non-
agricultural” households. It divides the “rural” population (those with agricultural 
registration) from the “urban” population (those registered in large towns or cities). 
Also, it separates “locals”, meaning those who have local registration, from outsiders 
(Nyiri 2010). Social rights such as education, health care, social welfare and 
housing are all tied to hukou; ways to change one’s hukou remain restricted (Jacka, 
Kipnis, and Sargeson 2013). This is why Solinger (1999) argues that the hukou 
system creates two fundamentally binary Chinese citizenships. 
Not surprisingly, in my study, none of my Chinese informants were rural hukou 
holders. The hukou system determines the socio-economic and cultural hierarchy of 
different groups, creates opportunities and obstacles for them to succeed in various 
aspects of their lives, and favours more resourceful urban men and women, and 
occasionally beautiful rural women, in dating and marriage markets (Wang and 
Nehring 2014). For some of my Chinese informants, although foreign citizenship 
brought by transnational marriage may seem attractive, marriage abroad presents 
the same perceived risks of métissage as rural-urban marriage at home. 
Despite of rapid social changes, marriage, reproduction and care for family 
members are still expected from Chinese women, regardless of their career 
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achievement. In mainland China and Hong Kong, women’s singlehood is often 
perceived as problematic. Single women who are generally well-educated and 
financially empowered, but fail to live meaningfully in a society that expects them to 
marry and care for a family, receive social criticism and stigma. The term sheng nu 
(leftover women) is now widely used to describe these women, who are considered 
to be too old (usually approaching or have already passed the age of 30) and not 
desirable by men. As I will argue in the next chapter, the defining line of the age of 
30 is vitally important for Chinese women. Those who are approaching it or have 
passed it may feel insecure about their disfavouring position in the local marriage 
market and may seek alternative romantic opportunities overseas.  
 
CHINESE WOMEN’S EDUCATION MIGRATION AND CLASS TRAJECTORIES 
 
The young middle-class migrant women from urban China and Hong Kong in this 
study were born in a historical time that allowed them to benefit from a concentration 
of family resources and overseas educational opportunities (see Fong 2011). In 
China, the “one-child” birth control policy that was implemented in 1979 and officially 
ended in 2015 has shifted intra-family power relations from older generations to 
young adults, and changed the ways in which Chinese families raise daughters, 
especially in the cities (Kajanus 2015).  
Although China’s birth control policy was never carried out in Hong Kong, the city’s 
fertility rate (1.13 in 2017) is one of the lowest in the world, and has been 
consistently below 2.1 – the level at which a population can replace itself from one 
generation to the next – for more than three decades (Census and Statistics 
Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2018). In Hong Kong and 
urban China, women are no longer treated as temporary and marginal members of 
their natal family (Watson 2004) but are now afforded equivalent access to 
education and other resources as men (Evans 2008; Judd 1989; Obendiek 2016).  
For the middle-class Chinese, an overseas degree is a form of cultural capital that 
facilitates social reproduction. Educational migration is considered to be a family 
capital accumulation project, and students themselves are sometimes portrayed as 
“passive” in the process of migration-decision making (Huang and Yeoh 2011). 
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However, as Tu (2016) argues, Chinese parents’ involvement in their children’s 
educational trajectory cannot be fully explained by traditional Confucian family 
hierarchy that places parents above their children in all decisions; nor can it be 
understood with the capital accumulation discourse only. Rather, filial piety is at 
play, and ensures a life-long reciprocal/hierarchical relationship between parents 
and children through supporting/receiving overseas education. 
In addition, educational credentials have long been used as a measure of 
compatibility and suitability of a bride and a groom in Chinese societies (Jacka, 
Kipnis, and Sargeson 2013). Therefore, international education plays an 
increasingly important role in enhancing marriageability, especially for middle-class 
women. However, paradoxically, higher education works hand in hand with age 
hypergamy to determine how and when educational credentials can be used as 
currency in the marriage market. As I was often told by my informants, a Chinese 
woman in her mid-twenties equipped with an overseas master’s degree is 
considered to be “intelligent but not over-achieving”. On the contrary, a female PhD 
graduate over the age of 30 is unfavourable because she is seen as “too old”, and 
her educational level “too high” as it may undermine her husband’s self-esteem and 
manhood (see also Fincher 2014; Ji 2015; To 2013). This all suggests the complex 
relationships between international youth mobility, marriage, marriageability, and 
gendering of ages that require unpacking. Focusing on migrants’ formation of a 
marriage or romantic relationship during their temporary migration trajectories in the 
UK, I thus ask in what ways youth mobility and (transnational) marriage are 
entangled within the gendered life-courses and class trajectories of young Chinese 
women. 
 
TEMPORALITIES OF CLASS IN MIGRATION 
 
Since the 1990s, theories of globalisation and transnationalism have become key 
frameworks in understanding inequalities in western capitalist societies, and 
dominated our understanding of international migration (Skeggs 2002; Cappellini, 
Parsons, and Harman 2016). Some contemporary social theorists argue that 
Giddens (1994) and Beck’s (1994)  influential works on reflexive modernity and 
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individualisation have diverted our research interest away from collective class 
action and division (see for example Oliver and O’Reilly 2010). 
Within the body of migration literature, ethnicity and gender are often seen as 
sources of difference, usually contributing to the exploitation of immigrants by the 
majority. Gender is a core lens through which to understand why certain groups, 
e.g. immigrant women who are ethnic minorities, face a distinct double 
disadvantage. In comparison to ethnicity and gender, class seemed to have 
received less attention in social research in the 1990s and 2000s. Wu and Liu 
(2014, 1392) argue that transnationalism “partially led to the dearth of class 
analysis” by treating international migrants more or less homogeneously, ignoring 
the existence of different segments of immigrants and class politics. In addition, 
migration researchers tended to see class positions as definable places that 
migrants can effortlessly put themselves in, but the ways in which they move into 
and out of these places had not been fully explored. Although some scholars have 
even gone so far as to suggest that class has become less relevant in contemporary 
society (Pakulski and Waters 1996), more recently, we have seen a resurgence in 
class studies, with a growing attention paid to the study of class identity in relation to 
migrant experiences (for example Fathi 2017; Oliver and O’Reilly 2010). 
Wright and Shin's (1988) work links temporality to class structure in a way that is 
useful in understanding class in migration. They argue that class is an embodiment 
of both the past and possible futures in the present. They state that “processual 
concepts of class can be viewed as linking class to the past whereas structural 
concepts link class to the future” (Wright and Shin 1988, 58). In their discussion of 
the temporality of class analysis in processual approaches, they go on to assert: 
Processual views…see classes as constituted by the lived experiences of 
people. Classes exist only insofar as the biographies of individuals are 
organised in such a way that they share a set of experiences over time 
which define their lives in class terms…Processual approaches to class 
revolve around the problem of learning, with how people come to learn to 
be class-members with the accompanying identities, worldviews, life-styles, 
meanings. At any given moment, what we have learned is explained by the 
trajectory of experiences that have accumulated in our lives…processual 
approaches, therefore, is primarily backward-looking: class is an 
embodiment of the past in the present (Wright and Shin 1988, 58). 
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The temporality of class analysis in structural approaches, as Wright and Shin 
(1988: 59) further suggest, concerns the future: 
Structural approaches to class, in contrast, revolve around the objective 
choices facing actors. The feasible set of objective alternatives facing 
actors within a class structure defines a range of possible future states that 
are available to them. History may matter in so far as it helps to explain why 
the class structure is the way it is, but it is not conceptually constitutive of 
the concept of class itself. The temporality of class analysis in structural 
approaches, therefore, is primarily future-looking: class is an embodiment 
of possible future in the present. 
 
Migrants’ interaction with and integration into the host society forces them to re-
evaluate their class position, and in doing so, they must look backward and forward 
to try to make sense of their current socio-economic position. Temporary migrants, 
whose intention of permanent settlement into a destination country is unfixed, may 
evaluate their class positions by comparing themselves with their new social 
network in the UK and their peers “back home”.  
This thesis argues that migrants try to make sense of their class positions in the 
host society by observing what class means and learning how to fit into a new class 
system in their everyday lives. For example, some migrants only realise the close 
correlation between British accents and social statuses after they move to the UK; 
some may attempt to learn and fake an accent so that they would be perceived as 
more respectable. Migration as a life trajectory is also a trajectory of class 
experiences, during which migrants’ old worldviews are challenged; lifestyles are 
changed; and meanings associated with privileges are renewed. This accumulation 
of class experiences and events in an individual biography gradually shapes 
migrants’ class identity in a new country, making class identification a constant 
work-in-progress. In this thesis, I will explore temporary migrants’ narratives of class 
identity, and ask: In what ways do the temporalities of migration and the temporality 
of class work simultaneously to shape temporary migrants’ class identity?  
 
MEANINGS OF SUCCESS AND RESPECTABLE FEMININITY 
 
The topic of “success” was often spontaneously brought up by informants. For 
student migrants, “success” is defined by the ranking of the school or university that 
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he or she is admitted to. After graduation, the definition of “success” becomes more 
ambiguous, and continues to “change over time and in different social spaces” (Tu 
2016, 5). Being seen as “successful” is important for both men and women from 
mainland China and Hong Kong, as it is related to whether one is considered 
respectable or not. Throughout my research, I found no big difference in the social 
meanings of being successful between mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Chinese. 
Take a look at what Kelly from mainland China said, 
To be successful is to find a job I like... I just hope to lessen the burden of 
my parents and my husband. I shouldn’t make my parents worried about 
me all the time, who still support me financially. My living cost is quite high. 
And I don’t want to just take from my parents without giving...I probably 
wouldn’t give my parents money even if I could, but I would send them gifts 
from UK once my life here is stable…My husband and I will buy a house 
soon after I submit my essay. We want to buy a house nearby the 
university, it would be more expensive but I think it’s worth it…We want to 
have kids but we probably won’t do it now because I want to find a job first. 
Also, here is what Belle from Hong Kong said, 
I think that coming to the UK to study is not just about studying but 
becoming an adult. Now I am no longer the little girl that needs my mum’s 
help. I had never tidied my home when I lived in Hong Kong. I didn’t know 
how to cook. I didn’t even know how to cook an instant noodle. But now I 
am the one who takes care of my husband. I remember I cried in front of 
my mum one time and I said I am worried that I wouldn’t have any big 
achievement in life. My mum said she gave me so much money to study in 
the UK, but she never expected me to have high achievement. She just 
wanted me to graduate successfully and experience life in the UK. She just 
wanted me to be happy…I think once I find a job and am able to apply for 
my mum to settle in the UK with me, I could be truly proud of myself…I 
want to have two children in the future. 
For both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong women, securing employment in the 
UK, becoming financially independent, being able to return parents’ investment in 
their overseas education by showing them that they live a good and happy life, and 
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fulfilling middle-class aspirations of owning a home and having children are all parts 
of the common package of success that most mainland Chinese and Hong Kong 
informants said they hoped to achieve. By achieving this package, young migrants 
then considered themselves to be successful, thus respectable. 
According to Skeggs (1997:3), to be respectable is to be moral, to be worthy of 
society. For the women in this study, as I will show in chapter 6, respectability is 
only achieved through the fulfilment of a number of gendered, and at times 
contradictory, expectations. This relates to the notion of respectable femininity, a 
topic which social scientists first studied in relation to white, middle-class women in 
Victorian Britain, and which was associated with domesticity, appropriate behaviour, 
language (Davidoff and Hall 2013; Skeggs 2002), and sexual conduct (Frances 
1994).  
According to Skeggs (2002), respectable femininity is constructed around particular 
types of morals and aesthetics, and is articulated as a process through which 
women add value to themselves. Respectability is seen to be an object of 
knowledge, and a symbolic capital that the working-class lacks. Those who are 
respectable are considered to be capable of being moral, while others are seen to 
be immoral and in need of control (Strathern 1992). Respectable femininity has 
since been researched in different cultural and racial contexts, such as East Asia, 
South Asia, and Africa, where normative perceptions of respectable femininity 
involve women prioritising family above work through careful management of 
marriage and child-bearing, taking up caring and socialising roles, and upholding 
moral propriety (Ang 2016; Hussein 2017; Khumalo, Mckay, and Freimund 2015). 
For example, the popular “leftover women” discourse in China demonstrates how 
important marriage and child-rearing are in the making of respectable Chinese 
femininity. But studies concerning middle-class women also point out that the 
influence of globalisation, and the normalisation of women becoming more educated 
and economically independent, have constructed new class identities for certain 
women and changed gender relationships in countries such as Singapore and 
Bangladesh, making them (re)negotiate respectable femininity and (re)draw class 
boundaries (for example, see Ang 2016; Hussein 2017). 
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My empirical concern lies in what it means to be respectable for Chinese women 
who consider themselves as coming from a middle-class background in their 
countries of origin. Chinese women in this study suffered from several paradoxes. 
Most of the young mainland Chinese women were the product of China’s 
compulsory birth control policy. In many cases, they represented the “only hope” for 
their families to raise successful off-spring (Fong 2011; Goh 2011; Tu 2016). Most of 
the Hong Kong informants were the first in their families to attend university 
overseas; they described a high level of parental expectation on them to find decent 
jobs, build a career, and excel in life. International education is indeed related to the 
making of middle-classness. Nonetheless, the value of an overseas degree in the 
Asian job market has decreased in the past decade (Hao and Welch 2012).  
Chinese temporary migrants who desire to stay on in the UK tend to narrate a 
migration story of opportunities and impediments. Although migrants generally 
perceive an extension of their stay in the UK, particularly through employment, as a 
form of success, transition into the British visa-sponsored labour market may not be 
an easy journey. For example, under the points-based immigration system of the 
UK, workers who have a skilled job offer and a certificate of sponsorship from a UK 
employer are issued a Tier 2 visa. In 2014, the numbers of Tier 2 work-related visas 
granted to citizens of China and Hong Kong were just over 5,000 and less than 
1,500 respectively (Home Office 2014). These figures seem low, especially 
considering that over 90,000 mainland Chinese students, and over 16,000 Hong 
Kong students studied in the UK in 2014 (UK Higher Education Statistics Agency 
2018). Young Chinese migrants are aware of the limitations of their various forms of 
capital, such as economic, cultural and social capital, in facilitating their 
transnational goals, and the risk of experiencing immediate downward mobility in the 
UK (for example, see Fong 2011; Ho 2011; 2013). At the same time, migrant 
women are aware that the parameters of ‘success’ constantly change, and are 
mindful of the need to fulfil other life goals such as marriage and family. 
I am particularly interested in the experiences of student-turned-spouse migrants 
and those who remained in or re-migrated to the UK through marriage immigration. 
These women, as I observe, considered prolonging their stays in the UK through 
marriage a choice, rather than a necessity. This “choice”, however, centres around 
the paradox of global hypergamy that puts pressure on women to “marry up”. I will 
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discuss how women who desire to become modern, progressive and respectable 
suffer from paradoxes regarding marriage immigration to the UK. Such marriage is 
considered, on the one hand, a “shortcut” to success that is below them as well-
educated middle-class individuals, and on the other hand, an immigration method 
that could be undertaken by lower-class migrants who have minimal resources, 
therefore hindering their respectable femininity – a key marker of middle-classness. 
Respectable femininity is taken as a relational concept in this thesis. Ang's (2016) 
research shows that through criticising Chinese lower-class migrant women’s 
materialism and lack of work or proper work, middle-class Chinese-Singaporean 
women are able to re-establish their own respectable femininity and reinforce the 
markers of what should not be and who we are not. Recognising that a woman’s 
respectability is tightly interwoven with her marriage, my aim is thus to understand 
what it means to be a respectable middle-class Chinese woman in the context of 
transnational marriage. By pointing out lower-class Chinese married migrants’ 
unrespectable femininity and instrumentality, Chinese migrant women in this study 
produce and maintain their identity and honour, both personally and collectively.  
Respectable femininity is also a contextual concept. Although both the British and 
Chinese discourses of middle-class femininity position women as overseers of order 
in the home (Ang 2016), the English and Chinese notions of respectable femininity 
are also different in many ways. For example, certain behaviours that carry symbolic 
meanings in the construction of middle-classness in a Chinese context may not 
have the same value in the British context. Since Chinese student-turned-spouse 
migrants in the UK are simultaneously embedded in aspects of both the British and 
the Chinese systems, they need to negotiate respectable femininity, gender 
expectations and desires in these two worlds. How do migration and transnational 
marriage shape Chinese women’s new understandings of respectability? As Skeggs 
(2002) argues, judgements of culture are put into effect to produce and maintain 
class divisions. For the Chinese migrant women in this study, the “judgements of 
culture(s)” refer to the middle-class culture in China and in the UK; their key task 
therefore is to legitimise status claims and decide which status claims are 
respectable in which context. Women’s status claims, I will argue, help them to 





DATA COLLECTION AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTEXT 
 
This thesis stems from a 13-month qualitative study exploring how young, well-
educated, middle-class Chinese temporary migrants seek to navigate their migration 
trajectories, experiences, and future plans in the UK. I used the snowball method of 
sampling to facilitate in-depth and semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
Chinese migrants. I conducted one or two follow-up interviews with four of my ten 
key informants. As for the rest of the key informants, I sent follow-up messages via 
WeChat or WhatsApp asking about their recent lives a few months after the 
interview and received their replies. Snowball method of sampling was used 
because I considered that some informants’ romantic relationships may entail a 
sense of instrumentality, which is potentially a sensitive and controversial issue. It is 
not easy to locate these migrants in any geographical space and get them to share 
their stories. I began by asking friends and colleagues, who themselves were 
temporary migrants to the UK, to recommend interview candidates. 
At the very beginning, an informant named Sarah suggested that I could approach 
more potential interviewees if I went with her to a Chinese church in Scotland. I 
gladly accepted her invitation, and for the first few months of my fieldwork, I 
attended Sunday service and Bible studies every Wednesday (and sometimes 
Thursday) to get to know other church-goers, who were often Chinese students or 
graduates. Gradually, I was able to interview Biyu, Victoria and Kelly in public places 
outside of the church, such as coffee shops and restaurants. 
Although I initially considered the church as a key field site that allowed me to do 
participant observation and interview informants, I soon encountered a problem that 
eventually led to me ceasing participation in the church. At that time, the number of 
informants that I met outside of the church had gradually increased. Through 
listening to my audio recordings and preparing transcripts after the interviews, and 
comparing my fieldnotes, I discovered that the narratives of informants whom I met 
inside and outside of the church were very different. While the former tended to 
stress the religious aspect of their lives and the role of God in guiding their decision 
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to migrate, their relationship, and their marriage in the UK, the latter told stories that 
had fewer religious elements. This is not to say that informants that I met outside of 
the church were all atheists. In fact, I interviewed eight self-identified Christian 
informants whom I met outside of the church. However, even when comparing 
Christians that I met through the church and outside of the church, the former group 
still seemed to engage in a stronger Christian narrative. There are two factors that 
may contribute to this pattern. First of all, I entered the church as a researcher who 
had grown up in a Christian family and self-identified as a half-believer. Although I 
considered the interviews part of the data collection process, my informants may 
have perceived them as opportunities not only to share their life stories, but also to 
inspire and guide me through their stories and relationships with God. Second, 
informants may have wished to maintain the self-presentation they performed at 
church, even during individual interviews. Since religion - or more specifically, 
Christianity - is not the main focus of my research, I decided to stop recruiting 
informants from the church in the middle phrase of my fieldwork. This allowed me to 
devote more time and effort to approaching informants through the snowball method 
of sampling, which proved rewarding. 
My goal was to understand migrants’ plans, hopes, and ways of staying on in the 
UK. Initially, the main criterion for inclusion in this study was very broadly-defined: 
informants should have the intention of prolonging their stay in the UK. Some 
informants admitted to me that they had no idea whether they could participate in 
my research because they were not sure about their future plans, and whether they 
wished to stay living in the UK permanently. This is partly because of the nature of 
my informants, who were young and highly mobile, and often saw their future as full 
of possibilities, excitement, and uncertainties. In the end, I had to rework the 
research design and limited my targeted informants to those who aimed to stay in 
the UK for longer than they had originally intended before coming to the UK. In this 
way, student migrants or working holiday makers who wished to return to China or 
Hong Kong immediately after the expiry of their visas were excluded. 
My informants’ referrals helped aid the process of earning the trust of other research 
candidates who agreed to participate. I was then introduced to more potential 
informants by those candidates who had become informants. However, the process 
of interviewing through snowball sampling was sometimes not as straightforward as 
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I had hoped. There are two reasons for this. The first is that targeted informants’ 
intention of staying on in the UK was subject to change. My informants selectively 
introduced me to their friends who they believed hoped to stay on in the UK. It was 
only after I started texting or talking to some of these potential informants, that I 
learned that they did not actually have plans to stay. In one case, my informant Jie 
Zhen admitted to me that she would not have been able to take part in this project if 
I had asked her to participate two months before our interview date because her 
plans had just changed.  
The second reason for the challenges in recruiting informants has to do with the 
heated British socio-political atmosphere concerning immigration throughout my 
fieldwork. In 2016, then Prime Minister David Cameron re-stated the Conservatives 
Party’s aim to reduce the net migration figure to below 100,000, which was a target 
first proposed in 2010. With mainstream newspapers continually publishing stories 
that cast migrants and refugees in a negative light (White 2015), and public debate 
around the issue of freedom of movement within the EU, the UK European Union 
membership referendum was held on 23rd June 2016, soon after I started the initial 
stage of fieldwork in April. When the referendum result was announced with a 
majority of British voters supporting leaving the EU (51.9%), it was clear to me and 
my informants that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, otherwise informally 
known as “Brexit”, would come in due course. Little did we know that three years 
after the referendum and at the moment of writing, there is still no clarity about how 
the UK plans to withdraw from the EU. Nevertheless, in these years of research and 
writing, I have noticed that the government has increasingly geared policies towards 
reducing the number of immigrants, including asylum seekers, refugees, non-
citizens and non-EEA migrants, in the UK. The scandal regarding the Windrush-era 
immigrants in 2018 is one example4 of the impact of the Home Office’s targets for 
removal of so-called illegal immigrants (Khomami and Naujokaityte 2018). The 
conflicts between states’ desire to ensure that the majority of migrants only stay in 
 
4 The Windrush scandal started when the Home Office removed a number of Windrush-era 
immigrants who had mostly been born as British subjects and moved to the UK from the 
West Indies half a century ago, and did not have documentation to prove their British 
nationality. The former Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, apologised for the “appalling” 
treatment of Windrush citizens (Gentleman 2018) and consequently had to resign. 
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the UK temporarily, and migrants’ own aspirations and agency to challenge the 
state-defined boundaries of temporariness and permanence, have always existed. 
However, the recent political environment concerning immigration and Brexit may 
have intensified such conflicts, and changed some migrants’ lives and future plans. 
This vastly shapes migrants’ experiences of belonging and intimacy in the UK. 
Although it is not my central aim to study the impacts of Brexit on Chinese 
temporary migrants in the UK, the political context that I have laid out here is 
important due to the fact that this research was conducted from March 2016 to April 
2017, a period which overlapped with the pre- (and post-) referendum. The political 
climate at the time was a source of concern for many of the Chinese migrants that I 
talked to. To a certain extent, the result of the EU referendum affected who I could 
approach for interviews, and how informants perceived their futures in the UK. Since 
my fieldwork relied mainly on snowball sampling, some potential informants declined 
my invitations for interviews. This included potential informants who no longer 
planned to stay on after the referendum. In general, those who agreed to be 
interviewed, at the time of interviews, remained hopeful to stay on despite the 




Interviews were conducted in London and Edinburgh, which were among the five 
most populous cities for Chinese migrants in the UK in 2015 (Unterreiner 2015). I 
arranged interviews in coffee shops, cafés and restaurants. In some cases where it 
was not practical to meet in person due to travel arrangements, interviews were 
conducted using the video chat functions of Skype, WhatsApp and WeChat. With 
informants’ permission, interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder. All 
interviews were conducted in Mandarin or Cantonese, and mostly lasted between 
one and three hours. The longest interview I conducted lasted 6 hours. Long, in-
depth and semi-structured interviews allowed me to engage in deep conversation 
with informants. Some informants admitted that they had willingly participated in the 
interview because our lives did not overlap. Many regarded the interview as a good 





I followed the guidelines and research ethics framework provided by the Research 
Ethics Committee of the School of Social and Political Science, the University of 
Edinburgh, and underwent the ethical review process before embarking for my 
fieldwork, which ensured that my research would not directly or indirectly harm 
either myself or the participants in our physical, psychological and social integrity. 
Particular attention was paid to the sensitivity of the topic of instrumental 
relationships being investigated. I was concerned about the possibility that some 
Chinese migrants may form a relationship for instrumental reasons in order to obtain 
residency rights in the UK. I considered that exposing these informants’ identities 
would put them at risk, especially if authorities such as Home Office were 
concerned, as this could invalidate their visa or residency status. Therefore, I 
provided informants with an option to not audio-record interviews. I assured them 
they needed not answer questions if they did not want to and that they had the right 
to terminate participation in the research at any time. I anonymised any such 
resultant data in this thesis (and in my publications) by using pseudonyms, altering 
details that might identify informants and creating compound/multiple characters. In 
spite of the fact that the vast majority of my informants did not claim that they looked 
for romantic relationships in the UK for visa purposes, my research topic could still 
be seen as sensitive; for this reason, I have been careful to ensure anonymity and 
present the overall picture of my research in a sensitive way.  
I obtained voluntary and informed consent before interviewing. I considered 
voluntary and informed consent process as dynamic, continuous and reflexive. 
Informed consent is obtained through a relationship of trust, which does not 
necessarily require a particular written or signed form. As written informed consent 
entails a sense of formality, I considered it is the quality of the consent, not its 
format, which is relevant. I believe a relationship of trust cannot be built through 
signing a written consent form; rather it is developed through building a personal 
connection with informants by engaging in informal chat and casual messages prior 
to interview, and my own presentation and delivery during interviews. 
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The audio recordings are now retained for my own future research. They are kept in 
my personal laptop with password to keep them safe, with USB backup stored in a 
safe place at home. I chose not to upload the recordings to an online platform such 




I followed an interview guide to organise each interview. Interviews usually began 
with a list of questions and topics that needed to be covered (Bernard 2011), such 
as informants’ motivations for migration, socio-economic background, employment 
status, social life, and romantic experiences and views (see appendix). I modified 
my follow-up questions based on each informant’s story. For example, I was told by 
my first few informants that they found it difficult to maintain a relationship when time 
on a visa was running out. I then added questions related to this issue. Time and 
temporality became an important theme to understand migrants’ intimate lives, life-
course decisions, and future planning while conducting data analysis. 
I translated and transcribed all interviews into English. Using a grounded theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss 2017), I gradually developed coding categories and 
major themes. This approach allowed research topics to develop “organically”; as I 
collected more data, I probed different points of interest at different stages of the 
research (Charmaz 2014). I allowed new themes to emerge and importantly, 
reconceptualised my study accordingly. I used NVivo 11, a software application for 
social research, to organise and analyse my data. Whilst analysing the data, I read 
the interview transcripts multiple times and coded a series of strong themes 
pertaining to “visa-time restriction”, “relationship difficulties”, “employment 
difficulties” and “marriage pressure”, which are discussed in this thesis. In the 
coding process, I developed new concepts and revisited my transcripts from time to 
time to combine and divide certain codes. In this ongoing process of 






I interviewed a total of 67 Chinese temporary migrants, ranging from 22 to 36 years 
of age, including 51 female informants and 16 male informants. In this thesis, due to 
the predominant focus on female informants, male informants’ data is mainly used 
as providing comparison and showing contrasting gendered experiences. Through 
snowball sampling, I was able to interview various types of visa holders and their 
dependants, including: Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur); Tier 1 (Entrepreneur); Tier 2 
(General); Tier 2 (Intra-company transfer); Tier 4 (student); Tier 5 (Youth Mobility 
Scheme); family permit (or spouse visa); and EEA family permit.  
At present, it is only through living in the UK for a certain period of time, usually 
either on the 5-year or 10-year path, that a temporary migrant is eligible to apply for 
indefinite leave to remain – permanent residency status akin to probationary 
citizenship. For those who obtain permanent residency in the UK, it will take another 
year to become eligible to apply for British citizenship. Figure 4 below shows the 
typical immigration paths that Chinese temporary migrants in this study took, which 
are available at the time of writing (November 2019). Most entered the UK as a 
student or working holiday maker, then went through a range of immigration 
processes to prolong their stays in the UK. 
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Figure 4 Typical immigration paths of Chinese temporary migrants 
 
The above figure outlines the two immigration paths of Chinese temporary migrants, 
who typically entered the UK as either an international student or a working holiday 
maker. If they wish to continue to stay in the UK after their initial visa expires, they 
have to first consider which visas they are able to switch onto, and the implication of 
their choices. Apart from becoming a Tier 2 skilled worker or a Tier 1 entrepreneur 
themselves, Chinese temporary migrants can also stay on in the UK through 
marriage, i.e. by obtaining a dependent visa or a family visa. While a dependent visa 
is given to the spouse or partner of an eligible British temporary visa holder, such as 
a Tier 2 skilled worker or a Tier 1 entrepreneur, a family visa is granted to the 
spouse of partner of an eligible British citizen/permanent resident/EEA national. 
Regardless of which visa(s) a Chinese temporary migrant switches onto during 
his/her 5-year or 10-year time in the UK, he/she must fulfil the requirements of either 
the 5-year or 10-year immigration path in order to obtain Indefinite Leave to Remain. 
Circular migration was common among my informants. More than four fifths (or 
80%) of the 67 informants were not first-time visa holders in the UK. The majority 
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had switched visa at least once since they first arrived the UK. Table 1 below shows 
the number of times my informants switched visas. 
 
Table 1 The number of times informants switched visas 
Number of times visa switched   Number of Informants 






CHARACTERISTICS OF FEMALE INFORMANTS 
 
All of my 51 female informants were heterosexual, and nearly half (21 out of 51) 
were married. The views of others, including those currently dating or involved in 
long-term relationships, and those not in relationships, on topics such as romance 
and marriage, were also considered. Twenty informants were in a relationship or 
marriage with a British permanent resident or citizen; two had an EU partner; and 15 
had a partner who was a UK temporary visa holder.  
The informants were well-educated; all but one held at least an undergraduate 
degree, with the majority having obtained a master’s degree. One-third of the 
women were not in employment or held no income at the time of interview. I classed 
another one-third of the women as low-income, earning a net monthly salary of less 
than £1,000. These informants relied heavily on the resources provided by their 
families in China or Hong Kong and/or their partners in the UK in order to support 
their overseas living expenses. Only around one-fifth of my informants earned an 
income that they felt allowed them to live comfortably. These informants were from 
professions such as accounting, banking, and academia. More details on the female 
informant characteristics are listed in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Characteristics of female informants (N=51) 
Characteristics n 
Relationship status   
Married 21 
In a relationship 11 
Engaged  3 
Divorced 2 
Single 14 
Education   
Higher diploma 1 
Bachelor's degree 14 
Master's degree 34 
Doctoral degree 2 
Income   
No income (not employed)5 17 
Net monthly salary of less than £1,000 16 
Net monthly salary of between £1,000 – £1,999 7 
Net monthly salary of between £2,000 – £2,999 9 
Net monthly salary of over £3,000 2 
 
Figure 5 below shows the visas held at the time of the research interview by the 42 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong informants who first came to the UK as students. 
 
5 This includes students who were being supported by their parents. 
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Apart from a large group who were furthering their studies on student visas (N=16), 
most informants prolonged their stays in the UK by switching to a dependant visa or 
an EU family permit (N=14). This method of staying on was much more prevalent 
than using the visa-sponsored employment route (N=6). 
The orange colour in the table refers to the family/dependent path undertaken by 
informants. The blue colour refers to the study route. The red colour means the visa-
sponsored employment path. 
Figure 5 The visas that my female informants held	
 
Note: In figure 5, “original Tier 4 (student) visa holders” refers to those who held 
their first Tier 4 visa. Students who held a new Tier 4 visa were those who chose to 
continue studying in the UK after receiving an initial Tier 4 visa and completing a 
level of education qualification. According to Home Office, students who enrol in a 
new programme after finishing their course must obtain a new Tier 4 visa sponsored 
by a UK university.  
CHARACTERISTICS OF MALE INFORMANTS 
 
The majority of the 16 male informants were heterosexual; two self-identified as 
bisexual, and one was homosexual. At the time of interview, five were married; five 
were single; and six were in a relationship. Just like the women, the men in this 
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study were well-educated; all but one held at least an undergraduate-level 
education, with the majority having obtained at least a master’s degree. Four of the 
men had obtained a doctoral degree. One-third (6) of the men were not in 
employment or held no income at the time of interview. I also classed four men as 
low-income, earning a net monthly salary of less than £1,000. Three informants 
earned a net monthly salary of between £1,000 and £1,999; one informant earned 
between £2,000 and £2,999 a month, and two earned over £3,000. Most of these 
informants had recently graduated and were doing temporary or part-time work in 
the UK. Figure 6 shows the visas held at time of interview by the 15 male informants 
who first came to the UK as students. Most of the men prolonged their stays in the 
UK through furthering their studies. Apart from one informant who obtained 
permanent residency through employment, only two men stayed on through 
becoming an entrepreneur or a skilled worker. In general, male informants tended 
not to remain in the UK through marriage or partnership, and expressed their wish 
not to do so. Although in reality, only a handful of men in my sample were able to 
switch onto a migration path that would lead to permanent residence, most student 
migrants who chose to further their study aspired to become a skilled migrant and 
believed that acquiring a higher level of education would help them to achieve that 
goal one day. 






My positionality and experiences shape how I approached this research and my 
informants. As a temporary migrant who first came to the UK as a working holiday 
maker with a Tier 5 (YMS) visa, I failed to secure visa-sponsored employment 
despite my master’s degree in Social Science, obtained in Hong Kong. When the 
expiry date of my visa was approaching, I faced the dilemma of either returning to 
Hong Kong, or getting married in my mid-twenties in order to stay living in the 
country with my partner; a step which at the time we were reluctant to take. In the 
end, I was fortunate enough to receive financial support from the joint funds of two 
families to further my study, which also allowed me to stay living in the UK with my 
partner without marrying.  
My gendered and classed positionalities, personal experiences and struggles 
facilitated my connection with the women in this study, and gave me insights that 
may not be available to others. Simultaneously, I am aware of the danger of having 
my “objectivity” jeopardised due to some of the similarities between myself, and my 
research subjects’, experiences. Here, I follow Mason's (2002) reflexive approach, 
which sees a researcher’s biography and personal characteristics as inseparable 
from the research context, data collection, and interpretation processes (see also 
Maynard and Purvis 1994; Stanley and Wise 1993). Furthermore, to minimise the 
impact of my “authority” as a researcher and make my informants feel as 
comfortable as possible during interviews, I gave them the opportunity to choose 
both the interview location and the language spoken during the interview. 
Finally, this research is not without limitations. As previously mentioned, my data on 
men and women shows that migration motivations, opportunities, and constraints 
are highly gendered. In this thesis, I mainly focus on Chinese migrant women’s 
perspectives, which may make discussions on men less substantial. Additionally, 
although romance and marriage are key themes in this research, I did not interview 
my female informants’ partners in the UK. As a result, I had no direct means with 
which to either understand their perspectives or validate/challenge my informants’ 
narratives. Nonetheless, these migrant women’s stories are relevant to the purpose 
of this thesis, which is to study the agency, opportunities, and constraints 
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experienced by temporary migrants in achieving their life goals, and the impacts of 
time, temporality, and states’ practices on migrants’ lives and trajectories, in 
particular their life-course decisions and the timing of their life-course events.  
Due to the nature of qualitative research, it is not possible to generalise the findings 
to the population of Chinese temporary migrants in the UK as a whole. However, 
this research gives valuable insights into the life struggles, and the dynamics of 
relationships and marriage negotiations of not only Chinese migrants but migrants in 
general. This study offers an initial understanding and sound base for further 
research in migration studies, including quantitative research to test the findings 
suggested. 
 
LIST OF KEY INDIVIDUALS 
 
Below is a list of key individuals who appear in this thesis. The individuals on this list 
are essential not only because they were key informants, with whom I either 
conducted one to two follow-up interviews or kept in touch on social media even 
after the initial interview, but also because in many ways their experiences shaped 
the direction of this research. Quotes from other individuals, who were less 
prominent in the research and are therefore not included on the list, will also be 
presented in various chapters, when a particular argument or point is being made. It 
is important to note that in this thesis, I describe my informants’ partners as ‘British’ 
or ‘English’ or ‘Scottish’ based on how migrants described them, their place of 
residence or accent. 
WOMEN 
Vivian  
As a Hong Kong Chinese woman, Vivian came to the UK as a Tier 5 (Youth Mobility 
Scheme) visa holder in 2015, when she was in her late twenties. Approaching the 
age of 30, she felt that she wanted to secure a life-long partner and escape from the 
social stigma of her singlehood in the UK. She met John, a 35-year-old British 
citizen from Hong Kong, one year after she moved to the UK. 
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Lin Lin 
Lin Lin was a young mainland Chinese woman in her mid-twenties who studied for 
two master’s degrees in the UK. She held a Tier-4 student dependant visa when we 




At the age of 25, Qing had already been married to a British citizen of Hong Kong 
origin for two years. Qing was a mainland Chinese who first came to the UK for 
studying in 2009. After marrying, she moved into her husband’s premarital home 
bought by her husband’s parents, but she did not feel entitled to the home that she 
lived in because her name was not on the deed and her father-in-law often brought 
relatives and friends to stay in their house as if he saw himself as the “true owner” of 
the place (see chapter 6 for detail). 
Cher 
Cher was a 27-year-old Hong Kong Chinese migrant who got married with a Tier 2 
work visa holder of East Asian origin in 2016. This marriage changed her original 
plan to return to Hong Kong for settlement. Just as Cher thought that she and her 
husband would now live in the UK for a long time and eventually obtain permanent 
residency, her husband became unsure about living in the UK and wanted to return 
to his country of origin. 
Ying 
Ying was a 27-year-old PhD student from mainland China who got married to her 
Chinese partner of three years in order to bring him with her to the UK. Their 
marriage broke down three months after they left China. Ying was in a new 
relationship when I last spoke to her. 
Belle 
Belle was a 24-year-old undergraduate student from Hong Kong who was married to 
Chris, an English PhD student in the UK. The couple had always lived apart, even 
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after their marriage, because Chris was away for an internship in an EU country. 
Belle considered Chris would be the breadwinner for their family in the future.  
Karmen 
Karmen was a former nurse in her early thirties from Hong Kong. She rated job and 
romance as the top two reasons for moving to the UK. Karmen had dated a few 
Hong Kong men before but was not in a long-term relationship. She hoped to find a 




Ronald was a 24-year-old Hong Kong student migrant, who after completing his first 
degree, decided to stay on through studying a second degree in nursing. Identified 
himself as a bisexual, Ronald had thought about obtaining British permanent 
residency through his relationship with an EU national, but in the end, he chose to 
pursue a career path that would lead to permanent settlement. 
Yi Fung 
Having previously studied in the UK, at the age of 28, Yi Fung returned to the UK 
from mainland China with his wife, who received a postgraduate degree offer. As 
the couple’s time in the UK was running out, Yi Fung was very frustrated and 
stressed, especially because his wife was diagnosed with moderate depression and 
was unable to finish her study in time. 
Leon 
Leon, a 29-year-old Hong Kong Chinese migrant became a PhD graduate in 
Materials Science in 2016. At the time of the interview, he was searching for visa-
sponsored jobs in the UK while at the same time having a temporary job at a 
community centre. Six months later, Leon told me that he was still in the same job 
and was no longer limiting himself to job opportunities in the UK. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter 1 On the Move for Hope, Love and Success” explores Chinese 
migrants’ socio-economic, political and romantic motivations for moving to the UK 
temporarily, and their aspirations to move over their life-courses through migration. 
It discusses how temporary migration to the UK is a decision shaped by parental 
influence, and is related to young Chinese migrants’ class trajectories.  
Chapter 2 Navigating Class: The Pig’s Liver and the Lobster argues that class 
as a concept in migration studies has not been fully examined. Regarding 
themselves as coming from a middle-class background in China or Hong Kong, 
Chinese temporary migrants in the UK hope to accumulate different types of capital 
and be recognised as middle class in the new cultural and socio-economic 
environment. The chapter begins by exploring the social meanings of being middle 
class in three geographical contexts, i.e. mainland China, Hong Kong and the UK. It 
shows how migration forces migrants to reflect on their class identity and challenges 
their old understandings about class. This chapter also argues that temporary 
migrants’ socio-economic mobility and class-related privileges are often temporarily 
suspended due to their lack of permanent residency status and their differential 
inclusion in the British labour market. It examines how the temporalities of migration 
and the temporality of class work together to shape migrants’ class experiences. 
Chapter 3 Obstacles to Capital Accumulation and Conversion: Differential 
Inclusion in the Labour Market looks at the various forms of capital that migrants 
obtain, such as economic, cultural and social capital, and the usefulness and 
limitations of these forms of capital in facilitating migrants to achieve their 
transnational goals, including having better life chances and longer duration of 
residence in the UK. This chapter contributes to class and capital discussion by 
examining the processes of capital conversion and proposing three subtypes of 
capital, i.e. temporal capital, family capital and intimate relationship capital, that I 
argue are particularly important for temporary migrants who have yet to settle in the 
UK successfully. 
Chapter 4 Navigating Romance, Relationships and Marriage looks at how 
Chinese temporary migrants consider romance an important experience in their 
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migration trajectories, and how they seek romantic opportunities through the use of 
social media and social networks. It demonstrates how discourses of love and 
sexual capital, such as virginity, are used by migrants to negotiate power in their 
relationships. 
Chapter 5 “The Clock is Ticking”: Time and Temporalities of Transnational 
Marriages and Migrant Lives scrutinises the ways in which migrant women 
navigate their intimate lives under the constraints of existing migration 
infrastructures. It argues that visa-time constraints, the social expectation of 
marrying, and the gendering of age shape women’s timing and decisions related to 
marriage and transnational family formation. It explores how migrant women’s state 
of temporariness forces marriage negotiations with their partner in the UK to be 
conducted under a time-constrained situation. Moreover, it conceptualises migrant 
women’s marriages which are based on young relationships formed before or soon 
after the expiration of visas as “lightning marriages”. The chapter demonstrates how 
these marriages are subjected to socio-cultural and state-subscribed stereotypes 
and suspicions, and how migrant women counteract these by making use of the 
discourse of love to justify their marriage choices. 
Chapter 6 Becoming Respectable concerns how transnational marriages may 
challenge the normal principle of marriage formation in Chinese societies - a 
compatible family or class background between a bride and a groom - and how 
migrants negotiate their marriage choices. It examines Chinese migrant women’s 
marriages to two types of men: (1) a British partner with a Chinese background (for 
example, a British-born Chinese, or a British citizen from China or Hong Kong); and 
(2) a non-Chinese partner in the UK. It argues that middle-class Chinese migrant 
women suffer from multiple paradoxes, and are torn between contradictory 
aspirations to become an independent successful woman, and to be seen as a 
woman who has accomplished marital mobility. Through the notions of choice and 
sacrifice, the chapter shows how women negotiate power within their transnational 
relationship or marriage by making it look “equal”.  
The Conclusion brings together the themes of the thesis through a brief review of 
some of the main individuals’ journeys after staying in the UK for a period of time. 
The circumstances of young middle-class Chinese migrants in the UK are vastly 
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different from the Chinese pioneers, early settlers and the Hong Kong elites who 
emigrated to western countries in the 1990s in the pursuit of flexible citizenship 
(Ong 1999). Since migrants’ stories in this thesis reveal how temporary migration to 
the West, like the UK, have become an increasingly important and common 
resource for middle-class Chinese, not only for the children who go abroad, but also 
for their family who support them, this research contributes to studies of social 
changes in China today, and to Chinese transnational migration literature in general. 
This thesis addresses the need to link temporality to class analysis in migration 
studies. Through studying temporary migrants’ aspirations and experiences in 
romance, relationships and marriage, this thesis contributes to discussions of the 
temporariness of contemporary migration, migrant agency, class and respectability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ON THE MOVE FOR HOPE, LOVE AND SUCCESS 
 
It was a sunny day in the autumn of 2016 when I first met Yi Fung, a 28-year-old 
migrant from mainland China, at the café of my local library. This interview location 
was suggested by Yi Fung, a master’s degree holder, who told me that he came to 
the library every Wednesday evening for free English lessons. I was surprised 
because I imagined the English training provided at public library would be beneath 
the language skill level that Yi Fung had already acquired. “These lessons don’t 
really have a standard format, but they give us a chance to speak English. I am the 
only Chinese person in the group…it is good, at least now I have an excuse to leave 
the house,” he said. Yi Fung came to the UK in 2011 to pursue a master’s degree. 
He then met his wife who was also a postgraduate student from China studying at 
the same university. After graduating in 2013, they both returned to China and got 
married, hoping to convert their overseas credentials into earning capital and 
becoming hai gui – literally, “sea turtles” – a term that is used to refer to overseas 
returnees. Recently, when the term hai gui is used in a context of comparison with 
another term hai dai , directly translated as “seaweed”, the former has a connotation 
of success, while the latter is associated with failure (see Hu and Cairns 2017; Hao 
and Welsh 2014). For three years, Yi Fung worked as a civil servant, whilst his wife 
had three different jobs in the media industry in Shanghai. Unsatisfied with her 
career progress, Yi Fung’s wife considered herself a hai dai, which refers to 
returnees who fail to achieve career success, hoped to return to the UK to study for 
a research master’s degree and ultimately pursue a PhD later. At the time, Yi Fung 
was also unhappy with his job, and considered it “dull” with a “lack of opportunity for 
promotion”. He then decided to follow his wife and return to the UK to seek job 
opportunities.  
Yi Fung and his wife are not alone; their circulatory migration experience was 
shared by other migrants in this study. The Chinese state-sponsored discourse of 
transnational migration is highly success-oriented (Nyíri 2002), and centres on 
migrants’ economic and social advancement. This chapter explores young Chinese 
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migrants’ socio-economic, political, and romantic motivations for moving to the UK 
temporarily. This chapter also discusses the significant role of migrants’ parents in 
shaping their migration decision and migration trajectories. 
Both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong migrants in this study have enjoyed an 
abundance of resources from a young age; they shoulder the hope of their parents 
to excel in life, and to “realise the unfilled dreams of their parents” (Yan 2006, 256). 
Mainland Chinese informants in this study were born under the “one-child” policy 
and to middle-class parents who benefited from the economic reforms that began in 
the 1970s. They were able to enjoy resources, material commodities and overseas 
educational opportunities that were inaccessible to their parents’ generation (see 
also Fong 2011), which, in the words of one of my informants, “experienced 
bitterness when they were young”.  
Following a different path of socio-economic development, Hong Kong had already 
adopted a capitalist market economy when it was governed by the British state. 
Hong Kong informants in this study were born between the1980s and early 1990s, 
and were children of the first generation of Hong Kong’s middle class. In spite of 
lacking university education, their parents mostly benefited from the emergence of 
Hong Kong as a regional financial centre and an increase in new employment 
positions, which boosted upward social mobility since the mid-1980s (Lui 2014a). A 
smaller nuclear family structure has also been observed in Hong Kong since the 
1980s, whereby Hong Kong families prioritise quality (with heavy emphasis on 
children’s education) over quantity of children (Chow and Lum 2008; Koo and Wong 
2009).  
MIGRATION DECISIONS AND PARENTAL INFLUENCE  
 
When asked about their decision to move to the UK, many expressed that their 
parents played an important role in shaping how, when, and where they should go 
for study or a working holiday. This research finding is consistent with other studies 
on Chinese student migrants, which suggest the vital role of Chinese parents in 
influencing their children’s migration decision (Qi 2017; Li et al. 2019). For example, 
although Alice, who was 27 years old at the time of interview, did not initially want to 
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study for a PhD because of the many years of commitment it required, she was 
persuaded by her father in the end. In another example, Cher, a Hong Kong 
informant in her late twenties, came to the UK at the age of 14 at her father’s 
request. She said, 
I didn’t want to come the UK at first. It was my father’s idea. He initially 
wanted to send my elder brother to the UK instead of me. My elder 
brother’s academic results were always better than mine, but he was kind 
of lazy and didn’t like studying. My father wanted to have at least one child 
graduate from a foreign university. At that time, my brother had a girlfriend 
in Hong Kong, so he really didn’t want to go. As a result, I was the 
substitute in this situation…When I left for the UK in 2005, my father did not 
want me to study in a mixed-gender school. He chose a boarding school for 
girls only that is located in a rural area in North Wales as he thought I would 
have less temptation and wouldn’t mess around with boys. He was right. 
There was nothing at all, just sheep. Even when you go to the town, the 
town is full of retired people. There was nothing to do. My dad didn’t need 
to worry that I would become a bad girl. 
 
Even at a young age, Cher knew that her father’s plan for her was highly gendered. 
Patriarchal values and norms in Hong Kong place women’s sexuality under greater 
social scrutiny than men’s. While pre-martial sexual behaviour is generally 
acceptable for young men, it is often restricted and repressed for women (Yu 2013). 
Since, under the patriarchal view, the young female body is considered to be 
vulnerable, it should be protected and safeguarded by male family members, usually 
the father. From Cher’s perspective, her migration trajectory began with a wish to 
satisfy her father’s aspiration to send at least one child abroad whilst ensuring his 
daughter stayed away from romance and sex when she was on her own in the UK. 
In a separate example, Ling Ling also studied for a master’s degree in education in 
the UK, following her father’s advice. She said, 
My dad really wanted me to study education. He had a plan for me. He 
always thinks girls don’t need to study for a degree in business. He thinks 
businesswomen have a very tough life. But teaching is good. In his plan, I 
would return to China to become a lecturer in a university. It doesn’t matter 
to him whether it would be a good university or not because either way I 
would have two long holidays each year – summer holiday and winter 
holiday. In my father’s eyes, this means a comfortable life. Of course, I 
wouldn’t earn a lot, but my social status would be high. 
 
Ling Ling did not challenge her father’s suggestion; rather she appreciated it and 
regarded it as an expression of her parents’ wish to pave the way for a smooth and 
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successful life trajectory for her. As Tu (2018) argues, Chinese middle-class parents 
play a great role in making decisions around educational trajectories. In another 
example, Weiyi, a 21-year-old mainland Chinese migrant who was also a Canadian 
citizen, was encouraged by her parents to move to the UK. She explained to me that 
her parents’ “businessmen attitude” was the main reason that she was sent to the 
UK to live on her own for four years. Weiyi’s parents saw life experience outside of 
Canada as a capital that their daughter should accumulate when she was young, 
which would be beneficial for her when she returned to Canada or China to work in 
the future. For many young migrants, like Cher, Ling Ling and Weiyi, their parents 
did not only decide their migration destination, but also the university degree that 
they should pursue, and the possible career paths after acquiring academic 
credentials. Many parents also considered their children’s migration destination 
based on their overseas family network. For instance, Winnie, a Hong Kong working 
holiday maker in her early twenties, was sent to the UK by her mother and elder 
sister, who even filled in the application form for her. She said, “My family 
considered a lot for me. My mum asked my sister’s in-laws to let me stay in their 
house in London, so I could settle here easily. They even found me a job at a 
Chinese restaurant through our relatives before I even arrived.”  
In Hong Kong, due to economic restructuring, the perceived value of a local 
university degree has decreased since the 1990s, but the competition to get into the 
top universities is still intense. Waters (2006, 182) argues that Hong Kong middle-
class families are able to escape from state education through emigration, which 
allows them to access greater educational opportunities “whilst at the same time 
changing the mechanisms of exclusion and selection within particular desirable 
occupations in favour of ‘overseas’ academic credentials” (see also Balaz and 
Williams 2004). 
For middle-class students who anticipate the prospect of failure in the highly 
competitive local school system, overseas education provides an escape route to 
avoid taking the most crucial public examinations6. The most significant education 
 
6 Before 2011, the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE) and the Hong 
Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE) were standardised examinations for Hong 
Kong students. After five years of secondary education, most local students were required to 
take the HKCEE. After sitting the HKCEE and having their examination results announced, 
candidates could apply for a place in sixth form in local schools. Failure in this exam was 
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reform in recent history in Hong Kong was the cancellation of the Hong Kong 
Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE) and Hong Kong Advanced Level 
Examination (HKALE) after a 3-year transitional period, and the introduction of Hong 
Kong Diploma of Secondary Education (HKDSE) to replace the old systems in 2012. 
My informants who were affected by the new examination system and the 
transitional phrase considered themselves as “guinea pigs” and preferred to leave 
Hong Kong and study abroad. There were also some informants, such as Leon and 
Ronald, who only decided to leave Hong Kong after knowing that their examination 
results were not good enough to secure admission to any local universities. 
Regardless of which examination system that my Hong Kong informants were 
subjected to, they perceived that the move to the UK would guarantee academic 
success. After accepting that his son was not willing to leave Hong Kong, Cher’s 
father changed his mind and considered it would be good for Cher to avoid the 
intense local academic competition by studying in the UK. She said, 
My dad always worried that I wouldn’t be able to get into any university in 
Hong Kong because I was too lazy. He always thought that I was not as 
bright as my elder brother so it would be kind of risky to let me even try to 
take the public exam. 
 
Another common phenomenon that I observed among some of my Hong Kong 
informants with siblings is that they were “force[d] to relocate as a consequence of a 
sibling’s anticipated failure” in the competitive school system in Hong Kong (Waters 
2006, 184). For instance, Jessica arrived in the UK when she was 16 years old. She 
said, 
In fact, my younger sister came to UK first. She was among the first group 
of students who had to take the HKDSE. She didn’t want to take the exam 
and wanted to come to the UK to study A-levels, so I followed my sister to 
come to the UK to take care of her. 
 
As for the mainland Chinese informants, they shared similar experiences with their 
Hong Kong counterparts. Many migrated in order to prevent anticipated failure in the 
 
widely assumed to be the end of a student’s academic career. Those who could remain in 
the school system were qualified to take the HKALE. Based on the results of the HKCEE 
and the HKALE, students could apply for admission into tertiary programmes at universities 
in Hong Kong. In 2012, the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education (HKDSE) replaced 
the two standardised exams and became the only public exam for secondary school 
students. 
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National Higher Education Entrance Examination, commonly known as Gaokao, 
which is usually taken by students in their last year of senior high school to compete 
for a space in university. Gaokao has been the dominant means of admitting 
students in Chinese Higher Education Institutions since 1977 (Gu and Magaziner 
2016). It is a highly competitive national examination that is tied to the hukou 
system. Although most students aspire to get into prestigious universities in Beijing 
and Shanghai, such as Peking University and Tsinghua University, they are also 
aware that elite universities allocate more places for local hukou holders in, for 
example, Beijing and Shanghai. This means that students whose hukou is based in 
cities or provinces outside of Beijing and Shanghai would have to score extremely 
high marks to get admitted. It is well-known that Chinese students are often under 
tremendous pressure during the years that they spend preparing for the exam. 
Thus, overseas education is seen as an easy alternative for middle-class families to 
achieve the reproduction of social advantage. 
While most informants came to the UK directly from either mainland China or Hong 
Kong, and their educational trajectories involved only one destination country, a 
small number of informants’ journeys involved more than one country and started at 
a younger age. For example, Li Ming and Qiana both studied in Singapore before 
coming to the UK. Li Ming moved to Singapore at the age of 15 and completed her 
high school there. Later on, she chose to study in the UK for her first degree 
because both Singapore and the UK adopted the British education system, which 
according to her, meant an easy transition. Qiana finished both her secondary and 
tertiary education in Singapore and received a small scholarship from the British 
Council to undertake a postgraduate degree in the UK. 
For some migrants, their move to the UK came with a secret agenda to escape from 
parental care and control. For instance, Mi, a 26-year-old student-turned-spouse 
migrant initially chose to study in the UK because of a lack of family connections 
here. She said, “my relatives said to me if I study in Australia or USA, they would 
have someone to look after me. But I didn’t want to live under the eyes of my 
relatives, so I came to the UK.” In addition, as an exceptional case, Ronald claimed 
that he cunningly planned for his escape from Hong Kong and parental control by 
purposely performing badly in academic exams. He said,  
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I was very calculative. When I realised that my parents could actually afford 
sending me abroad, I used all the methods that I could think of to make 
sure I could not continue my study in Hong Kong. I knew that I had the 
ability to get into at least one university programme in Hong Kong, but I was 
just desperate to leave. 
CHINESE MIGRANTS’ TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 
 
Many informants expected material and cultural returns from “world-class” education 
including securing jobs (Ramirez 2013), building social networks (Collins 2013; 
Brooks, Fuller, and Waters 2012), and having better marriage choices in the future. 
International education is also perceived to help students to gain new perspectives 
and lived cultural experiences (Marginson 2014; Tran 2015), and to become 
cosmopolitan and global subjects (Kim 2011). The student migrants that I 
interviewed often regarded the US and the UK as the best destinations for overseas 
studies. Many said they had compared the UK and the US in terms of education 
systems and admission requirements. For instance, prospective PhD students and 
postgraduates normally considered it would take a shorter time to complete a PhD 
in the UK (usually within four years), than in the US (usually within four to eight 
years). At the same time, informants perceived the required English language exam, 
TOEFL7, for admissions in US universities as more difficult than the corresponding 
IELTS8 exam in the UK. For example, although Fangfei, a 27-year-old PhD student, 
initially applied to universities in both the UK and the US, she later withdrew all the 
applications to universities in the US because she considered it would be too difficult 
to attain good scores in the TOEFL exam. 
Moreover, migrants’ imaginaries also influence their choice of destination. Scholars 
have discussed the role of the imagination in motivating youth mobility (see Collins 
2013; Nonini 1997; Raghuram 2013). Kim (2011) notes that media consumption of 
the symbolic west, particularly of the US, which is a major culture exporter that 
defines cultural tastes and values, shapes the migration aspirations of Asian 
 
7 TOEFL stands for Test of English as a Foreign Language. It is a standardised test that is 
commonly used to measure the English language levels of non-native speakers who wish to 
enrol in universities in the US. 
8 IELTS is a short form of the International English Language Testing System. It tests the 
English language proficiency of non-native English language speakers and is widely 
recognised by universities in the UK. 
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women. However, the US was also stereotypically perceived to be more 
“dangerous” and “chaotic” by my informants, who saw “Americans” as more 
“sexually open” and “violent”, as compared to “British people”. These informants 
fantasised about living in the UK as a way to “learn proper English”. Those who lived 
in London also imagined it as a cosmopolitan city “full of history, art, culture and 
class”. For example, Ling Ling, a 22-year-old student-turned-spouse migrant said, 
When I was young, I always thought London was my favourite city, which 
has a sense of history and class. I wouldn’t study in the US because I think 
gun violence is a huge issue there. I also think the culture and atmosphere 
in the US is too open. It doesn’t feel safe. My parents said they would worry 
about me if I were to study in the US. They also thought the UK is better for 
its tradition in education. 
 
Working holiday makers from Hong Kong aged between 18 and 30 years old could 
choose from a variety of countries to work and live in for a certain period of time, 
due to the bilateral Working Holiday Scheme established between the government 
of Hong Kong and countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, Germany, 
Canada, France, and the UK. At the time of writing, PRC citizens meeting the age 
and financial requirements are eligible to do a working holiday in Australia and New 
Zealand, but not the UK. Australia is one of the most popular destinations for Hong 
Kong working holiday makers due to its long partnership with Hong Kong since 
2001. In the year 2015-2016, a total of 6,514 Working Holiday visa applications 
were received from Hong Kong nationals by the Australian government, which 
represented the 11th most populous sending country (Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection, Australian Government 2017). However, many of the Hong 
Kong informants that I spoke to imagined a working holiday in Australia as “fruit-
picking”, “boring”, “living in rural farmland” and “lacking white-collar job 
opportunities”. Owen chose to do a working holiday in the UK instead of Australia in 
his early twenties. He said,  
Although a lot of Hong Kong people go to Australia for a working holiday, I 
didn’t consider going there myself. I don’t really like the country. My 
impression of Australia is just sunshine, beach, and farm work. I am not 
very interested in any of these. I think London and Sydney are very 




In a separate example, Vivian also preferred to do a working holiday in the UK, but 
her reason was more related to her gender imagination of a specific kind of working 
holiday in Australia. She said, 
I have read in the newspaper that many Taiwanese working holiday makers 
who do fruit-picking jobs in Australia are exploited. They are paid less than 
minimum wage. Also, if you are a young lady and work in a farm there, it is 
not safe. I have heard that some young women got sexually assaulted by 
their boss. And I don’t really like picking fruit or doing any farm work as I will 
get freckles! That’s why I chose to come to the UK! 
 
Vivian’s imagination of a working holiday in Australia was largely shaped by 
newspapers and social media, such as Facebook, personal blogs and online 
forums, which according to her, often give advice to young female travellers, who 
are perceived as exposed to greater sexual dangers, about how they should protect 
themselves. When I did a quick search on Google by typing “women taking working 
holiday in Australia” in Chinese, I easily found newspaper articles and online forums 
that have titles such as “Exploiting working holiday makers, women use sex in 
exchange for visa”(Apple Daily 2015), or “Girls, be aware! Taiwanese girls’ horrible 
working holiday experiences in Australia” (Kalika 2013). These online resources 
describe how young women are threatened to have their salary payments delayed if 
they refuse to have sex with farm owners. According to Vivian, these kinds of stories 
were widely known among Hong Kong working holiday makers. 
POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR MIGRATION  
  
As a British colony that had previously been a part of successive Chinese empires, 
Hong Kong’s cultural identification with China is rooted in ethnic-based national 
identification, but at the same time, Hong Kong’s distinctive historical path has also 
shaped the emergence of a local Hong Kong identity since the 1970s through public 
activism (Mathews, Ma, and Lui 2008; Veg 2017; Ho, Jackson, and Kong 2017). 
Hong Kong became a colony of the British Empire after the Qing dynasty ceded 
Hong Kong island at the end of the First Opium War in 1842. Later on, the Qing 
dynasty further ceded the Kowloon Peninsula in 1860 and leased New Territories to 
the British in 1898 for 99 years. As the end of the lease approached, diplomatic 
negotiations between China and the United Kingdom resulted in Sino-British Joint 
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Declaration in 1984, in which the UK agreed to handover Hong Kong in 1997, and 
China would ensure Hong Kong’s economic and political systems unchanged for 50 
years. In the face of the uncertainty after the handover however, some middle-class 
Hong Kong people felt compelled to emigrate because they feared that their 
freedom, their rights, and the rule of law that they had enjoyed would be threatened, 
and they may no longer be able to maintain the cosmopolitan ways of life that were 
substantially different from those of “communist” China (Mathews, Ma and Lui 
2008).  
Scholars have pointed out that Hong Kong has seen a rise or a consolidation of 
local identity discourses over the past decade (Morris and Vickers 2015; Veg 2017). 
For example, the June Fourth Vigil, the 2012 Anti-National Education Protest, and 
the 2014 Umbrella Movement all demonstrate Hong Kong people’s determination to 
advocate localism and local interests. The numerous heightened moments of mass 
protests in the post-1997 era have witnessed widespread participation from all walks 
of life, including the middle classes, university students, and secondary school 
pupils who were born in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2012, the government tried to 
introduce “Moral and National Education”, commonly referred as the “patriotic 
education curriculum”, that aimed to cultivate a sentiment of patriotism for the 
country and Chinese culture. But Hong Kong rejected the Chinese government’s 
citizenship project through protests. 
In 2014, tens of thousands of individuals participated in the Umbrella Movement, a 
series of spontaneous protests throughout Hong Kong. It was stimulated by the 
Occupy Central campaign – a civil disobedience protest which began in the centre 
of Hong Kong in 2013. It later spread to various other areas, including Mongkok, 
Admiralty, and Causeway Bay, and major city intersections remained closed to 
traffic for 79 days. It was the first time in Hong Kong’s history that people protested 
at such a scale, with multi-point protests and occupation for such a long time. These 
big protests reflect deep public concern and anxiety about the “loss” of Hong Kong 
people’s ways of life, which had crystallised over the long period of British colonial 
rule, and their frustration towards the political system of “One Country, Two 
Systems”, the incapability of the Hong Kong government, and a distrust of the 
Chinese government. The most recent large-scale protests that began in June 2019 
and have shown no sign of quieting down, were triggered by the Hong Kong 
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government’s proposed bill, which if passes, would allow transfers of fugitives to 
mainland China. The introduction of the bill caused widespread criticism as people 
feared it would erode Hong Kong’s legal system. For months, protesters have taken 
to the streets – at times in the millions. 
As local and national identification become more incompatible, and public views for 
and against local activism become more divided, personal and family relationships 
are impacted. During and after the Umbrella Movement, many friends and family 
members who have different political views stopped speaking to each other (Ho, 
Jackson, and Kong 2017). In fact, during my interviews, I observed that personal 
relationships were so impacted by politics and the ongoing protests that although 
Hong Kong informants were in general more open to talk about politics than their 
mainland counterparts, they were sometimes cautious to give their opinions. In 
Hong Kong, the yellow ribbon is the symbol of the pro-democracy camp; and the 
blue ribbon is the symbol of the pro-Beijing camp. In daily life, people often identify 
themselves as wong si (yellow ribbon), lan si (blue ribbon), or neutral. A small 
number of informants declared their political camp at the outset of the interviews, 
especially when talking about their political motivation for migration. Kelvin, a 35-
year-old PhD student who identified himself as a wong si, said the following during 
our four-hour long interview:  
I think things have been changing so fast in the past couple of years in 
Hong Kong. In fact, I left not long after Chun Ying Leung became the Chief 
Executive of Hong Kong. I can see how things have deteriorated. A few 
years ago, if you had asked my wife, she would not have considered 
moving abroad at all because our families are all settled in Hong Kong. 
Now my wife and I would seriously consider the possibility of moving 
abroad and obtaining permanent residency elsewhere.  
 
Even though Kelvin was passionate about politics and closely followed current 
affairs in Hong Kong whilst living in the UK, he considered it was best to have an 
“escape route” and obtain foreign citizenship. Ronald, also a self-claimed wong si, 
described Hong Kong’s political situation as “deteriorating” too. He said,  
I think I am lucky to be able to leave Hong Kong…the UK is a democratic 
country. If I could stay here, why would I want to return to Hong Kong under 
the rule of an undemocratic government? I have more freedom here. 
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During fieldwork, I did not encounter one Hong Kong informant who claimed to be a 
lan si. The research method of snowball sampling allowed me to gain trust from 
informants easily, however it may have prevented me from approaching informants 
with certain political views because informants themselves were likely to introduce 
me to their friends who shared similar values and lifestyles with them. However, I 
was able to conduct interviews with informants who claimed to be indifferent 
towards politics and remained neutral between the two political camps. One of these 
informants was Leon, a 29-year-old PhD graduate, who took no political side but felt 
tired of living in Hong Kong. He said,  
I think if you want to change anything in Hong Kong, you need to be in the 
system to fight it. But I don’t want to do it. I think when you feel like you are 
helpless in a society, all you can do is leave. 
 
Wallace, who participated in the Umbrella Movement and claimed he was on the 
front line when the police fired tear gas to disperse peaceful demonstrators outside 
the government headquarters on 28 September 2014, said he had not been as “hot-
blooded” since then. He said, 
People may say to me, “you don’t fight for your own freedom anymore”. 
Yes, I don’t. I have accepted the fact that China has ruled Hong Kong. 
There are two things you can do. You can accept it, or you can resist it. I 
have accepted it, but I chose to move away. 
 
Although not all informants had a clear political stance, their perceptions of Hong 
Kong’s political situation were shaped by their friends and families who informed 
them of the “reality” of today’s Hong Kong. Despite leaving Hong Kong for non-
political reasons, Victoria now saw her migration as a wise decision because of what 
she learnt from her friends in Hong Kong. She said, 
I am upset by the political situation in Hong Kong. Some of my friends want 
to emigrate but they can’t. They always say to me, “don’t come back unless 
you have no choice”. I think they may be a bit envious of me because I can 
move away but they can’t. 
 
The majority of my mainland Chinese informants were reluctant to talk about politics 
or criticise the Chinese government during interviews. One informant openly said to 
me that she had to be careful about what she said because she knew that “there are 
Chinese students living abroad who collect information for the Chinese 
government”. With a cautious attitude, most of them, however, did not hesitate to 
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criticise food safety and pollution issues in China. For example, Alice, a PhD 
student, said that one of her main motivations for remaining in the UK rather than 
returning to China was the comfortable living environment and the better air quality 
that she could enjoy. Georgia, who had been living in the UK for over a decade, said 
“my husband and I consider that air pollution is too big of a problem in China now. 
We are worried that if we go back, our health will be jeopardised.” The more liberal 
informants openly expressed how they did not feel safe in China for political 
reasons. Transnational migration, permanent residence, and citizenship of a foreign 
country are considered parts of an escape route for when China is no longer 
regarded as a good place to live (Delury and Schell 2013). For instance, Lin Lin was 
married to a PhD student from China who planned to develop his career in London 
after graduation. Lin Lin wanted to remain in the UK and expressed her concern 
about the vulnerability and safety of Chinese middle-class in the context of an 
unstable political environment . She said, 
I am worried about the political situation in China. I am not sure what will 
happen next. Sometimes there is news about middle-class businessmen in 
China who have suddenly disappeared or got caught by the police for no 
reason. I worry that this might happen to us one day...I just don’t feel too 
safe in China. 
 
Sofia, a 25-year-old migrant who had family members involved in politics and 
business, said, 
China’s political atmosphere is very intense. You may not notice it from the 
outside, and you may think that things are very peaceful and normal, but 
the truth is political earthquakes and power struggles happen all the time. 
Everything in China is temporary; nothing will stay permanently. 
 
Similarly to Lin Lin, Sofia now felt unsafe living in China after being exposed to news 
about China reported by western media. She said, 
It is only after I moved to the UK that I know what actually happens in 
China. In China, we only have one search engine – Baidu – and it works 
closely with the government. Baidu blocks sensitive information from the 
general public. But living here in the UK allows me to see and know things 
from uncensored resources, and that gives me a different perspective. I 
have more freedom to access information. I now know China is constantly 
changing. Its international status has also changed from time to time. In 
China, most people believe that our country is getting stronger and we live 
in a very peaceful country. We think our economy is doing so well that a 
bubble economy is impossible. We all think we live a much better life 
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compared to people in North Korea. But now I know we often live under the 
lies of the government. Sometimes the reality is not like what the 
government wants us to believe in.  
 
These quotes are valuable data that reflects how Chinese young adults understand 
politics in China. When I was a postgraduate student in Hong Kong in 2011, I 
noticed it was difficult to get mainland Chinese students to talk about their political 
views. I still remember the awkwardness and silence when I naively invited some 
Chinese friends to attend the June Fourth Vigil. Hence, I anticipated the difficulty of 
getting my Chinese informants to talk about their political motivations for migration, 
but I did not expect the openness of some informants during the research 
interviews. 
Among all of the mainland Chinese informants, Ying was the most vocal about her 
discontent with the corruption and bureaucracy of the one-party government. She 
explained to me that her father, who was a professor at a university, had always 
been her biggest inspiration. Exposed to western literature and books about 
Chinese modern history that were banned by the Chinese government, she was not 
aware of how different her political views were from her peers, who “were 
brainwashed by the regime”, until she started university in China. She was shocked 
that some of her classmates did not believe the Tiananmen Square Massacre had 
actually happened in 1989. She said, 
I am very against the communist party. I support the self-determination and 
independence of Hong Kong. I agree that Taiwan is a country that is 
separate from China… If I return to China, I want to teach students in 
university to have critical thinking and not to believe in everything that the 
Chinese media says. But I am also worried that I would be caught doing 
this in China. Since President Xi came to power, my friends and I all feel 
that the state has tightened its control on us. 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR MIGRATION 
 
In this study, while more Hong Kong informants than their mainland counterparts 
described relentlessly rising house prices “back home” as a key motivation for 
moving abroad, more mainland Chinese informants than the Hong Kong cohort 
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commented that “complicated” and “insincere” Chinese social relationships were a 
push factor for migration. 
Regarding my first observation, this is not to say that mainland Chinese informants 
were not pressured by the rise of property prices in cosmopolitan mega cities in 
China, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. However, in comparison, Hong 
Kong informants tended to be more concerned with their inability to afford a home, 
which would affect their quality of life and their vision of a future in which they can 
fulfil their expectations of marrying and rearing children. Belle, who was married to 
an Englishman, said,  
I’ve always liked Hong Kong. But now I am married, I have to think about 
housing, I think in this aspect, London is better and more affordable. The 
property market in Hong Kong is just crazy. If you don’t have parents to 
help you, it is almost impossible to own a place in Hong Kong. After getting 
married, it is likely that you will need to live with your in-laws. I could 
imagine the situation which is just unbearable to me. 
 
Karmen, who had been a full-time nurse in Hong Kong, was also keen to get on the 
property ladder before migrating. She said, 
I think I earned quite a lot in Hong Kong, but I still couldn’t own a place. I 
have friends who are a couple and they each earn HK$60,000 to 70,000 
per month (roughly £6,000-£7,000). But they still haven’t been able to 
afford a place. I think housing is a big issue in Hong Kong. That’s why I 
wanted to move away and seek a different life. 
 
Due to the neoliberal policy adopted by the Hong Kong government, the property 
market is largely controlled and monopolised by big property developers. Strong 
demand from foreign buyers and their flood of money have pushed an increase in 
property prices for decades. The limited public housing built by the government 
cannot meet the heavy demand from Hong Kong people, especially those who find 
private housing unaffordable. According to the 15th Annual Demographia 
International Housing Affordability Study conducted in 2018, which looked at 309 
housing markets in the world. Hong Kong has been ranked as the world’s least 
affordable housing market for a ninth consecutive year. The survey uses the “mean 
multiple” approach, which divide the median house price by the median household 
income. In 2018, average home prices in Hong Kong were 21 times the gross 
annual median household income (Demographia 2019). In second place was 
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Vancouver with a home-price to median-income ratio of 12.6, meaning it would take 
an average of 12.6 years to save enough money for a house. 
In general, it is now not uncommon for young adults with a median or even higher 
income to continue to stay with their parents after getting married, with one spouse 
moving into another spouse’s family home. While home ownership has become a 
distant dream for many, and even rental property prices are extremely expensive, 
Hong Kong informants reassessed the image of Hong Kong as a “land of 
opportunity” (Lui 2014b), and considered that moving abroad could be a better 
option. Joy, a 23-year-old working holiday maker from Hong Kong, was originally a 
student migrant who stayed on in the UK after the completion of her first degree. 
Unsure about whether or not she could continue her stay after the expiration of her 
current visa, she expressed her concern about having to move back to Hong Kong 
eventually. She said, 
I have a friend who graduated in the same year as me, but instead of 
staying here, she returned to Hong Kong immediately and moved back in 
her parents’ home. She told me she felt like her parents do not seem to 
understand that she is now a grown-up who lived abroad for three years on 
her own. She is frustrated that they don’t treat her like an adult at all. This 
makes me worried because I can imagine the same could happen to me. I 
could not afford to live separately from my parents either if I moved back to 
Hong Kong. 
 
Hong Kong is not the only city with soaring property prices. Housing affordability is 
also a major issue in some of the larger cities in China, such as Beijing, Hangzhou, 
Nanjing, and Shanghai. In spring 2010, the Chinese government attempted to halt 
the rise in housing prices by raising the down payment requirement across the 
country as a whole, increasing the minimum mortgage interest rates, and imposing 
home purchase restrictions (Chen, Funke, and Mehrotra 2016).  
According to an article from Forbes, an American business magazine, an average 
1,000 square foot apartment in Shanghai costs 5 million yuan (or £567,450). 
Property prices for some neighbourhoods in Shanghai have risen by 40% in the past 
five years. However, Shanghai’s average monthly salary is 7,108 yuan, which is 
around £700 (Rapoza 2017). Despite the fact that home buyers are required to put 
up at least 20% equity in their homes, housing prices in major cities in China are still 
soaring. This partly shows the deep wealth inequalities in China, in which a small 
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number of people are able to own multiple property assets, when many others 
struggle to afford one.  
The strong demand for housing can also be explained by the close correlation 
between property ownership and marriage, and the cultural expectation on the 
groom’s family to buy a house before marriage (see chapter 6). Few young middle-
class Chinese people that I interviewed had already owned a flat in China in first or 
second-tier cities before coming to the UK with financial help from their parents (see 
also Fincher 2014). Those who had not yet owned a property said they expected to 
receive financial help from their parents to purchase a home either in China or in the 
UK in the future. Most mainland Chinese informants did not consider the continuous 
rise in property prices in China as a major push factor for them to seek alternative 
lives abroad. This is very different from the Hong Kong informants who repeatedly 
expressed this concern, and considered financial help from parents as less taken-
for-granted. 
For Gina and Victoria, the attractiveness of living in the UK originated from their 
imagination and understanding of what constitutes a “good life”, and their belief that 
such a life is not attainable in the social environment of Hong Kong or China. They 
talked about how achieving work-life balance and a new cosmopolitan lifestyle were 
goals that they set for themselves in the UK. Gina, a 30-year-old woman who 
previously worked as a nurse in Hong Kong, said, 
I was mentally prepared to earn less in London than I did in Hong Kong 
before I came here. I told myself I had to stop working like crazy in Hong 
Kong for a while. It was just too much. I came here to try something new 
and to live differently. I wanted to travel to Europe. 
 
Gina’s words echo those of Victoria, a 36-year-old Hong Kong migrant who was 
married to a British-born Chinese man in Scotland. Having a part-time job in a 
Chinese church, she said, 
When I am tired, I allow myself to slow down a bit. But I can also work a lot 
when I have the energy. In Hong Kong, you can’t afford a life like this. 
People will look down on you if you only have a part-time or freelance job. 
You have to work constantly. 
 
Lin Lin was a 28-year-old woman from mainland China who stayed in the UK 
through being a student dependant. She said she liked the spacious environment, 
 75 
low population density, and slow pace of life in London, as compared to her 
hometown Shanghai. Lin Lin particularly enjoyed the relatively slow dining 
experiences in London. Urban life in China, as Lin Lin commented, is all about 
“move, move, and move” with no time to stop or relax.  
In a separate example, Ronald, a 24-year-old student migrant, said, 
Hong Kong gives you lots of pressure. Everyone wants to buy a flat but not 
many people can do so. And if you don’t have a university degree, you are 
worthless; your life has no value at all. Once you graduate, you earn about 
HK$10,000 (£1,000) or even less, or maybe you won’t even be employed. 
 
Many informants described work pressure, intense competition, an unfavourable 
work environment, long working hours, and low wages as some of the reasons for 
migrating to the UK temporarily. For instance, Karmen decided to leave Hong Kong 
because of her dissatisfaction with her job and poor management at work. She 
worked in the intensive care unit of a hospital for five years before coming to the UK. 
She said, 
My department’s employee turnover rate was very high. It provides training 
for staff in the beginning but after a while, you have to rely on yourself if you 
want to learn something new. This could be very dangerous. When I 
worked there, my manager thought that I was capable of handling a lot of 
things, even though I didn’t receive proper training. I was constantly worried 
that if anything happened to my patients, I would be the first one to be 
blamed; my face would be shown on the front page of the newspapers; and 
I wouldn’t be able to keep my nursing licence. I have high standards for 
myself. I don’t want to become one of those people who only sit around and 
pray that nothing bad happens to them during work. I want to become 
someone who can be brave enough to give opinions in front of managers, 
but not just receive orders. I thought I couldn’t change anything if I 
continued to stay there so I left. 
 
Some informants from mainland China described Chinese social relationships as 
“complicated”, “insincere”, “superficial” and “instrumental”, which became one of 
their motivations for moving away. But no Hong Kong informants said they moved 
because of this. Hoping to work in academia after graduation, Ying described 
academic publication in China as entirely about networking, but not necessarily 
related to the quality of the work. She said, “In China, you often need to beg people 
for help and know someone who can help you. This makes me very unhappy. 
Chinese social relationships are more troublesome and complicated than 
relationships in the UK”. 
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Sofia’s family background and social circle had also shaped her understanding of 
the “national characters” of Chinese people as “materialistic” and “instrumental”. 
Although these characteristics are not Chinese-specific, and could be argued to be 
common features of social elites and businesspeople of other nationalities, Sofia 
insisted that “it is the Chinese people who always try to take advantage from their 
own people”. She described Chinese social relationships as “suffocating”, 
“insincere” and “over-competitive”. She said, 
If people approach you, that’s because of your value and your status. If I 
didn’t have any value, they wouldn’t be close to me anymore. Since I was 
small, I understood that people approached us or behaved in certain ways 
because of my father’s influence. This kind of socialising work is very tiring. 




YOUNG CHINESE WOMEN’S MIGRATION FOR LOVE, RELATIONSHIPS, 
MARRIAGE PROSPECTS AND AN IDEAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THEIR 
FUTURE OFFSPRING 
 
Many female informants in this study hoped to explore romantic opportunities, 
maintain an existing relationship, and secure a life-long partner through living in the 
UK. In chapter 4, I will discuss in detail how the Chinese state-sponsored discourse 
of sheng nu (leftover women) pressures young single women in China, and how 
such discourse travels across borders through TV and social media to impact the 
way Hong Kong women view the timing of marriage. I will also examine how some 
women hoped to escape from social stigma of singlehood and enter marriage by 
migrating. None of the male informants, regardless of their sexual orientation, told 
me that looking for romance was one of their motivations for migration. 
Within my interview sample of migrants who had a relationship prior to their arrival in 
the UK, more young women than men moved to accompany their partner to the UK. 
This is not to say that Chinese men do not move for their partner (Yi Fung’s case is 
a good example), but it was not a common pattern among my informants. If the men 
in my study did move for their partner, it was for a life-long partner, i.e. their wife, but 
not a girlfriend.  
However, very few female migrants who moved with their boyfriend ended up 
staying with the same man after arrival. This includes those who came to the UK 
after their boyfriend had already settled in the country for a period of time. For 
instance, Binyu came to the UK to study for a master’s degree because of her 
previous relationship. She said, 
When I first came to the UK in 2011, my ex-boyfriend was already studying 
here. I decided to move after him. But when I finally made it here, I found 
out that he had been seeing another girl, so we broke up. But I was still 
very thankful because if I hadn’t come here for my past relationship, I 
wouldn’t be with my husband now. 
 
Rose, a 28-year-old PhD student from mainland China, was also motivated by her 
ex-boyfriend to study in the UK. The couple broke up shortly after arrival. She is now 
in a relationship with an Englishman whom she met a year ago. She said, 
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My ex-boyfriend encouraged me to come to the UK. He said that’s what he 
wanted to do. At the time, I had taught in China for three years and life had 
become very boring and repetitive. I thought to myself if I didn’t learn more 
new things now, it would be too late. Although we broke up in the end, I 
didn’t feel too bad about it because he inspired me to get a PhD.  
 
Rose’s experience was similar to that of Sarah, a 26-year-old PhD student who 
decided to follow her husband (then-boyfriend) after he received an offer to 
undertake a PhD from a university in the UK. She said,  
My original plan was to return to China after getting my master’s degree 
from the UK, and then work for a few years before doing a PhD in the UK. I 
always thought that it would be a disadvantage for me if I didn’t accumulate 
any work experience before starting my PhD. But my mum thought I would 
be wasting my time. She worried that I would be too old to get married if I 
did it the way I planned. It is really strange but many parents in China 
believe that women who have a PhD are not able to get married. Then my 
mum said, “go get married and have kids first, and then you can continue 
your study”. I don’t know if it is the same for Hong Kong people but in 
China, many people think that nu bo shi (women with doctorates) are very 
strange. They are highly educated but remain single. People don’t see nu 
bo shi as very respectable. In the end, I came back to the UK straight after 
the completion of my masters’ because of my husband. In a sense, it was 
very practical because he got a PhD offer at the time so if I hadn’t stayed in 
the UK with him, we would have had to do a long-distance relationship for 
four years. In the end, I decided to forget about my original plan. 
 
Binyu, Rose, and Sarah all came or returned to the UK because of their partner’s 
educational migration trajectories. All considered it a “practical” decision to prevent 
having a long-distance relationship, which could lead to a break-up. At the same 
time, these migrants were financially supported by their Chinese parents who 
encouraged them to move in order to maintain their existing relationship and protect 
the prospect of marriage. These parents were worried that their daughter would 
become single or even worse, sheng nu, if they stayed in China, while their 
boyfriend moved away. 
Women also tended to extend their stays due to relationships developed in the UK. 
For instance, Meggie was a 29-year-old Tier 2 work visa holder who first came to 
the UK as a postgraduate student. She chose to prolong her stay to maintain her 
previous relationship through enrolling in another postgraduate programme. 
Although she broke up with her ex-boyfriend before completing her second master’s 
degree, she managed to find a visa-sponsored job after graduation. She is now in a 
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relationship with a Pakistani man who has British permanent residency. Ying Men, a 
32-year-old student-turned-spouse migrant, had also been prolonging her stay in 
London because of her relationship with a Greek national. Since she considered 
China would be an unfavourable work environment for her husband, who could not 
read or speak Chinese, and her chance of getting a good job in Greece was 
minimal, she thought staying in London was possibly the best option for a 
transnational couple like them. 
Previous research has discussed how young Chinese migrants who have long-term 
migration goals tend to see temporary migration as a starting point for life-course 
transitions (Kajanus 2015; Fong 2011). Very few women that I interviewed 
challenged the taken-for-granted life-course of marriage and childbearing, despite 
their migration experiences and exposure to new cultural influences (see chapter 4). 
For some, marriage, family formation, and even the happiness of their future 
offspring were already on their mind before they left China or Hong Kong. For 
instance, at the age of 30, Hong Kong Chinese woman Gina felt like she was ready 
to settle down with her British partner, whom she met shortly after arriving in the UK. 
At the time of interview, the couple had been together for a year, and were living 
together. Gina hoped to start a family eventually in the UK. She said, 
I understand that every country has its own problems. I also understand 
that leaving Hong Kong doesn’t guarantee a paradise abroad. But Hong 
Kong kids are very unhappy. Nowadays, Hong Kong parents have to apply 
for a place in kindergarten before their kids are even born, otherwise their 
kids won’t stand a chance of getting into a good school. You have to plan 
everything for your children. I just think this makes me very uncomfortable. 
The first time I noticed how big the parental pressure is in our society is 
when I first started to work in the maternity ward in a hospital in Hong Kong. 
I saw a fax at work. It was an advertisement for a nursery school. I 
wondered why this was sent to our department. Then someone told me it 
belongs to my colleague, Joanna. I couldn’t believe it because Joanna’s 
baby hasn’t even arrived in this world yet. All the kids in Hong Kong are 
expected to know a few different languages and some musical instruments. 
It is a very stressful life. Kids in Hong Kong don’t have time to play. They 
have a lot of homework and extra-curricular activities to do every day. They 
can’t rest until 10pm or 11pm.Why do we demand so much from our kids? I 
don’t want to raise my kids in Hong Kong at all. 
 
Gina considered herself a “victim” of the highly stressful academic environment in 
Hong Kong and aspired to raise her future children in the “freed” learning 
environment abroad that would, in her imagination, allow them to enjoy “real 
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childhood”. A similar narrative was expressed by other female informants who were 
married or already had children. 
CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude, I have discussed the search for hope, love, success, flexibility, and 
opportunities in the UK among young middle-class migrants from Hong Kong and 
mainland China. Academic reputations, employment prospects, and professional 
advancement are some of the pragmatic reasons that Chinese temporary migrants 
choose to move to the UK, but migrants’ motivations are multiple, and are related to 
their life goals and aspirations, their dissatisfaction with their lives, and their 
imaginations of the “west”, especially the destination country. In this chapter I have 
also discussed the role of migrants’ parents in shaping the courses of their migration 
trajectories. Drawing on data collected from interviews with migrants, I have 
explained that their middle-class parents considered international education a 
spatial strategy to bypass the local education system and accumulate more valuable 
cultural capital. In addition, in some Chinese families, the timing of daughters’ 
migration is related to their age and relationship status. Due to the societal pressure 
on young women to follow the feminine life script to get married, and the close 
correlations between marital mobility, the prospect of marriage and international 
education, the timing of migrant women’s migration (and the family support they 
receive for migration) is determined by whether they are in a relationship, the 
likelihood that the relationship will last, and whether the length of their programme of 
study or the length of temporary stays will impact their chance of marrying. This 
chapter has also discussed young Chinese migrants’ socio-economic and political 
motivations for leaving home in search of a “better life” for themselves and their 
future offspring. However, as migrants’ transnational sojourning continues, they may 
encounter obstacles to realising their aspirations, and discover that expectations 




NAVIGATING CLASS: THE PIG’S LIVER AND THE LOBSTER 
 
I met David, a 33-year-old lecturer, at a café in the London university where he 
worked. The café was busy that evening, packed with students and university staff. 
David was a tall, intellectual-looking Chinese man, who wore a formal shirt, dark 
trousers, and glasses. I found a table while David queued to order some food. He 
returned with a slice of cake and two forks, and offered to share the cake with me. I 
automatically responded to his offer according to the cultural code that I have 
learned throughout my life: to first express my gratitude, then decline the offer, then 
allow the person to offer again, and finally either gratefully accept or firmly decline 
with politeness. As we both behaved appropriately, the atmosphere was relaxed, 
which facilitated the interview afterwards. For our first ever meeting, David and I 
happily shared a portion of food without feeling any awkwardness. It occurred to me 
that even though we were strangers, this way of socialising was acceptable to us 
because we were from the same ethno-cultural background; I imagine that the same 
behaviour with a British acquaintance would have seemed less acceptable. 
David left China and migrated to the UK more than a decade ago. I considered him 
a more established migrant than some of my other informants who had only lived in 
the UK for a couple of years. As a result, when I asked David how he perceived his 
class status in the UK, I made an assumption and said, “you have done so well in 
your career! You must consider yourself a proper middle-class in London now.” To 
my surprise, he replied,  
I think I can’t fit into the class system in the UK because we are talking 
about two different class systems here. For British people, social class is 
about what you wear, where you live, what you eat, how you commute…it 
is about your lifestyle, your educational background, etc. I grew up in 
China, and that’s why sometimes I have certain behaviours that British 
people may consider as “posh” and some are seen as “very working-class”. 
For example, I love eating pig’s liver…people here would not eat it. They 
think only working-class people or Scottish people would eat food like this. 
But I love it. And I love eating lobster too. In this case, people may think I 
am so posh because I am willing to spend a lot on it. 
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David regards food culture and culinary taste as an important signifier of one’s class 
status. Class distinction and cultural boundaries exist within, but also of course 
beyond, food practices.9 Class as an experience or an analytical concept is 
ambiguous and vague. According to Guo (2016, 2), “the single term ‘class’ is a 
shorthand to describe groups ranked in a hierarchical order, structures of material 
inequality or an individual’s social attributes, or to indicate social standing or 
prestige.” Reay (2005, 911) states that class is produced and operated through 
“feelings of ambivalence, inferiority and superiority, visceral aversions, recognition, 
abjection and the markings of taste”. Bourdieu's (1986) approach to class concerns 
not only a hierarchical mode of distinction based on economic structures, but a 
distinction reproduced through everyday practices, including consumption practices.  
A dominant British view of class, which contradicts what David describes in his 
quote, sees class as more than just practices of consumption or spending; it is 
“something beneath your clothes, under your skin, in your reflexes, in your psyche, 
at the very core of your being” (Kuhn 1995, 98). Although this statement makes 
class sound like a mysterious entity, it definitely holds a certain degree of truth in 
contemporary British society. An article about the class pay gap in Britain published 
by the Guardian in February 2019 echoes to Kuhn’s statement. The authors argue 
that the individuals in elite occupations, such as accountancy, who are considered 
to be more trustworthy are those who display “corporate ‘polish’ – encompassing 
formal dress and etiquette, interactional poise and an aura of gravitas” (Friedman 
and Laurison 2019). They further suggest that the assessment of whether a person 
is “posh” or not is made not by any formal means, but through a “instinctive gut 
feeling”. This idea that people can rely on an intuitive sense to determine one’s 
class status echoes Kuhn (1995). 
Literature on the transnational mobility of Chinese students emphasises the value of 
overseas education in the making of middle-class status (e.g. Ong 1999; Tsong and 
Liu 2009; Tu 2016; Waters 2012). Very often, self-funded international students are 
considered to come from a middle-class or upper middle-class background (Waters 
2006). I was initially interested in interviewing informants about class for the purpose 
 
9 For example, see Cappellini, Parsons, and Harman's (2016) article on how culinary taste 
helps to maintain middle class identity in a working class context in the UK.  
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of justifying them as “middle-class” migrants. Questions about “class” came under 
the “Individual family background” section of my interview guide, and I assumed that 
such questions would be answered straightforwardly (see appendix). However, they 
in fact triggered some interesting discussions about class identity, class aspiration, 
and anxiety. This chapter will explore the complexity of “class” in migration. It will 
show that the definition of class employed by nation-states may be different from the 
social representations understood by social scientists, which may also be different 
from how people think of class, and how they see their class and socio-economic 
positioning. In the next chapter, I will adopt a Bourdieusian-inspired analysis of 
different forms of capital, but already in this one I will show how the different 
discourses or experiences point to the relevance of the “capital” approach. 
In this chapter, I first discuss how “class” is understood and what “middle-class” 
means in three geographical and cultural contexts: mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and the UK. I argue that class particularly matters to the young Chinese migrants in 
this study as they desired to be recognised as middle class or they wished to display 
characteristics which would make them being seen as a successful member both in 
China or Hong Kong where they came from, and in the UK. On the one hand, my 
informants hoped to achieve their own and familial expectations to reproduce 
middle-class status through studying or working in the UK. On the other hand, class 
is embedded in young migrants’ everyday lives in the UK as they try to legitimate 
their belonging to the new environment. Class is experienced through interactions 
and negotiations with the host society and self-reflection (for example, see Thatcher 
and Halvorsrud 2015). 
Here, I should make it clear that “class” was not a topic that my informants 
spontaneously talked about. Some informants admitted that they found it hard to talk 
about class. I will show that strong feelings of doubt and insecurity persist within 
migrants’ narratives of class. Towards the end of this chapter, I will argue that the 
temporalities of migration and the temporality of class work simultaneously to shape 
temporary migrants’ class identity.  
BEING MIDDLE-CLASS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
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The Chinese middle class features widely in public debate in China and generates 
great interest within and outside of China. Rocca (2017) explains that there is a 
common consensus among both Western and Chinese scholars about the existence 
of a Chinese middle class but the group cannot be defined easily. He states (p. 3) 
that, 
Objective criteria, such as education, income, occupation and level of 
consumption, are all difficult to measure in China, while subjective criteria, 
such as lifestyle, manners, political ideas and identification with a social 
figure, leave plenty of room for interpretation. 
Both Rocca (2017) and Goodman (2014) talk about how analysing the middle class 
through research methods such as large-scale surveys can be problematic, as 
results are often biased due to the way scholars frame their questions. Rocca (2017: 
4) also explains the difficulties in defining the group, as there are a variety of terms 
that scholars use, and their meanings are at odds with one another, e.g. middle 
property stratum (zhongchan jieceng), middle property class (zhongchan jieji) 
intermediate class (zhongjian jieceng) and middle income stratum (zhongdeng 
shouru jieceng). Moreover, in the Chinese language, there is no clear distinction 
between plural and singular forms, thus there is no way to express “whether the 
middle class is a collection of different strata (the middle classes) or a coherent 
class” (p.4). 
According to Goodman (2016, 1), since 2002, the emergence of China’s middle-
class has become a state-sponsored discourse with “uncertain sociological 
foundations”. While the middle classes are identifiable, they are mostly associated 
with the Party-state and are found mainly in the public sector. They constitute no 
more than 12% of the Chinese population. The majority of the population is still 
either farmers or working-class, including urban workers and rural migrants. This 
poses the question of whether or not the middle-class is a discourse rather than a 
social structure.  
Interested in the social meanings of being middle class in China, Rocca (2017) 
looks at “the middle class” as a way of thinking and a new social imaginary that 
China is embracing. He explains that the normative approach of locating China’s 
middle class results in confusion because every definition of the middle class 
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conceals a hidden agenda. While academic scholars turn their attention to 
accounting criteria nicely presented in statistics and scientific discourse, private 
consulting companies are interested in assessing the middle class based on their 
consumption behaviours. Those who consider the middle class as a political force to 
facilitate political changes try to collect data on political views so as to predict their 
political actions, e.g. protests. By contrast, Rocca (2017) argues that the size and 
the precise characteristics of the middle class are irrelevant and insignificant 
because they cannot be separated from the social imaginaries and hidden agendas. 
Interviews with both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong informants about their 
understanding of class and their class identity show that responses were often 
diverse and sometimes contradictory. Differences in social and historical 
developments between China and Hong Kong also shape how the two cohorts 
perceived the question of class. For some mainland Chinese informants, the first 
immediate response to my question about class (jieji) was to follow the old political 
script as proclaimed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): China is a classless 
society in which all are equal. For example, an informant said to me, “I don’t know 
whether you are aware…but we don’t have the idea of class in China.” Another 
informant said, “I don’t think the way we understand class in China is the same as in 
the West because our modern society is built upon socialist ideals.” Interestingly, 
the same informant had the following to say: 
I think life is not about absolute equality. If I grew up in a very poor family, 
or if I had no parents, or if I had to take care of two young siblings in my 
family, then I wouldn’t have even dared to dream about studying abroad. I 
would have had to work in a factory to make a living. I know there are many 
families in China who don’t have the resources like I do…It [studying 
abroad] is something that many families in China cannot afford, a luxury 
that many cannot enjoy. 
 
Contradictory narratives like this make an analysis of mainland Chinese informants’ 
class identity an interesting and difficult job. On the one hand, it is clear that the 
process of political education and the state’s indoctrination has impacted some 
informants’ understanding of class more than others, to an extent that it has almost 
become a natural reflex to approach the issue of class with the standard answer. On 
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the other hand, these informants also acknowledged that social stratifications exist 
in modern China; some even understood that they were the ones who benefitted 
from the current system. 
Contemporary China is founded on a class-based political system, which originated 
in Marxist-Leninist ideology and was further developed in Maoist class analysis. 
When the CCP came to power, every citizen was officially given a specific class. 
Those who were assigned the “red” class background were people who had fought 
or died on the CCP side, or those who were workers or poor peasants. A “red” class 
background provided these people with better access to education, work, and 
marriage opportunities. On the contrary, those who were rich, former exploiters, or 
resisted the CCP, received the “black” class label and were discriminated against. 
The “bad class” and their descendants had limited life chances and were the least 
desirable in the marriage market (Unger 1984). During the Mao era and the Cultural 
Revolution, an individual’s “class” determined not only their life chances, but also 
those of their children and even grandchildren.  
The Mao era was a chaotic time; the poorest peasants and workers, who used to be 
at the bottom of the social hierarchy, were suddenly told that they were the leading 
citizens of the New China. This new social hierarchy created by state intervention in 
the 1950s resulted in a huge social and psychological upheaval. In the post-Cultural 
Revolution period, more “normal” hierarchies of production, technocracy, and 
bourgeoisification with aspirational class identities were restored, due to the 
development of a semi-market economy (see Jacka, Kipnis, and Sargeson 2013, 
199–216). Since the Reform Period in the 1980s, a Weberian approach to social 
status and stratification has characterised how the Chinese state and the majority of 
the public think about “class”: as something that is shaped by market structures and 
employment relationships (see Goldthorpe and Erikson 1992).  
Since the 1980s, members of the Party-state and their families have accumulated 
great wealth. From the state’s perspective, the great economic disparities between 
the rich and the poor, corruption, and the abuse of power by officials, have 
contributed to social discontent, which the Chinese government hopes to resolve by 
developing a middle-class society that would act as a force for stability, good 
governance, and economic progress (Goodman 2014). Due to the strong political 
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interest of the CCP in researching and locating the Chinese middle-class, there has 
been an “academic fever” (Li 2010, 57) over China’s social stratification, as scholars 
attempted to develop new Chinese class schemas (see Lin and Wu 2009; Liu 2009).  
Instead of precisely locating the Chinese middle class, which Rocca (2017: 118) 
suggests is impossible, he states that we can grasp the middle class by analysing 
the content of the Chinese middle class’s lifestyle with the definition given by Gérard 
Mauger, that is, “a set of practices and/or representations specific to a social group”. 
In post-Mao China, every rich person has become rich recently. There is no 
traditional bourgeoisie or aristocracy and thus no legitimate practices and 
representations to imitate. Chinese people are learning to behave as modern 
subjects and undergoing a “civilizing process”, which according to Rocca (2017: 
120), is “a gradual standardization and sophistication of manners and opinions 
among the population”. The main subjects of this process are the middle class.  
The state plays an important role in encouraging middle-class aspirations and 
cultivating modern citizens by promoting terms such as wenming (literally, 
“civilization”), suzhi (quality) and hexie shehui (harmonious society), all of which aim 
to improve the quality of the population. Suzhi, in a neoliberal way, when referred by 
the Chinese state, has a closer meaning to “human capital” or “embodied human 
qualities”. In the pre-1980s context, it referred primarily to qualities that are resulted 
from both nature and nurture, and are not merely inborn attributes (Kipnis 2006; 
2007). For the Chinese state and neoliberal theorists, a nation can build up its suzhi 
or human capital by training or educating citizens. In China, it is widely held that 
people should cultivate their suzhi through education and hard work (Lin 2011). 
 
Despite the state’s direction, Rocca (2017) argues that China’s civilizing process is 
not a result of institutional enforcement, rather it comes from spontaneous collective 
social behaviours from the individuals themselves who produce and follow new, 
blurred and sometimes contradictory norms. The consequence of not following such 
norms has less to do with state punishment, and more with a situation of 
marginality. As a result, for the Chinese middle class, who consider education as the 
basis for acquiring suzhi, the usage of the term is more closely related to Bourdieu’s 
cultural capital (see Ponzini 2020). In Bourdieu’s concept of social distinction (1984), 
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education as a means to obtain distinction and social status, is essential for 
individuals to secure middle-class status belonging and separate themselves from 
the working class. The Chinese middle-class families’ willingness to spend a small 
fortune on their children’s overseas education and convert economic capital into 
cultural capital can be explained by their view of education as one of the most 
powerful means to strengthen their children’s social status in relation to lower 
classes and maintain social distinction. 
 
Rocca (2017) adopts a more Bourdieusian approach to look at the ways in which 
the Chinese middle class distinguishes itself and is to be distinguished from the 
other social groups. Rocca (2017) first talks about the social imaginary created and 
shared across a broad swathe of the Chinese public about the middle class. He then 
argues that the imaginary consists of rather few elements that are wealth and 
culture-related: the middle class are rich (income being the most crucial criterion for 
belonging to the class); they have a high disposable income; they are home 
owners10; they are car owners; they live in gated communities; they travel abroad 
and take vacations; they have the means to send their children abroad for 
education; and most uniquely and importantly, they are the people who behave as 
conscious citizens.  
The last element, as a more cultural criterion, is a slightly different imaginary created 
by a great majority of urban dwellers tending their own middle-class image and are 
adopted by people who live in rural areas. Such imaginary of the middle class who 
is not just rich, but people who have high education and the ability to display high 
suzhi is a good example of Bourdieu’s work that shows the kinds of people the 
Chinese middle class excludes: those who are only able to make money, such as 
shopkeepers; those who do not have the “right job/status”, e.g. peasants and 
migrant workers; those who are not in the “right environment”, for instance living in 
traditional housing but not gated estates; and those who display “bad behaviours”, 
e.g. spitting on the ground, speaking loudly, eating noisily, dressing without care. 
Rocca (2017) argues that two kinds of people seem to fit the middle-class profile 
perfectly: first, technicians and managers working in foreign and private enterprises 
 
10 Home ownership in China and elsewhere is a form of “ontological security” which leads to 
wealth accumulation and reinforces class boundaries (see Saunders 1990). 
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and transnational companies, and second, “intellectuals” or talented people with a 
very high level of education.  
Moreover, Rocca (2017) observes that some of the Chinese middle classes reject 
being regarded as rich, or seen as middle class, due to their fear of being judged by 
their excessive consumption behaviours. They also reject being seen as belonging 
to the elites who are often “in the system”, that is, having political capital or a 
position in the government or the party. This middle-class psychology shows that 
the rule of cultural capital trumping economic and political capital, at least in the 
eyes of the most educated Chinese middle class, has now been fully developed. 
MIDDLE-CLASS IN CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG 
 
Similar to mainland China, Hong Kong’s middle class is also a new and unstable 
group. This is because most families have only become middle class in the last two 
generations. For most of my informants, their grandparents were not middle-class 
people but refugees or low-skilled workers from mainland China. But different to 
mainland China, Hong Kong’s class ideologies have not undergone fundamental 
ruptures. Hong Kong was ruled by the British from 1841 to 1997 and was briefly 
occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945 before British rule resumed. Most Hong Kong 
citizens today are descendants of the first influx of refugee capitalists and workers 
from mainland China who migrated to Hong Kong in the late 1940s. In the 1950s, 
skills and capital brought by Chinese refugees, along with a vast pool of cheap 
labour, helped to build the economy, transforming Hong Kong from an entrepot to a 
leading East Asian industrial and manufacturing centre. In the 1980s, the opening of 
the mainland Chinese market and rising salaries in Hong Kong drove many 
manufacturers north. Hong Kong again transformed its economy and consolidated 
its position as a regional financial centre and a major tourist destination in Asia. 
The shift in the structure of the economy from industry-oriented to finance-oriented 
has boosted upward social mobility and increased new employment positions (Lui 
2014a). Adopting a classification informed by the Nuffield scheme (Goldthorpe 
1987), Lui (2014a) identifies classes in Hong Kong based on occupational structure 
and income level. He observes that the middle class is found among the upper and 
lower service sector. He also finds that individuals who were born in Hong Kong are 
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more than two and a half times more likely to attain service class positions. 
Moreover, those who received more than 13 years of schooling, meaning attaining 
post-secondary education, are almost 15 times more likely to reach the same class 
positions, compared to those with a lower educational level (Ibid.: 45). These 
findings show that there is a close correlation between education and class in Hong 
Kong. 
The social imaginary about the Hong Kong middle class and the ways in which the 
Hong Kong middle class imagines itself are very similar to that of the imaginary 
about mainland Chinese middle class and the ways the mainland middle classes 
perceive themselves. They are rich: they are high-end consumers; they are home 
and car owners; they live in private instead of public housing estate; they like to 
travel; they aspire to western citizenship and consider migrating a choice rather than 
a necessity; and they send their children to international schools in Hong Kong or 
abroad for education. Ong (1999)’s remarkable work on flexible citizenship, and 
subsequent works, such as “astronaut families” (Ho 2002), tell the story of Hong 
Kong Chinese elites and middle class families who emigrated to western countries 
in the 1990s in pursuit of multiple citizenship, and to help their children to acquire 
education degree from western universities, which has become increasingly 
important for class reproduction in Hong Kong, with the strategies of accumulating 
and converting different forms of capital.  
Moreover, I argue, like the Singaporean middle-class Chinese who view migrants 
from mainland China in Singapore as outside the boundary of “middle class”, who in 
their eyes, are unrespectable, un-middle-class and un-Chinese (Ang 2016), the 
middle class in Hong Kong also draw ethnic and class boundaries by asserting their 
own superiority over mainland Chinese who they perceive as possessing only 
economic capital. They look down on the mainland Chinese tourists who buy brand-
name clothing and use “flashy things”, and those who try to prove they belong to 
high-ranking classes by displaying their wealth. They also criticise mainland 
Chinese tourists for what they consider to be uncivilized and inconsiderate 
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behaviours in Hong Kong, such as the “kid pissing” controversy11, Chinese shoppers 
buying too much Hong Kong-produced infant milk, Chinese tourists eating in the 
underground and not giving up their seats to elderly or people who need it more 
[also see Rocca (2017:148)]. These incidents provoke a lot of sentiments on the 
Internet with Hong Kong people attacking the mainlanders, who then counterattack 
with a nationalistic repertoire.  
Even the term suzhi that is commonly used in mainland China, is criticised by some 
Hong Kong people, who insist that zhisu, or in Cantonese zatsou12, has always 
been the “proper” term, which is used traditionally to refer to “human qualities”. They 
argue that suzhi is only a modern term invented by the Chinese communist state in 
the 1960s, thus is considered as “improper” and “illegitimate” and “inferior” to the 
term zhisu or zatsou13.  
During the process of continual confrontations and adjustments of social 
imaginaries, both Hong Kong and mainland Chinese middle class understand that 
being rich is not enough to be considered respectable. In Hong Kong, judgements 
and criticism of mainland Chinese come from the individuals themselves who form 
collective values and norms, contribute to the definitions of appropriate attitudes, 
 
11 In April 2014, a mainland Chinese couple was filmed letting their toddler urinate in the 
middle of a busy street in Hong Kong. The video went viral, triggering a huge debate about 
acceptable standards of behaviour in mainland China and the former British colony of Hong 
Kong, and violent reactions. For example, an anonymous user of China’s popular online 
forum called for mainland parents to bring their children to Hong Kong and let them urinate in 
the streets in protest. This incident was reported by newspapers, such as South China 
Morning Post and Daily Mail (See Chong 2014; Crane 2014). 
12 Here, and the rest of Cantonese spelling in this thesis, is based on Jyutping, a 
romanisation system for Cantonese developed by the Linguistic Society of Hong Kong. 
13 See the thread “The debate of zhisu/zatsou and suzhi/souzat” posted on Hong Kong 
Golden Forum - a popular discussion forum in Hong Kong, in 2014 , in which the usage of 
zhisu/zatsou is considered by some users as a marker of Hong Kong identity; others praised 
those who used zhisu/zatsou insead of suzhi as people who “respect history and culture” 
(Anonymous 2014). 
 92 
behaviours and standards, recognise their naturalness and use them to assess 
themselves and others. 
After the handover of Hong Kong to China, economic operations and political 
connections between Hong Kong and mainland China increased dramatically. 
According to Lui (2014b), this has resulted in the formation of divisions within the 
middle class along the lines of occupation and industry. A split middle class in Hong 
Kong is observed, whereby a “globally or regionally oriented middle class” who were 
in commerce, business services, and finance sectors benefitted more from the so-
called “China opportunities”, as compared to those who were outside of the 
business sector. Middle-class professionals, managers, and administrators working 
in community and social services, such as doctors, lawyers, nurses, social workers, 
and teachers, were what Lui called the “embedded middle class”, who found their 
lives less relevant to the “China opportunities”.  
While the “globally or regionally oriented middle class” in Hong Kong and the rising 
middle-class in China both enjoy the fruits of China’s economic success, the 
embedded middle class in Hong Kong have found the changing political and social 
situation in the post-1997 era challenging. Political movements and mass rallies 
since 2003 are considered by scholars such as Lui (2014b) and So (2014), as 
evidence of the embedded middle classes’ discontent towards a loss of social and 
political distinctiveness, and a restriction of individual rights and freedom under the 
influence of China. The responses of the middle classes in Hong Kong towards a 
growing sense of social and political restlessness are diverse, ranging from active 
political participation to emigration. Studies have shown that overall, Hong Kong 
people’s cultural identity has been strengthened since the handover (Mathews, Ma, 
and Lui 2008; Veg 2017; Ho, Jackson, and Kong 2017).  
Interviews with some young people from Hong Kong has shown that they believed 
to maintain a middle-class identity is to distinguish themselves from the 
mainlanders. Cher, a Hong Kong informant said, 
I am a Hongkongese of course. In fact, I didn’t care about whether I was a 
Hongkongese or Chinese before. Few years ago, if you ask me, I would 
say I am a Chinese from Hong Kong. But things are different now. Now I 
would really want to draw a line between me and those Chinese. I wouldn’t 
 93 
want to be considered as a Chinese. All the political issues I have 
witnessed over the past few years, they have affected how I see my grim 
future in Hong Kong and have made me more determined to stay living in 
the UK. Especially now that I am married, I would really worry about the 
future of my children, if I have any. This is not just about hoping my kids to 
grow up in an English-speaking environment. It is also about I don’t want 
them to learn some of the bad behaviours of mainlanders. I said to my 
husband that I don’t want my kids to grow up in Hong Kong. As a 
Hongkongese, I see some of the behaviours of mainlanders as 
inappropriate, but they don’t see it the same way because they are from 
that environment. But I don’t want my kids to behave like them. 
Cher was sent by her Hong Kong middle-class family to study in the UK on her own 
at the age of 15 years. Now a married woman, Cher still maintained a very strong 
Hong Kong identity. Her class identity is reflected by her statement about how she 
hoped to raise her children in the UK, an English-speaking environment as she 
emphasised, and teach them about proper behaviours that are arguably more 
British or Hong Kong, rather than mainland Chinese. 
Fiona, a PhD student studying History in the UK also commented, 
These days, many people say Hong Kong people who are close to Beijing 
or pro-Beijing are those who are older and from a lower-class background. 
They are seen as uneducated. 
Gina, a former nurse from Hong Kong, also had her own standard about good 
qualities or behaviours that is related to her Hong Kong and class identity. She said, 
I would say I am a Hongkongese. I have met quite a few Mainland Chinese 
here who would take a look at you and if they thought you were a Chinese; 
they would speak to you in Chinese immediately. I think this is rather rude. 
90% of them would not even ask whether you speak Mandarin or not. They 
just assume that you must be coming from China! Very few of them would 
approach you in English when they first meet you, which they should. This 
is universal, especially when you meet strangers outside of your own 
country. We, Hongkongese would not do that. 
As scholars have suggested, Hong Kong’s unique cultural identity originates as a 
desire to maintain membership among a globally elite group of nations defined by 
democratic governance and capitalistic economic practices, and to preserve the way 
of life characterised by mobility oriented away from China (Abelmann et al. 2014; 
Mathews et al. 2008). Moreover, Shih (1998, 295)’s study on the social 
constructions of mainland Chinese migrant women in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
argues, 
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Without the convenient marker of language or ethnic difference, and 
without a ready-made discourse of independent national memory and 
culture, (Hong Kong and Taiwan) cultural imaginaries must turn elsewhere 
for the recognition, production, and consolidation of difference. 
As young Hong Kong people look elsewhere for the production of difference in a 
transnational setting, class, and more specifically appropriate behaviours associated 
with class identity, become significant. Hoping to be seen as educated, cultured and 
coming from a middle-class background mean that young Hong Kong people seek 
to maintain a profile that is not identified too closely with mainland Chinese. 
BEING MIDDLE CLASS IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 
 
Class awareness has a long history in Britain. Working-class identities were 
developed from very early in the 18th century (Thompson 2013). In the English 
notion of class, class is “a discursive, historically specific construction, a product of 
middle-class political consolidation, which includes elements of fantasy and 
projection” (Skeggs 2002, 5). The first formal measures of household class were 
developed by the Registrar General’s Office in 1911. The boundary between the 
working and middle classes was strongly associated with the difference between 
“manual” and “non-manual” employment. In contrast to the mainland Chinese and 
Hong Kong societies, where the middle class is still a new and unstable group, the 
middle class in Britain has a much longer history; class privileges are passed down 
from generation to generation and through education and consolidated by social ties 
and networks.  
Income and house value are important criteria to claim or to be allocated to 
membership of a particular class. Scholars’ interest in the correlation between 
domestic property and social class can be traced back to the 1960s. Rex and Moore 
(1967, 273–74) observe that people’s “market situation” determines their “differential 
access to property”. In the UK, there is a striking divide between those who own and 
those who rent. Since a house is also a form of investment, those who own a 
property have a greater sense of security than those who do not. British literature on 
housing and class often points to how housing inequality and deprivation, and the 
accumulation of real wealth, results from home ownership and housing inheritance 
 95 
(see Badcock 1989; Clapham, Kemp, and Smith 1990; Crawford and Mckee 2018; 
Forrest and Murie 1994; Hamnett 1991).  
According to the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) conducted in 2013, which was 
a collaborative work between British sociologists Mike Savage and Fiona Devine, 
and the BBC, the British class structure has changed from a Victorian system 
featuring a three-class system (“working”, “middle” and “upper” classes) to a more 
complex model of class dynamics. The GBCS was a twenty-minute web survey 
hosted by the BBC, which covered questions on leisure pursuits, cultural tastes, 
social networks, and economic situation. Economic questions related to household 
income, savings and house value, highbrow and emerging cultural capital, and 
information on the number and status of the social ties respondents had. Within a 
few weeks of going live, over 161,000 responses were received. Over 90% of the 
survey respondents considered themselves “White”. The GBCS became the largest 
survey of social class ever conducted in Britain. After performing a “latent class 
analysis” of the survey data, Savage (2015) proposed seven new social classes 
based on household income, household savings and house value: elite; established 
middle-class; technical middle-class; new affluent workers; traditional working-class; 
emerging service workers; and precariat. 
Savage and his research team note that these seven classes do not form a neat 
hierarchy, despite attempts to rank them according to level of economic capital. 
While the team is confident with the order of placing the “elites” at the top, followed 
by the “established middle-class”, and having “precariat” at the bottom, they are less 
sure whether “new affluent workers” should be placed higher or lower than the 
“technical middle-class”. They also note that the “traditional working-class” and 
“emerging service workers” may differ in the balance between their income and 
house values.  
Savage’s seven social classes is different from the nested classification proposed 
by the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification, which is designed based 
on the levels of occupation, and is the official socio-economic classification in the 
United Kingdom. Its eight classes version is most commonly used, and the order of 
the classes is as follows: higher managerial and professional occupations; lower 
managerial and professional occupations; intermediate occupations (clerical, sales, 
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service); small employers and own account workers; lower supervisory and 
technical occupations; semi-routine occupations; routine occupations; and never 
worked or long-term unemployed (see Rose and O’Reilly 1997). 
I take on Savage (2015)’s class stratification as it is not based purely on the level of 
employment, but also income level of a household, house value, and a cultural 
judgement of the social importance and the respectability of one’s occupation. Here 
again, we can see the tensions between economic and cultural capital in defining 
the middle class. Using Bourdieu’s concept of social distinction and theory of 
cultural capital, Savage wrote the working-class was considered to be “less 
cultured” and inferior to the middle or non-manual class (see Savage 2015, 33–35) 
because of their lack of ability to “command claims to cultural snobbery and 
privilege” (Savage 2015, 39). Having a white-collar job, earning a considerable 
income, and owning a property and/or car are not adequate to be seen as middle 
class; rather adapting to the “culture” is equally important to increase one’s 
respectability. In Britain, class distinctions are often drawn along the lines of 
language, accents, cultural behaviours, and attitudes, but not only on wealth.  
In the UK, the hierarchy of tastes is a matured, sophisticated and settled territory. 
Among homeowners, which area/district a property is located in, the type of property 
(i.e. a flat, a house, privately owned or council estate), the number of bedrooms and 
bathrooms, and the magnificence of the garden being among the criteria of 
judgement. Among people claiming to belong to the middle class, everything can be 
used as the basis of sophisticated distinctions. Wearing vintage clothing is better 
than wearing famous trademarks. Sitting down to have dinner round a table is 
superior to doing so in front of the television. While wine knowledge is appreciated, 
excessive drinking and obesity are not. Hobbies and entertainment are important to 
demonstrate one’s taste, for example classical music, contemporary theatre and 
artistic performances are assessed as tasteful activities. The pattern of classification 
is limitless. 
Being unable to converse in a way associated with having “good” education is often 
presented as a lack of “standards”. Middle-class families in the UK, like those in 
China and Hong Kong, tend to invest a large amount of money in cultivating their 
children’s interests in certain cultural activities and hobbies, such as piano and 
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French lessons, getting them into good private schools, and placing equal 
importance on their children’s performance in extra-curricular activities as on 
academic results.  
Although most British people, as Savage (2015) notes, continue to identify strong 
markers of class through the identification of family background and lifestyle, as well 
as through their interactions with those different to themselves, it has been observed 
that the British are now engaged with complex “emotional politics” of class (see also 
Skeggs 2002), due to a general public disdain of the idea of snobbery and class 
prejudice As Savage (2015: 366) notes, 
Class is important not so much as an overt badge (when people feel proud 
to belong to a class), but more in the way it prompts moral and emotional 
reactions, especially negative ones. It matters more which class you do not 
belong to, rather than which one you think you do belong to. 
Talking about class in public is uncomfortable. Although British people regularly 
distance themselves from the idea of social class, and class snobbery, what they 
say (or not) about class is different from how they actually enact and perform class 
in their everyday lives. This goes to the heart of the “new snobbery” that Savage 
describes in today’s class talk.  
Similar emotional politics can be observed among my mainland Chinese and Hong 
Kong informants. Some of them were not comfortable to say they belonged to the 
middle class, but when they were asked to choose between lower class, middle 
class and upper class, they selected the middle-class category. As I discussed 
further in this chapter, it seems to me that just like the British middle class, there is a 
very complex etiquette about how and when class is talked about among informants 
from the two cohorts. As highly educated migrants, they refused to be classified as a 
wealthy person because to admit that would mean that they do not fully 
acknowledge the resources provided by their family that give them migration 
opportunities and better life chances, inflicting negative moral and emotional 
reactions. While informants tended to be careful not to show off their wealth, they 
narrated stories about the hardship that their grandparents endured and the hard 
work of their parents (for example, see Gloria’s quote below). At the same time, as 
migrants themselves who had high class aspirations, even if they did not feel they 
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belonged to the middle class in the UK now, they expressed the hope that they 
would in the near future. 
 
CLASS AND MIGRATION 
 
I think I haven’t fit in to any classes here…York has many rich retired 
people. But I am just a student. I think social classes in the UK are not 
entirely determined by income, but hobbies, temperaments, and habits… I 
belong to a separate category called “Chinese or Asian immigrants”. But in 
the future, I think I could gradually climb up the social ladder in the UK. 
(Joy, a 23-year-old event organiser who arrived in the UK in 2012) 
 
Migrants’ understandings of class, and of their class identities, are complex and 
temporary. Fathi (2017) argues that there are limitations in adopting classical 
theories of class when analysing migrants’ accounts. For example, Fathi (2017, 22) 
states that Marxist, Weberian and Bourdieuian approaches to the study of class lack 
an attention to “gender, race, belonging and, to a degree, space”. She also notes 
(2017, 25) that while prestige is argued as being an important dimension of the 
Weberian concept of status, it is not clear as to how prestige would be evaluated 
when such concept varies in different societies. None of the main theoretical 
approaches to class, including the Marxist, Weberian and Bourdieuian, consider 
migration as a factor that may change the class schemata in a society. 
In the broader migration literature, the class representations of different groups of 
migrants are often seen as a manifestation of uneven power relations resulting from 
global inequalities. At the lower end of a transnational hierarchy we find refugees, 
asylum seekers, and unskilled labour migrants; in the middle of the spectrum, we 
locate international students and other middling transnationals who are in less 
marginal positions; at the top, we see highly skilled and investment migrants, and 
global elites who enjoy flexible mobility due to their tangible capital and privileged 
positions. However, we often ignore the facts that refugees or asylum seekers could 
be coming from a middle-class background in their country of origin, or skilled 
migrants could only find unskilled jobs after migration. I refer to sociological 
literature concerning “middling transnationals” and “skilled migrants” to understand 
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my informants’ class position. The term “middling transnationalism” (Conradson and 
Latham 2005) describes the mobilities of those who are neither transnational elites 
nor developing-world migrants. According to Smith (2005, 242), “middling 
transnationals” are those who “occupy more or less middle class or status positions” 
in both their original and receiving countries. I find these definitions relevant but 
sometimes too broad for capturing the class dynamics of my informants. 
If being self-funded is itself a class signifier, the majority of student migrants in this 
study do occupy a middle-class status in their country of origin. But where does their 
money come from? While most informants were funded by their parents only, a 
minority were supported by a collective fund contributed by their parents, 
grandparents, other relatives, parents’ friends, etc. Some informants who had 
siblings told me that their family could only afford to send one child abroad. If 
collective kin support is needed to pursue international education, or if only one 
sibling can be sent abroad, does this mean that the family is – financially, at any rate 
- below “middle-class”? It seems to me that heterogeneous manifestations of class 
position in relation to international education exist but have not been fully explored 
in previous studies. 
While it would be easy to assume that skilled migrants come from a middle-class 
background in their country of origin, there is, in fact, no universal definition of 
“skilled migrant”. In her study of “highly skilled” middling Singaporean transnationals 
in London, Ho (2011) quotes Koser and Salt (1997) to show that a clear definition of 
a skilled migrant cannot be obtained, despite social scientists’ efforts to develop a 
definition based on migrants’ skills, qualifications, and experience. Iredale (2001) 
broadly defines a highly skilled worker as an individual with a university degree or 
equivalent experience in the field. This definition remains inadequate in light of the 
fact that many of my informants who studied arts, humanities, and social sciences 
disciplines at university did not consider themselves “skilled”. They commented that 
they did not acquire any “hard” technical skills that could be useful in the work 
environment. Even though they were aware that in an idealised neoliberal 
employment market, the employee is expected to demonstrate “soft” interpersonal 
skills – skills that their disciplines are known for (Urciuoli 2008) – they did not think 
that such skills would help them to qualify as skilled migrants in the eyes of the 
Home Office. 
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If the sociological categories used in the academic literature are not adequate to 
help locate my informants’ class position, would the stratification of the Home Office 
be more useful? In recent years, the British visa regime has developed increasingly 
complicated visa application processes for non-EEA migrants, creating more 
bureaucratic steps, and making longer lists of fees for visa applicants. Decisions on 
visa applications are now routinely made according to economic criteria, such as 
applicants’ income and personal wealth. Steadily increasing fees have also become 
attached to many aspects of visa application processes, such as the healthcare 
surcharge, the tuberculosis test result which must be obtained at a cost from clinics 
approved by the Home Office, and so forth. The stratification of the Home Office is 
manifested in the lists of fees that temporary migrants need to pay prior to arrival; 
the lists filter out applications who do not have a certain level of financial means. 
Skilled migrants from outside the EEA countries can apply for a Tier 2 (General) 
visa if they are offered a “skilled job” in which they usually need to be paid at least 
£30,000 per year. This salary is higher than the median annual income in the UK, 
which was £28,677 for full-time employees in 2017 (Office for National Statistics 
2017). The Home Office’s stratification and visa requirements give us a clue of the 
kind of migrants that are welcomed in the UK, who are likely to be coming from a 
middle-class background in their country of origin, and are unlikely to require the 
use of the welfare system during their stay in the UK.  
However, as I will further explain in chapter 3, not all middle-class well-educated 
Chinese migrants could take up visa-sponsored jobs in the UK. The way that 
middle-class migrants experience immediate downward mobility in a new 
geographical and cultural environment due to the depreciation and the 
inconvertibility of their cultural capital and symbolic capital has been well-studied 
(see Fong 2011; Ho 2013; 2014). Although observations of migrants’ “class shifts” 
are relatively common in the migration literature, few studies discuss how migration 
pushes migrants to become aware of or rethink their own class status, and the 
markers of the class system in their home countries, as well as those of the new 
country.  
Regardless of how migrants hope to distinguish themselves hierarchically from 
others, for a social group to be called a class, there must be a common signifier that 
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is “widely understood and accepted in society” (Guo 2016, 2). However, such a 
signifier could be slippery in the context of migration. For instance, those who come 
from a middle-class background in China – a fast-developing economy – may not be 
considered middle-class by the British society. Similarly, old privileges that used to 
be associated with one’s class background may lose their meaning in a new cultural 
environment. In other words, the “middle-class” in the UK and the “middle-class” in 
China could be conceptually different. 
Mobility is a process of ontological negotiations. Geographical mobility creates 
circumstances where migrants are required to enter a conscious or unconscious 
process of setting goals, accumulating and deploying capital, and pursuing self-
improvement. This process is directly related to migrants’ social mobility and how 
they perceive their present social position by comparing their lives before and after 
migration. It is migrants’ reflections on class and their self-fashioning, and how this 
process of constructing a class identity is constrained by a set of socially acceptable 
categories and definitions, that I aim to address in the second half of the chapter. 
 
MIGRANTS’ SELF-PERCEIVED MIDDLE-CLASS STATUS IN CHINA AND 
HONG KONG 
 
As a relatively young group (aged between 22 and 36 years old), more than half of 
the informants relied mainly on the resources provided by their families to pay for 
their living expenses in the UK. Of the 67 informants, 23 were not in employment or 
had no income. They were mainly student migrants who did not take up part-time 
jobs, and fresh graduates who had not yet secured employment in the UK. 
Additionally, 20 informants were underemployed, earning a net monthly salary of 
less than £1,000. Ten informants earned a net monthly salary of between £1,000 
and £1,999, which they regarded as “insufficient” to accumulate any savings. Only 
one-fifth of the total number of informants had an income that they felt allowed them 
to live comfortably; among which ten informants earned between £2,000 and £2,999 
a month, and four earned over £3,000. Importantly, nearly all female informants who 
were in employment said they earned less than their partner in the UK. Although 
most informants were not in full-time employment or were under-employed, they still 
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evaluated their self-perceived class status as “lower middle”, “middle” or 
“somewhere in the middle” based on their family background, educational 
qualifications, and potential earning power. 
Informants’ parents worked in various fields, such as corporate businesses, small-
to-medium sized family businesses, secondary or tertiary education, I.T., banking, 
insurance, and civil services, etc. They saw their parents’ occupation as an 
important indicator of their own class status. A relatively typical profile of a mainland 
Chinese informant in this study was having a mother who works as a teacher, and a 
father who works as a civil servant; or a mother who works as a civil servant, and a 
father who owns a small-to-medium business. There were also a number of 
informants who did not come from a dual-income family, with their mother being a 
housewife, and father being a traditional breadwinner. Here, I include several quotes 
about migrants’ perceptions of their own class background from both male and 
female informants from China and Hong Kong. 
If I judge my class status based on my family background, I think I belong 
to the middle-class. My father had a big business in China. Unfortunately, 
he died because of a car accident. Although my dad has passed away, the 
company is still running; and our family could afford to send me and my 
sister to study overseas. 
(Biyu, a 26-year-old mainland Chinese woman who is married to a Scottish 
man) 
 
My parents are civil servants. I wouldn’t say our family is rich but we could 
live a comfortable life in China. I mean, if we were so rich, then my parents 
could have sent me to study abroad when I was younger, then I could be 
like my husband who completed his secondary school education here. But 
we were not. 
(Ling Ling, a 22-year-old mainland Chinese woman who is married to a 
British citizen originating from Hong Kong) 
 
I don’t think I am very rich. We have too many rich people in China. My 
family is not that rich but they can always travel abroad. My parents had 
also received a university education. It is very impressive because in those 
days it was very difficult to get into university, so I guess I am definitely 
middle-class in China. 
(Dai Ming, a 27-year-old mainland Chinese man who is completing his PhD 
in the UK) 
 
I think I come from a middle-class family because my parents could afford 
to send me and my sister to the UK for education. I have had a piano since 
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I was young. I also know that learning music is quite an expensive hobby in 
Hong Kong. I now study a music degree in London, and I hang out with 
friends here who also study music and are good at playing at least one 
musical instrument. These friends of mine, they come from at least a 
middle-class, and even an upper middle-class family background.  
(Jessica, a 23-year-old single woman from Hong Kong) 
  
Informants generally saw their capability to pursue an overseas degree as an 
important indication of class status. They also often described their lives in China or 
Hong Kong as “comfortable”, “abundant”, “sufficient”; they have “never eaten 
bitterness in life” and “never worried about putting food on the table”. Their family 
could afford to pay for their extra-curricular lessons, such as private tutoring, piano 
classes and violin lessons, and to send them abroad for education. Informants also 
evaluated their own class status by making vague comparisons, for example, they 
did not regard themselves as lower-class people because they “were not entitled for 
social benefits” or “did not live in a poor area”. Simultaneously, they acknowledged 
the existence of the super-rich and elites who live a luxurious and extravagant life, 
and own big houses and expensive cars. In comparison, they regarded themselves 
as “not as rich” or “just ordinary” with “occasional bourgeois consumption of 
expensive brands”. 
In this research, I find it inadequate to classify my informants’ class status solely 
based on income level, occupation, and other economic representations because 
the majority did not have a full-time job. Therefore, I consider educational 
qualifications and informants’ own self-ascribed class identity as the most relevant 
indicators of their class status.  
 
CONFUSION ABOUT CLASS IDENTITY IN THE UK 
 
For some informants, class itself is a vague and unfixed concept. They often found it 
hard to translate their original class status into the class system of the UK.  
I think it is difficult to identify social classes in China because in my parents’ 
generation, they had nothing, and they built up their lives by working really 
hard. But I can’t deny that my family is wealthy in China because I was sent 
to study abroad when I was young. My mum also has a lot of savings that 
she has already bought a house for herself in the UK. But in the UK, social 
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class is not just about how much money you have in your bank account. It 
is also about your lifestyle, temperament, your family background…In 
China, we can’t talk about social classes by looking into all these aspects. 
We can only differentiate between those who have money and those who 
don’t. Family background as a criterion was more or less removed because 
of what happened in the past (indicating the Cultural Revolution here). If I 
judge my social class just by how much money my family has, I guess my 
family belongs to the upper middle-class.  
(Gloria, a 28-year-old mainland Chinese woman who lives in London with 
her husband, also a Chinese migrant) 
 
I think my class status in the UK is lower than what I was in China. But it is 
really hard to tell because in London, we have many foreigners. We have 
more foreigners than locals. How do immigrants fit into the British class 
system? I don’t know. But I think my social class wouldn’t be too low 
because my husband belongs to the middle-class here. It is just the ways 
he talks and socialises with people… his accent is good, and he is quite 
posh.  
(Mi, a 26-year-old Chinese woman who arrived in the UK in 2013 and 
works in the fashion industry in London) 
 
In this study, I observe that the longer migrants were removed from their original 
social and cultural context, the more uncertain they became in perceiving their own 
class status in the UK. Chinese migrants who had been living in the UK for an 
extensive period of time, or were married to a local British person, tended to be 
more aware of the distinctive features of class in Britain. Very often, they had to 
adapt to unfamiliar cultural practices and use new logics to understand what it 
means to be “middle-class” in British society.  
In their study of mainland Chinese marriage migrants in Singapore, Zhang, Lu, and 
Yeoh (2015) looked at how migrants’ imagination of cosmopolitan living was very 
different from the reality they faced in the rural neighbourhoods of Singapore. While 
brides from mainland China are often seen as coming from “low-class country”, they 
themselves see the Singaporean family that they marry into as “rural”, “traditional”, 
and “anything but cosmopolitan and urban” (Ibid., 238), due to the smallness and 
provinciality of the flat they live in, and cultural clashes in their daily lives14. Although 
 
14 For example, Zhang, Lu and Yeoh (2015) discover that while urban Chinese migrant wives 
see dressing up and applying make-up as essential for socialising, and to maintain “face” for 
their husband, women in Singapore usually only wear “good clothes for important 
occasions”. This cultural difference causes great misunderstanding. In Singapore, when 
Chinese migrant wives have a makeover, they are seen as trying to be sexually seductive to 
men other than their husband. 
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class is not a focus in their study, their discussion of the “problematic process of 
assimilation or acculturation” (Ibid., 238) in migrants’ daily lives resonates with my 
observation of my informants, who often rationalised their class experiences as 
“cultural difference” (wenhua chayi). Examples include the case of David which I 
presented at the very beginning of this chapter, and Mi, who thought that her 
husband’s “posh” English accent and socialising behaviours helped to increase his 
respectability. Mi had learnt that although the link between accent or language and 
class is weak in the Chinese context, in the UK, a person’s accent is a very 
important reflection of their class position. 
 
SUSPENSION OF CLASS-RELATED PRIVILEGES IN THE UK 
 
For those who had work experience before migrating to the UK, a reduction in 
income generated a sense of insecurity about their middle-class status. However, 
for most informants, this was generally understood as a sacrifice they were willing to 
make and a temporary situation. For instance, Karmen, a 31-year-old personal carer 
in London, who had worked as a full-time nurse in a public hospital in Hong Kong, 
came to the UK as a working holiday maker. She said,  
I think judging from my income in Hong Kong, I should be considered as a 
middle-class. Now in the UK, I think I belong to the lower-class because my 
salary is very low. If I take more shifts, I could earn more…but now I only 
work four days a week, 12 hours a day. After paying tax, there is nothing 
much left. 
 
Karmen chose to suspend her earning power and career prospects in Hong Kong to 
pursue a romantic opportunity and a better work-life balance in the UK. Her long-
term goal, however, was to become a registered nurse in the UK. When she did not 
work, she was preparing her registration application, including passing the English 
language exam. In her view, being a registered nurse in the UK would mean a 
significant drop in her income from HKD$40,000 per month (HKD$480,000 or 
£50,000 per year) in Hong Kong to £23,000 per year (Groome 2017) in the UK 
before tax. But it would also be the first step towards gaining British citizenship.  
Suspension - intentionally suspending, or putting on hold, some aspects of life in 
order to maximise others - is a work-life strategy that many migrants use. 
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Suspension shifts migrants’ life focus from the present to the imagined future; this 
process is driven by migrants’ aspirations, desires, and capacities. Suspension of 
class-related privileges and a sense of insecurity about class depreciation often 
goes hand in hand. This is reflected in the case of Lin Lin, a 28-year-old migrant 
who completed her master’s degree and switched onto a Tier 4 Dependant visa. In 
her case, she had suspended her socio-economic mobility and potential earning 
power in China in order to accompany her husband to finish his PhD in the UK. She 
said, “I was middle-class in China. But I have become wu chan15 in the UK. I don’t 
have a property here. I don’t have a stable job here.”  
 
CONCLUSION: TEMPORALITIES OF MIGRATION AND THE 
TEMPORALITY OF CLASS 
 
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, Wright and Shin (1988, 9-10) argue 
that class has a temporal nature. This is because people often make sense of their 
current socio-economic situation and justify their social position by comparing their 
present economic position with their past lives. Class identity is a narrative (Giddens 
1991) rather than a fixed destination.  
For temporary migrants, class identity is complex and entangled with their identity 
as a migrant. As Savage (2000, 150) argues, we should “see class cultures as 
contingently embodying forms of individualised identities which operate relationally”. 
In this chapter, I have discussed the social meanings of class in contemporary 
China, Hong Kong, and Britain. As demonstrated by data from my interviews with 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong migrants, class representation from a political 
and sociological perspective does not necessarily match with individuals’ own 
perception of their class status, which also changes over time during their migration 
trajectories in the UK. 
 
15 “Wu chan” is a short form of “wu chan jie ji”, meaning proletariat in Marx’s class theory. Lin 
Lin’s use of “wu chan” has a simpler meaning: “wu” means “lacking” and “chan” means 
property. Rather than describing herself as a proletariat according to Marx’s understanding, 
Lin Lin was saying that she had no property in the UK. 
  
 107 
Migration and new cultural encounters may challenge Chinese migrants’ knowledge 
and ideas about class, especially after a period of stay in the UK. Migrants are 
aware that the British class system works differently, and that their Chinese or Hong 
Kong class status loses its former meaning in the new cultural and social context. 
This chapter shows that Chinese migrants’ understanding of their own class status, 
of what class is, and how it works in general, are sometimes upset by their 
encounters with British society. The movement of people and border regulations 
contribute to different forms of social inequality. For example, migrant workers, 
including those who are well-educated and skilled, are prone to vulnerability as they 
are often subjected to differential treatment in the labour market (see chapter 3) and 
the time-related visa restrictions of the destination country (see chapters 3 and 5). 
Although the majority of informants saw themselves as “in the middle” of the social 
spectrum in their place of origin, some felt that they had experienced a degradation 
of their class status after migrating to the UK (for example, see Lin Lin’s comment 
about becoming “wu chan” (proletariat/lack of property). Other self-perceived 
middle-class informants, however, thought that they still retained their middling 
position after migration; or if their class status had changed, it would only be 
temporary. In other cases, marriage migrants justified their class identity by referring 
to class position of their spouses in the UK. All of these examples demonstrate that 
the temporality of class and the temporalities of migration work simultaneously to 
shape temporary migrants’ class identity. They also highlight the agency of Chinese 
temporary migrants in constantly seeking ways to make sense of their class and 
migrant identities in the UK.  
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CHAPTER 3  
OBSTACLES TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND CONVERSION: 
DIFFERENTIAL INCLUSION IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
Existing studies of Chinese international student migration have applied Bourdieu’s 
theoretical tools to class analysis. For examples, Waters (2006) and Xiang and 
Shen (2009) all analyse how middle-class children acquire cultural capital through 
overseas education and the role of capital convertibility in class consolidation 
processes. Among these studies, cultural capital acquired overseas is often seen as 
useful to increase middle-class children’s employability and maintain their status as 
they return home. Other studies look at the problems of capital devaluation and 
deskilling faced by ethnically Chinese skilled migrants or student migrants who 
move to western countries and stay overseas successfully (Ho 2013; Man 2004). 
However, little is known about the obstacles to the processes of capital 
accumulation and conversion of young Chinese middle-class migrants who struggle 
to remain overseas, and which types and subtypes of capital are being used in 
attempts to achieve transnational goals and consolidate a middle-class identity that 
would be recognised both in their home countries and the UK. I argue that it is 
useful to use the term “capital” to define and analyse the resources discussed in this 
chapter. This is because Bourdieu’s interpretation of the four different forms of 
capital, i.e. economic (income and wealth), cultural capital (education, language and 
taste), social capital (social network and connection), and symbolic capital (objects 
that are related to one’s status) is a framework that allows us to identify middle-class 
membership. 
The concept of capital conversion derives from Bourdieu’s influential argument that 
in modern society, income and wealth alone are not enough to determine class 
identity and membership. Bourdieu pays extra attention to cultural capital because it 
can generate the other three forms of capital, and thus is regarded as the key to 
securing middle-class reproduction. For example, Bourdieu (1986: 245) describes 
how in class-divided societies, “possessors of large cultural capital” are able also to 
secure material and symbolic profits, whereas those who are from poor families and 
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do not have the economic and cultural means to continue education, but only to 
maintain the minimum necessities of their lives, cannot do so.  
Bourdieu (1986) describes three features of “capital”: (1) capital takes time to 
accumulate; (2) the value of capital is determined by its convertibility; and (3) the 
conversion processes of different types and subtypes of capital are subjected to 
sets of constraints of the social world. These features are precisely the reasons why 
Chinese migrants who consider themselves middle class in China or Hong Kong 
may not be able to identify themselves as having the same status in the UK (see 
chapter 2), due to the lack of time to accumulate capital in the UK and the difficulty 
to convert their own nationally and culturally bounded capital.  
Inspired by the work of Plüss (2013) on migrants’ capital conversion abilities, I will 
examine the processes through which Chinese migrants are able to effect 
conversions between different forms of capital, such as economic, cultural and 
social capital. In this chapter, I will also identify several subtypes of capital that are 
specific to, and help illuminate, migrant experience, e.g. temporal capital, family 
capital and intimate relationship capital. I will show how these types and subtypes of 
capital are related and distinct. In other words, I hope to contribute new elements to 
the analysis of capital conversion. 
 
THE CONVERSIONS OF ECONOMIC, CULTURAL  
AND TEMPORAL CAPITAL  
 
In chapter 1, I discussed the efforts of Chinese middle-class families to help their 
children to accumulate institutionalised cultural capital, especially in the form of a 
foreign degree. Student migrants (and their family) actively transform economic 
capital into cultural capital. According to the website TopUniversities, which 
specialises in offering advice to students who intend to pursue a global career and 
higher education, undergraduate tuition fees for international students in the UK 
currently start at around £10,000 annually, rising to £35,000 or more. At the 
postgraduate level, yearly tuition fees for taught degrees varied between £9,700 and 
£32,000 in 2016/17 (Playdon 2018). In addition to tuition fees, each international 
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student in the UK is expected to have a living allowance of at least £1,015 a month 
(Home Office 2019a). Even though informants did not normally equate spending 
such large sums with buying a foreign degree, many held the view that without the 
money required to buy time and temporary residency rights in the UK, they could not 
have made it overseas. In this sense, time is a form of capital that can be converted 
from economic capital. 
The UK employs a points-based immigration system to regulate the number, 
composition, and qualities of migrants from non-EEA countries. Most temporary 
migrants are subjected to what I call “state-controlled time” (see chapter 5), which 
refers to the lengths of time that migrants are allowed to live in the destination 
country. Temporary migrants in the UK are also allowed to count time spent in the 
country towards the five-year and/or ten-year permanent residency paths. If a 
temporary resident manages to live in the UK with a valid visa for long enough, he 
or she will earn the ticket to permanent residency or probationary citizenship and 
become a “to-be-citizen” (Kostakopoulous 2010; Van Houdt, Suvarierol, and 
Schinkel 2011; Soysal 2012). Probationary citizenship is a reward for committed 
migrants as it frees them from visa restrictions, but such a reward can be taken 
away if they no longer fulfil the requirements set by Home Office, for example if they 
leave the UK for more than two years. 
As I have stated elsewhere in this thesis, not all of the temporary migrants that I 
interviewed hoped to stay in the UK permanently or to obtain British citizenship. 
However, migrants’ wish to prolong their stays meant that they had to navigate their 
personal and professional lives within the visa system whilst living in the UK. For 
those who had already obtained a British degree and had no intention to continue 
studying, the routes to achieve extended residency were limited to employment, 
investment, and marriage. 
Most informants attempted to or at least considered converting their institutionalised 
cultural capital back into economic capital and visa-time capital by securing visa-
sponsored employment. However, restrictive immigration policy, the temporalities of 
migration, and differential inclusion in the labour market made staying on in the UK 
through visa-sponsored employment a difficult goal to attain. The pathway to 
settlement through skilled work has been, for many years, narrowing. In 2012, the 
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then-Home Secretary Theresa May cancelled the Post-Study Work (PSW) visa, 
which took away non-EEA students’ right to spend two years in the UK after 
graduation. In September 2019, the Home Office announced new proposals, one of 
which is to re-introduce the 2-year Post-Study Work visa for non-EEA students 
starting courses from 2021. This proposal was criticised by the right-wing campaign 
group Migration Watch as a “retrograde step” (BBC News 2019).  
Under the current visa regulations, students have a maximum of four months to look 
for graduate-level and visa-sponsored jobs. They will usually need to meet certain 
financial requirements to acquire a Tier 2 (General Work) visa: a minimum salary of 
£30,000 per year or earning the “appropriate rate” for the job that they are offered. 
In this thesis, Tier 2 visa is an abbreviation for Tier 2 (General Work) visa, unless 
specify otherwise. This visa is issued for workers who have a skilled job offer and a 
certificate of sponsorship from a UK employer (Home Office 2019b). However, 
during my data collection between 2016 and 2017, the minimum financial 
requirement for the Tier 2 visa was lower. At that time, my informants would have to 
earn a minimum salary of £20,800 per year for the visa; and a minimum of £35,000 
or more per year in order to acquire UK indefinite leave to remain after holding a 
Tier 2 visa for five years. As for working holiday makers from Hong Kong who, 
unlike their mainland Chinese counterparts, were able to work in the UK through 
participation in the Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS), their two-year visa could not be 
renewed. Therefore, they too would have to look for visa-sponsored employment or 
explore other avenues during this fixed time period, if they wished to stay on in the 
UK. During the research interviews, my informants often criticised the Home Office, 
and expressed their view that these measures were constructed to impose barriers 
for migrants like them who hoped to establish themselves in the UK.  
Previous studies have suggested that Chinese well-educated migrants in developed 
western countries often experience deskilling, depreciation of cultural capital, and 
immediate downward mobility due to a sudden change of habitus (see Fong 2011; 
Ho 2013; Man 2004). As argued by Friedmann (2002: 302), habitus, which can be 
understood as an environment in which social norms and tendencies are shaped by 
individuals over time, is place-contingent. As such, the occupational habitus of 
migrants’ place of origin often creates tension when exercised in a different socio-
economic context. However, individuals may “continue to judge their circumstances 
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according to the “rules” of their place of origin” (Kelly and Lusis 2006: 837). 
Changing of habitus remains a discomforting process when people find themselves 
confined in an environment where former achievements and resources are rendered 
irrelevant (Oliver and O’Reilly 2010: 14). 
This echoes my informants’ experiences in the UK. For those who obtained 
educational qualifications from their country of origin, their credentials were not 
always transferrable; and cultural capital was not an item in a “rucksack” that could 
be carried across borders freely (Erel 2010). Many felt their skills and qualifications 
were underrated, their job choices were limited, and their salaries were lower than 
they had expected. 
Analysing migrants’ narratives of impediment reveals how the neoliberal assumption 
that geographical and social mobility are improved through an accumulation of 
economic and educational capital is not borne out in practice. The social sciences 
literature provides ample examples of this: over-qualified Filipino domestic helpers 
in First World countries (Constable 2003; Lan 2006; Parreñas 2001), degree holders 
from the EU taking up unskilled jobs in the UK (Jordan and Brown 2007), and highly 
educated migrants failing to get into sectors classified as “highly-skilled” in 
destination countries (Kofman and Raghuram 2005).  
Also, education migration does not bring equal employment opportunities and life 
chances to those who move. Depending on the popularity of the degree that 
migrants pursue, their job prospects, income level, and chances of staying on in the 
UK vary. In general, my informants perceived degrees in the arts, humanities and 
social sciences as less financially rewarding than degrees in finance, business, and 
management.  
My informants regarded a British university education as more valuable than a 
degree obtained in mainland China or Hong Kong in terms of conversion into 
economic and social capital in their home country, where a British degree is 
considered relatively prestigious by employers. For instance, Alice was a PhD 
graduate in Linguistics, who had been looking for academic jobs in the UK for 
months. She considered her qualification to be the most valuable in securing a 
lectureship at a university in China, but not in the UK. Overseas education does not 
only enable student returnees to accumulate and convert international social assets 
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on a larger scale, but also “lifts people to a higher scale of capital conversion” 
(Xiang and Shen 2009). This is in contrast to graduates who hope to stay on in the 
UK, where a British university education is seen as more of a norm, and is often a 
prerequisite to be considered for employment. 
LACKING EMBODIED CULTURAL CAPITAL 
  
My informants understood that although they were able to acquire institutionalised 
cultural capital from British universities within a few years, cultural knowledge about 
British social practices, fluency in English, and advancement in communication skills 
were harder to achieve. As temporary migrants, they lacked embodied cultural 
capital, which according to Bourdieu (1986), refers to an individual’s incorporation of 
cultural attitudes, norms, and practices that are inherited over time, primarily through 
the socialisation process within a family unit, to propel them forward or fast-track 
their career in the UK. 
Researchers argue that English language and communication skills are a form of 
embodied cultural capital that facilitates better job prospects, social interaction, and 
cultural integration for migrants moving to western developed countries (for 
example, Dustmann 1999; Thondhlana, Madziva and McGrath 2016). Although 
English education is widely incorporated in primary and secondary school 
curriculums in mainland China and Hong Kong, many informants commented that 
their teachers mainly focused on training their reading and writing skills, and 
memorisation of grammar and vocabulary, but not so much on their speaking and 
listening skills. After arriving the UK, many migrants had difficulties in understanding 
certain British accents and expressing themselves in English. But most agreed that 
their communication skills had improved after living in the UK for a period of time. 
Gradually, most migrants were able to make friends with non-Chinese people but 
very few had close British friends. For example, Sally, a 30-year-old spouse visa 
holder said, 
It has taken me some time to get used to the way British people talk and 
socialise here. The trouble is sometimes I may offend someone, but I 
wouldn’t know. This is something that no one would teach you. British 
people are quite polite, shy and not straightforward. You can only learn 
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about what you should say and what you can’t say by living here for a long 
time. 
 
Another informant, Cathy, a PhD holder and lecturer at a university in London, also 
admitted that incompetence in spoken English and a lack of communication skills 
were problems which made her feel that she was unable to earn respect from her 
colleagues and students. She said, 
My difficulty is that even though I’ve obtained a PhD degree in the UK, my 
English is not as good as the natives. When you give a lecture to students, 
you can’t make jokes that they can understand. You have no idea what 
students like and dislike…when students don’t like you, they can cause you 
a lot of trouble. 
  
In fact, language skills capital and cultural knowledge capital often go hand in hand. 
When migrants felt that their English was not “good enough”, they usually also 
described an inability to adapt to British culture and frustration in their daily lives. 
Cathy continued, 
When I first started to work here, I was not familiar with the western 
teaching style. On my first day of work, I was told to sit in a course and to 
observe how the course was run. I was told that I would take over the 
course 3 to 4 weeks later. When I went into the classroom, there was a 
middle-aged English guy there, I assumed he was the course tutor. He then 
started to take attendance. After that, he looked at me, and all the students 
looked at me. Then he said, “she may look like a student, but she is not. 
She will take over my course, not as a student, but as a teacher!”. This was 
the first day of my job. Can you imagine how I felt? I think there is a gender 
issue too. If it was my boyfriend who sat there - my boyfriend is 190cm tall 
by the way - I think the guy wouldn’t introduce him like this…In China, 
people generally respect teachers. Even though you are a woman, and you 
are young, your identity as a teacher automatically gives you respect. 
Chinese students don’t care too much about your experience and gender, 
they obey you as long as you occupy a higher social hierarchy. Maybe 
because I am Chinese, I see hierarchy in the work environment as very 
important. The guy who introduced me to the class was actually a 
Research Fellow, his job rank was below mine… Sometimes I feel really 
bad because it seems like everyone seems to think it is okay to give me 
advice, regardless of who they are and whether it is appropriate. 
Sometimes I don’t even agree with the advice that I am given. 
  
For new migrants, an improvement in English communication skills and an 
accumulation of embodied cultural capital in the British social context are essential 
for building a career in the UK, which often takes time. Depending on migrants’ own 
personality and social networks, their experiences of interactions with local people 
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vary. In Sally’s case, she stressed an observational learning approach in which 
direct teaching and instruction from her network was minimal. In Cathy’s case, 
although she received help and advice in her workplace, her own understanding of 
the importance of hierarchy in Chinese culture shaped the way she interacted with 
her colleagues and students, and her expectations from these interactions. 
Many migrants were aware of how unfamiliarity with cultural practices and social 
norms hinders the establishment of useful social networks that could shape career 
trajectories.  
For example, Li Ming, an auditor at a Scottish bank, aspired for career advancement 
to the managerial level. She said, 
When you become a manager, your role is to establish relationships with 
people above you and below you. But because I come from a different 
cultural background, I think it would be hard to do networking with people 
whose positions are above me. Of course, it is true that if you have a good 
personality or if you have good relationships with your colleagues, you will 
have more opportunities. After all, people always have preferences. If 
people like you, you will have more opportunities. It is very normal. This is 
also why some older colleagues of mine decided to return to Asia when 
they had reached a stage where they could no longer progress further in 
their career because they felt that there was no support available. 
 
Migrants rely on the knowledge they acquired before migration to make sense of 
their new cultural experiences. These experiences in turn shape their identities. One 
of the topics that was frequently brought up by informants themselves was the 
adoption of an English name, which some believed to be a form of capital that would 
help them secure jobs in the UK. These informants felt that using a Chinese name in 
job applications and interviews could hinder their chances of being hired. Qing, a 
master’s degree holder who was unemployed at the time of interview, said,  
When I would apply for jobs and get rejected, I would get upset. I would 
think that my CV is not good enough or my English is not good enough. But 
my (Hong Kong) husband would say to me that I got rejected because I 
don’t have an English name. 
 
According to researchers at Nuffield College’s Centre for Social Investigation (CSI), 
compared to white British citizens, ethnic minority groups in the UK have to send, on 
average, 60% more job applications to get a positive response from prospective 
employers. Their finding is based on an experiment they conducted between 
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November 2016 and December 2017, where they sent nearly 3,200 real job 
applications in response to adverts on a recruitment site, randomly varying 
applicants’ minority background by changing their name, but holding their skills, 
qualifications, and work experience constant (Centre for Social Investigation 2019). 
The findings of this and other previous studies, such as a field experiment 
conducted for the Department for Work and Pensions in 2009, have revealed 
significant discrimination against job applicants from ethnic minority backgrounds 
(Wood et al. 2009).  
Most Hong Kong informants had a Chinese and an English name, and preferred to 
be called by their English name during interviews. These informants adopted the 
English name, and sometimes changed it more than once, when they were in 
secondary school and even primary school, often as requested by their English 
teachers. Mainland Chinese informants were less likely to have an English name 
before migration. Both mainland Chinese and Hong Kong informants often adopted 
names that may be considered unconventional, inappropriate or arbitrary by local 
British people, such as Coco, Suki and Rainbow (for sociolinguistic analyses of the 
English first name culture in Hong Kong and among overseas Chinese, see Diao 
2014; Gao 2011; Li 1997; Tan 2001, respectively). Less conventional names like 
these undoubtedly mark young Chinese people out from the crowd and express 
their individuality, but these names may lose their values as they are carried across 
geographical and cultural borders. 
Even though Qing agreed with her husband that adopting an English name could 
increase her employability, she was still reluctant to do so. Qing continued,  
I really don’t want to have an English name. I am quite stubborn to think 
that there is nothing wrong with my name. Why do I need an English name 
just to make others’ life easier? 
 
Qing felt that holding onto her Chinese name was a major way to hold onto her 
Chinese identity and, in her words, her “true self”. However, when Qing failed to 
secure a job continuously for 6 months, she started to feel underappreciated by 
British employers, and was forced to apply for jobs that targeted Chinese people or 
required Chinese language skills, confining her to an ethnic niche (see Pang and 
Lau 1998; Mok and Platt 2018).  
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Even with a “proper” English name, new migrants still need to acquire knowledge of 
recruitment practices and processes in order to secure good job opportunities. For 
example, as a working holiday maker, 23-year-old Owen hoped to find a sales job in 
the fashion industry in the UK. One of his friends in Hong Kong recommended that 
he hand in his CV to shops in person, based on his own successful experiences. 
Despite walking into 30 shops along Oxford Street in London, Owen did not get any 
interviews or job offers. As a new migrant with no social networks in London, Owen 
did not realise that even in the fashion retail industry, most job applications are 
processed online in the UK. In the end, he was hired as a salesperson at a small 
boutique in his local area, earning an hourly rate of £3.50, which was much lower 
than the minimum wage set by the government. If he had known about the national 
minimum wage, workers’ rights, and the channels to make a complaint, he would 
have had a lower chance of being exploited. 
 
EMPLOYERS’ PREFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATION 
 
The majority of informants said they did not have personal experience of “serious 
discrimination” in the UK but felt that “mild” racial and gender discrimination are not 
uncommon. Cher, a 27-year-old Tier 2 (Dependant) visa holder perceived racial 
discrimination as a major factor undermining her employment opportunities. She 
recalled a job interview in which she and another, white local, woman were the 
remaining candidates for one job. She said, 
I felt like we both had similar qualifications and experiences, but in the end, 
I think I didn’t get the job because I am Chinese. 
 
However, not all informants considered their ethnicity as a disadvantage in the 
British labour market. Some, like PhD student Fangfei, anticipated that job 
opportunities for Chinese in the UK would increase after Brexit due to the close 
economic co-operation and strong diplomatic relationship between the UK and 
China. She was more concerned about gender discrimination in British academia 
than about racial discrimination. She said, 
I believe race is not the biggest issue. Chinese PhD graduates from British 
universities can get into academia in the UK. But I heard from a senior 
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student in my department whose job application as a university lecturer got 
rejected, and she told me that the interviewer actually said to her that they 
prefer hiring men…gender discrimination definitely exists.  
 
Some Chinese women that I interviewed saw their ethnic and gender identities as 
double disadvantages in their industries. For instance, Ying Men was a Chinese 
language teacher at a private primary school in London in her early thirties. After 
graduating from university, Ying Men worked as a teacher in various countries, 
including China, Singapore, and the UK. She had 8 years’ work experience and was 
hoping to acquire a managerial role in the school where she was currently teaching 
in the near future. But she also pointed out, 
Most managerial roles in schools are dominated by middle-aged white men. 
I guess this is quite common. But I am a high achiever. I know that if I 
returned to China, there wouldn’t be too many obstacles that would stop me 
from getting managerial roles, but here in the UK, it is not that easy. I feel 
that this is not because I am incapable, but because the structure here 
prevents me from getting what I want. 
 
However, some informants held an opposite view. David was a research fellow at a 
university in London who drew on the fact that his deputy director was a Chinese 
woman to support his argument that perceived discrimination may be a problem of 
self-projection and imagination. He emphasised, “No one knows whether it 
[discrimination] exists or not”. In a separate example, Georgia shared a story about 
her Japanese friend who used to work in a law firm in London that was largely 
dominated by white British men. Through this story, she argued that self-perceived 
discrimination contributes to feelings of insecurity and inferiority, which may also 
provide an excuse for migrants to victimise themselves. She said, 
My friend was very excited when she accepted the job offer and heard that 
she was the first East Asian to work there [the law firm]. But I remember 
every time we met up, she complained about how unhappy she was…she 
said she got discriminated against by local British at the firm. I couldn’t 
believe it. I knew that from my experience of working in university, 
sometimes there would be local people who talk amongst themselves and 
pretend not to see you. But I don’t think it counts as a form of 
discrimination. It is a differential treatment I suppose. My friend said people 
at her firm would actually give her a certain look. They gave her lots of work 
to do. When everyone had gone home, she was the only one staying 
behind. She passed her probation after working there for one or two 
months, and her company actually was willing to apply for a work visa for 
her to stay in the UK, which was something that the company had never 
done before. In the end, she chose to return to Japan because she said 
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she couldn’t go on anymore. I am still in touch with her. Recently she told 
me that in her new job, she has to finish work at five in the morning and go 
to work at 8am again…I asked whether she regretted giving up the job in 
London, she said [she regretted it] a bit. I now see things differently…I 
won’t easily jump to the conclusion that something happens to me because 
of discrimination. I would think of other explanations before drawing that 
conclusion. If I am always too sensitive about how people treat me, I will 
always feel inferior. Once you think racial discrimination is the cause of 
everything you face, then you will feel like there is no way you can make a 
change because you simply can’t change who you are and how you look. 
But if you try to make sense of what happens to you from a different 
perspective, you will become positive and try to improve yourself. 
 
 
LIMITED TEMPORAL CAPITAL AND UNDESIRABLE TEMPORARY 
RESIDENCY STATUS 
 
Time is a form of capital that determines how likely it is that a temporary migrant will 
be able to stay on in the UK; in general, the longer the time a migrant has on his or 
her visa, the better his or her chance of getting a job. How much temporal capital a 
migrant acquires is determined by the type of visa he/she holds, which is related to 
how much economic and cultural capital he/she owns and his/her family resources 
in their country of origin. Migrants’ temporal capital in the UK cannot be 
accumulated beyond the appropriating capacities of an individual agent. For 
instance, while middle-class families in mainland China and Hong Kong can afford 
to sponsor their children’s education in the UK, which also gives them an 
opportunity to live there temporarily, families of lower-class background are not able 
to do so. And in spite of the initial success of young middle-class migrants’ 
conversion from economic capital to cultural and temporal capital, in order to 
continue their accumulation of temporal capital and stay living on in the UK, most 
migrants will have to switch onto a skilled work visa. 
Job hunting takes time. According to my informants, the application process for visa-
sponsored jobs is comparatively more complicated, and often takes longer to 
complete, than for other jobs that do not require a visa. For the Chinese temporary 
migrants that I interviewed, the timing of their search for, and even departure from a 
job, is important, and requires them to conduct careful planning and calculation. For 
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example, during our first interview in March 2016, Vivian, a working holiday maker 
from Hong Kong who had been working in a low-paid event promotion job for over 
six months, struggled to make a decision about whether to stay in her job. She said, 
If I want to stay in the UK by getting a Tier 2 visa, I might as well leave this 
job now and find a visa-sponsored job straight away. Otherwise, my chance 
of being hired by a company that sponsors me with a work visa will only get 
lower and lower as time passes. By the time I have less than a year on my 
visa, I would only be able to find temporary or short-term contract jobs, and 
there is no way I would get visa sponsorship from these jobs. But I don’t 
know if I should leave my job now because even though it doesn’t sponsor 
me with a visa and the salary is quite low, it is still better than nothing. 
 
In a separate example, Qi was a 25-year-old Chinese national, who first came to the 
UK for a master’s degree in international relations and politics in 2013. Two months 
after she arrived, she started to prepare her CV for job applications in the hope of 
remaining in the UK after graduation. Despite her best efforts, she was not able to 
stay. However, she was offered a job by a British company that required her to work 
in Hong Kong straight away. In the end, she accepted the offer and moved to Hong 
Kong for one and a half years until being transferred back to London in the summer 
2016 with a Tier 2 (Intra-company Transfer) visa. She recalled how difficult it was to 
find jobs after graduation in London two years ago. She said, 
Although I had started to look for jobs pretty much as soon as I arrived, in 
the end, I only had 4 months to do it intensively due to my busy course 
work…You know, if you want to obtain a Tier 2 visa, you need to start 
preparing your CV and job applications long before your course finishes. I 
spent a lot of time preparing. I even did an internship just so that I could put 
it in my CV! But it didn’t work. 
 
For most informants, finding the first job in the UK, including temporary, permanent, 
part-time, full-time and even freelance jobs, was the most difficult and time-
consuming. Although migrants’ chances of being invited to a job interview and 
becoming employed were generally improved after securing the first job, by the time 
they accumulated some work experience and wanted to find a job that would 
actually give them a work visa, they had little time left in the UK before they had to 
leave. 
The actual duration of temporary migrants’ mobilities is determined by the temporal 
limitations placed upon their visas. Many working holiday informants also explained 
to me that they were likely to be perceived as “uncommitted staff” due to their 
 121 
temporary residency status in the UK; such status entails considerable risks, 
uncertainties, and extra costs in the eyes of prospective employers, who may be 
concerned about their employees having to leave the country after receiving full 
training. 
Theoretically, if a migrant is skilled and/or equipped with adequate educational 
qualifications or extensive work experience, especially in visa-sponsored industries 
such as finance, business, accounting, information technology, tertiary education, 
engineering and nursing, it should not matter to employers how much time the 
prospective employee has in the UK before his or her visa expires at the time of 
lodging a job application. However, interviews with Chinese migrants suggest 
otherwise. For example, Yi Fung, a Chinese national in his late twenties and a 
master’s degree holder from a British university, was a Tier 4 (Dependant) visa 
holder whose residency status was tied to his wife, who was a master’s student. 
After only one-and-a-half years in London, Yi Fung failed to secure a visa-
sponsored job in the IT industry, despite his qualifications and work experience. In 
contrast, another informant who acquired a Tier 4 (Dependant) visa due to his wife’s 
doctoral study in the UK, had a four-year window of time in the UK. This allowed him 
to work in three different IT jobs and accumulate work experience before he was 
employed by his current company in London, which offered him a Tier 2 work visa at 
the outset when the contract was signed. 
Temporal capital is arguably even more crucial for those who hope to remain in the 
UK through the employment path, but who do not consider themselves as having 
the skills or qualifications required to meet the demands of major visa-sponsored 
industries in the UK. Although most informants had found jobs that they were 
qualified to apply for, many of these jobs could not sponsor a work visa. Feeling 
frustrated, Lin Lin said, 
If you go to any recruitment website and find a job advertisement, the first 
question they ask before you can fill in an application form is “do you need a 
visa to work in the UK?”. If you tick “yes”, you will find “thank you for your 
interest but you cannot proceed further” on the next page. Higher education 
means nothing if you don’t have the right residency status here. 
 
Another informant, Vivian, was in a similar situation. During our second interview in 
September 2016, she described herself as being stuck in what could be called an 
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“immobile employment situation”. Vivian obtained a degree in Japanese studies 
from a university in Hong Kong and accumulated four years of work experience in 
prestigious Japanese companies before moving to the UK. Despite her credentials, 
however, she failed to find any visa-sponsored jobs. She did receive initial interest 
from a few Japanese companies in London, but these employers had a policy of 
hiring only migrants who did not require visas, or British citizens. She said,  
There was a time when I felt so desperate that I was willing to take any job 
– just any job as long as I could stay in the country for five years to get 
permanent residency. I imagine that once I have gained this right, I will 
have more freedom to choose what I want to do, and I could find a 
permanent job with Japanese companies here. And by that time, they 
wouldn’t reject me simply because of my residency status. But how can I 
get there in the first place? 
 
For these informants, their chances of being hired by a company who would 
sponsor their visa were limited, and rested not only on being offered a job in the first 
place but also on their professional performance during a probationary period. Since 
companies offering visa-sponsored employment can sponsor any employee at any 
time they wish, some would consider granting a visa to a non-European Economic 
Area (EEA) migrant only after having his/her performance assessed. As such, 
Chinese employees must ensure that they leave an adequate amount of time for 
British employers to conduct job evaluation, and to apply for a Tier 2 visa from the 
Home Office. 
Maggie, now a human resources officer at a Chinese trading company in London, 
succeeded in switching from a student visa to a work visa in the later stage of her 
employment. Maggie obtained two master’s degrees in the UK. She first started to 
look for jobs when she was studying for her second master’s degree. Soon she was 
hired by her current company for her proficiency in Chinese and English. When her 
contract was about to end, she was offered a Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) visa16 by 
the company. Knowing that this Tier 5 visa could not be directly switched to a Tier 2 
visa that leads to permanent residence, Maggie boldly asked if she could be 
sponsored on a Tier 2 visa instead. At the time, the company was in the process of 
applying for a Tier 2 visa sponsorship licence from the Home Office. Since Maggie 
 
16 A Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) visa is issued for workers who have a certificate of 
sponsorship from a UK employer/organisation/charity with a valid Tier 5 sponsorship licence 
(Home Office and UK Visas and Immigration 2019). 
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had left enough time for job hunting and encountered a good job opportunity quite 
early on, she was able to work for a few months before her student visa expired. 
She was later among the first employees in her company who received a Tier 2 
visa.  
As an HR officer, Maggie’s job was to interview job candidates, process job 
applications, and conduct Tier 2 visa administrative work for non-EEA employees, a 
large part of which was to deal with the Home Office. Here she explained from an 
employer’s perspective why temporary migrants having a longer time in the UK 
would be in a more advantageous position in recruitment. She also criticised the 
current visa system, which in her view, had imposed high financial and temporal 
costs on British employers who wished to hire non-EEA migrants. She said, 
This year our company experienced some tough times. We had an 
employee who wanted to change from a Tier 4 student visa to a Tier 2 work 
visa. It used to be easy. In previous years, we usually waited for a few days 
to receive the visa from the Home Office. This year the Home Office told us 
that it would take around 4 months to get the visa. But this employee’s 
student visa was expiring. We hired a solicitor, who told us that there is a 
new way to get Tier 2 visas more quickly. Basically, there are 20 quotas 
released from the Home Office every day. We have to call them every 
morning and see if we can get the visa on a first-come first-served basis. 
This time we were lucky and were able to get it for our employee. It 
happened before that the work visa was released too late and the 
prospective employee had already left the UK, and did not return to take up 
the job. I imagine this was because he had found a better job after 
resettling in China…Sometimes even after you submit all the supporting 
documents to the Home Office, you still need to wait for a long time to get 
the visa. You know, people who work at the Home Office can easily give 
you the visa within a day. Very often, they have reviewed all the 
documents, but they just put them aside just to delay the process. This is 
one of their ways to discourage companies from hiring people from outside 
of the EU. Also, British employers who wish to hire a non-EU migrant have 
to complete a Resident Labour Market Test and advertise the job to local 
people for 28 days. And only after that, they can offer the job to a non-EU 
migrant. But this requirement is meaningless and only adds administrative 
burden to companies like us. This is because many companies actually 
have already hired someone, or had potential employees in mind before 
they even “advertise” the jobs. The government forces us to meet this 
requirement just to show that they have done something to protect local 
interests. But what’s the point? 
 
Maggie further pointed out that although the Resident Labour Market Test is 
designed as a requirement for companies to prove that no native or resident of the 
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UK is available for the job by advertising it in specific ways before giving it to non-
EEA migrants (Workpermit 2017), it has become merely a part of standard 
recruitment procedures that come after the interview and candidate selection 
processes. The 28 days requirement also becomes a period of waiting time for both 
visa-sponsored companies and employees themselves before they can start the 
visa application process. 
 
LIMITED AND WEAKENED SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 
In Bourdieu’s pioneering work, social capital is defined as “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” 
(1986: 248). This definition highlights the importance of the relationship between 
group membership and the resources accessible.  
Within migration studies, the notion of social capital has been widely deployed to 
explain the significant role that kinship and friendship networks play in facilitating 
migratory processes. New migrants often move to destinations where there are 
established kinship networks or ethnic communities, which facilitate their integration 
into the destination country (Portes 2000). 
Compared to the early Chinese migrants who were often uneducated male 
peasants, and managed to emigrate using networks of family, friends and 
neighbours to find unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the UK in the 1970s (Watson 
1975), permanent migration to the UK is arguably more difficult for today’s migrants 
who are subjected to stricter immigration rules, especially those who only have 
limited social networks in the UK. None of my informants had adequate social 
capital, that is, an immediate family member in the UK who could help them to 
achieve family reunification immigration. While they had made friends and 
colleagues in the UK, these social networks were rarely used to facilitate an 
extended stay, remigration, or permanent immigration. One exception was Wallace, 
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a student informant who tried to switch to a Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur) visa17 by 
collaborating on a business plan with his university friend whom he met in the UK. 
Chinese migrants in this study hoped to expand their social networks in the UK. 
However, they were also aware that the longer they stayed living in the UK, the 
more devaluated their pre-migration capital would be. Many described their 
frustration at not being able to further expand or maintain their social networks in 
their country of origin, and how their original networks were weakened over time. 
Hite (2005) observes that “hollow” embedding happens when migrants’ former 
friendship networks “move on”, and migrants can no longer find their place among 
them. This phenomenon does not only relate to migrants’ relational ties and sense 
of belonging, but also has implications for their ability to make use of guanxi18, which 
can be translated as a personal connection, relationship, or network in Chinese 
social contexts, for pragmatic reasons, such as in career development. 
While new arrivals were generally positive about their ability to secure career 
opportunities in China or Hong Kong when they eventually returned, people who 
had lived abroad for a longer period of time, for example over a decade, were more 
 
17 The Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur) visa has now been cancelled. It was issued to eligible 
applicants from outside the EEA and Switzerland who were awarded a UK-recognised 
bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or PhD before the date of endorsement, for having a 
genuine and credible business idea. 
18 Guanxi is probably one of the most researched Chinese concepts in recent decades. 
Translated as “interdependent relationship” by Qi (2013), guanxi is highly embedded in every 
aspect of Chinese social life, especially in the context of discussions of relations between 
individuals in friendship and political or economic relationships. As Qi (2013: 309) states, the 
term quanxi indicates “carefully constructed and maintained relations between persons 
which carry mutual obligations and benefits. The term receives enormous attention from 
international media and western researchers, reflecting their strong interest in how guanxi 
facilitates business in or with China following the rise of China since the 1980s. For instance, 
Hope, from the BBC news (2014), reported “The mystery of China’s guanxi”, describing it a 
“crucial part of doing business in China”. But guanxi is not confined to business relations; it is 
a concept that is fundamental to the understanding of Chinese social structure. It is claimed 
that in China, “from birth to death, almost everything in one’s life needs guanxi” (Ruan 2017, 
1). Having good guanxi enables ones to give birth in a hospital with good service and 
facilities; to enroll into a better school; to get a good job after graduation; and to arrange a 
better funeral service for loved ones (Yang 1994; Gold, Guthrie, and Wank 2002). Qi (2013) 
argues that guanxi is not itself a cause of corruption, but one of the mechanisms. Guanxi is a 
social mechanism to gain and maintain trust and provide transaction cost advantages. 
Guanxi or similar relations are “universally practiced as informal facilitations of the formal 
processes” in politics and business everywhere (Qi 2013: 313). 
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sceptical of their career prospects back home. Ryan (2018) examines how migrants’ 
extended temporariness puts them in “place-specific opportunity structures”: as they 
gradually embed in a new labour market, they are at the same time dis-embedding 
from the labour market of their country of origin. Some informants were also 
concerned that the longer they stayed abroad, the more unfamiliar they would be 
with the work atmosphere and recruitment procedures in China or Hong Kong, and 
the more difficult it would become to bring acquired cultural capital back home (see 
also Ryan and Mulholland 2014).  
FAMILY CAPITAL 
 
Although migrants’ social capital in the UK was initially limited, and their friendship 
networks “back home” were often weakened over time, there are two subtypes of 
social capital, i.e. family capital and intimate relationship capital that are particularly 
prominent for Chinese migrants’ migration and life-course trajectories in the UK. I 
define family capital as financial resources, emotional support and physical help, 
especially in the form of childcare, provided by migrants’ families in China or Hong 
Kong. The term “family capital” emphasises the role that Chinese parents play in 
helping their migrant children to settle in the UK and maintain middle-class lifestyles. 
Most informants said they returned to China or Hong Kong at least once a year to 
visit their family. Both migrant sons and daughters claimed that they maintained a 
close relationship with their family in their home countries out of choice and duty, yet 
I noticed that it was usually migrant daughters, but not sons, who maintained daily 
contact. Migrant daughters who were married to someone in the UK, especially 
those who were in a dual-income marriage, saw family capital in the forms of 
financial subsidy and childcare, as an even more important resource.  
Migrant women in this study tended to ask their own mothers, instead of their 
mothers-in-law, to get involved in child rearing. In some cases, migrants’ mothers 
would stay in the UK for a maximum of 6 months per year (due to visa restrictions), 
to provide care for their daughter and their grandchildren. Informants appreciated 
the free labour provided by their own mother, whose help has aided them to save on 
nursery spending and eased the double burden on them to juggle demands in 
domestic and public spheres. As Xiao En, a PhD student and a mother of a 2-year-
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old said, “The most difficult time for us was when my husband and I were both sick, 
but we didn’t have any family or relatives here to help out with the kid. That was the 
time that I really wished my mum could live in the UK to help us.” It is also important 
to note that not all migrant daughters expected childcare assistance from their own 
parents. Some migrants had never considered asking their parents for help because 
of the generational differences in beliefs and values about early education and child 
development. 
Most migrants agreed that parental support in the form of financial assistance was 
crucial for them to become successful and have a relatively comfortable life in the 
UK. As young migrants who were just starting their career, many of them continued 
to receive financial help from their Chinese parents after graduating, at least for a 
period of time. As stated previously, only around 25% of my informants earned an 
income that they felt they could live comfortably on. A majority of my informants 
relied heavily on the resources provided by their families in China or Hong Kong in 
order to support their overseas living expenses and maintain middle-class lifestyles. 
In addition, migrant daughters’ family capital, especially in the form of financial 
assistance for home purchase, help them to gain entry to middle-class membership 
in the UK (see chapter 2 for the close relationship between home ownership and 
class identity in the UK) and gain power in transnational, and sometimes inter-racial 
relationships (see chapter 6). 
 
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP CAPITAL 
 
Among various kinds of social relationships, migrants’ romantic relationships often 
play a crucial, if not the most important, role in facilitating extended stays and 
permanent immigration. In this thesis, I define intimate relationship capital as a 
person’s romantic relationship(s) and intimate resources. 
One of the benefits of acquiring intimate relationship capital is that migrants can 
make use of it to obtain a dependant visa, a spouse visa, or an EEA family permit. 
The length of time a temporary migrant has in the UK is determined by his/her 
residency status, which can change through marrying or having a committed 
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romantic relationship with: (1) a British permanent resident/citizen, or an EU citizen; 
or (2) a temporary visa holder. However, apart from EU citizens who are not subject 
to British immigration rules, British citizens and UK-based visa sponsors can only 
sponsor a non-EEA migrant a spouse visa if they meet the minimum income or 
wealth requirement. The implication of this is that most of the Chinese migrants who 
managed to acquire a spouse visa by marrying a sponsor whose income bracket or 
amount of savings could reasonably be considered to position them as middle class, 
would be likely to form a middle-class family unit in the UK. 
Job opportunities and life chances are unequal between spouses or partners of 
British or EU subjects, and spouses of temporary visa holders. Since the first 
group’s right to live in the country is based on their marriage to a person who is not 
subjected to temporal restrictions, according to the informants, they are perceived to 
have acquired a “more permanent or settled” residency status. This is in contrast to 
the latter group, whose residency rights are tied to visa-sponsors who themselves 
only hold temporary residency status and have no indefinite leave to remain in the 
UK. In comparison to those who are married to a British subject, these migrants 
have a higher chance of being denied permanent jobs. They are more likely to be 
perceived as “uncommitted staff” who may have to leave the country sooner than 
employers hope. Despite this, those holding more years on their visa – for example 
spouses of PhD students – are usually (but not always) more employable than those 
who hold only a year or two on their visa due to their partners’ shorter course 
lengths (see Yi Fung’s example above). Intimate relationship capital can be 
converted to temporal capital, stratifying different visa holders by giving better life 
chances to some but limiting opportunities for others. 
According to informants who were in a relationship with a British national, the 
relationship offered the potential not only of permanent residency and British 
citizenship, but also of other pragmatic gains. These informants generally 
considered that their English communication skills had improved; cultural knowledge 
had deepened; and social networks had expanded due to their transnational 
relationship or marriage. Many agreed that their British partner had taught them 
some life skills, local knowledge, and social skills that they would not have been 
able to attain otherwise, for example, how to find good rental properties in the UK. In 
other words, apart from being able to be converted into temporal capital, the 
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acquisition of intimate relationship capital was also positively perceived by my 
informants who used it to accumulate embodied cultural capital, and socially adapt 
and integrate into the new society. 
LIMITED ECONOMIC CAPITAL AND CHANGING IMMIGRATION POLICY 
 
Despite their relatively well-off backgrounds, most of my informants admitted that 
they (and their family) had inadequate economic capital or funds to achieve 
investment immigration into the UK, which at the time of the interviews, was still 
available to non-EEA migrants. The discontinued Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) visa, which 
permitted individuals to enter and relocate to the UK for the purpose of establishing 
a business in the country, was replaced after 29 March 2019 by a new category of 
visa, the Innovator visa. This new category of visa is reputably much more difficult to 
gain approval for, and has stricter rules surrounding continued compliance. In 
essence, a business must now be started by the applicant and endorsement for the 
business plan must be gained from a limited number of approved bodies – often 
venture capital firms seeking a stake in the business – according to a stringent set 
of criteria. Additionally, the applicant must pass an English language test at the 
outset and continue to spend three years working solely on the business, after 
which permanent residency will only be granted if certain criteria for the growth of 
the business have been met.  
Although I only interviewed one male informant who held the discontinued Tier 1 
(Entrepreneur) visa by opening a Japanese restaurant in London, and one female 
informant who was married to a Chinese migrant who once held the visa, most 
informants were aware of this immigration path. There used to be two major ways to 
acquire a Tier 1 visa in the UK. First of all, student migrants who obtained a British 
degree and had been officially endorsed as having a genuine and credible business 
idea were able to apply for a Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur) visa. This visa allowed 
migrants to stay in the UK for one year, extend the stay for a further year, or switch 
onto a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) visa with a minimum of £50,000 of investment funds. 
Very few student informants considered applying for this visa because they 
understood the difficulty of writing an excellent business proposal and anticipated 
that the chance of being granted the visa was low. For other non-EEA migrants who 
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did not previously hold a Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur) visa, and had no access to 
£50,000 of investment funds from limited sources approved by the government, they 
had to possess at least £200,000 of investment funds in order to be able to apply for 
a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) visa.  
Most informants were not attracted to the Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) visa either due to 
insufficient funds or a pessimistic attitude towards the British economy. Some also 
commented that although they would like to obtain this visa, such big investment 
was regarded as “unworthy” by other family members who considered migration not 
merely an individual pursuit but also a collective goal. When I interviewed Winne, a 
22-year-old Hong Kong migrant, in late 2016, her plan was to return to the UK after 
the expiration of her working holiday visa by persuading her family to invest in the 
UK. Since the new Innovator visa was introduced after my fieldwork had finished, I 
was not able to obtain data to understand how this change may impact migrants’ 
planning and options. But Winnie has recently told me that she felt “very confused” 
by the constant changes in British immigration policy and has lost the incentive to 
return to the UK. 
CONCLUSION 
Following Bourdieu’s theory of capital and capital conversion (1986), I have shown 
that middle-class migrants from mainland China and Hong Kong do indeed 
accumulate and convert their various types of capital. For example, they exchange 
economic capital for cultural and temporal capital by paying for a university 
education in the UK. This rewards the migrant with the time and cultural experience 
of living and studying in the UK, as well as the skills gained from a university degree 
in their chosen field.  
However, migration is not just an act of physical border crossing; it comes with other 
imposed boundaries, such as migration policies, the strictures of the labour market 
and even the social system of their new environment, that migrants also have to 
deal with (Liversage, 2009). My data shows that, should the migrant wish to stay on 
in the UK, the capital previously gained in this transactional process can be very 
difficult to convert back into economic capital or indeed further temporal capital to 
extend their stay in the UK. Tier 2 sponsored employment can be difficult to find at 
the best of times. However, at the conclusion of studies, when the temporal capital 
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remaining in the UK is just four months, migrants often particularly struggle to gain 
employment that offers Tier 2 visa sponsorship by the time their visas expire. 
Additionally, should the migrant find another way to stay in the UK, for example 
through marriage, their worth in the job market may not live up to expectations.  
Therefore, I conclude that the conversion of cultural capital through temporary 
migration to the UK is not always a two-way street; rather, it is sometimes a dead 
end. This explains why migrants, even those who strongly wished to stay living in 
the UK, would from time to time consider returning to their country of origin, where 
skilled and well paid work is often a more realistic expectation, in order to be able to 
continue the transactional process that started at the beginning of their migration 
journeys and more fully realise the capital gained through their experiences in the 
UK. Having said that, for those who seek to build capital and be recognised as a 
successful migrant and a member of the middle class in the UK, they continue to 
navigate obstacles to capital conversion, and often rely on family capital and 
intimate relationship capital to keep pursing their transnational goals. I have 
highlighted the importance of these two subtypes of social capital, especially when 
migrants’ ability to convert cultural capital into economic and temporal capital is 
restricted by UK’s societal mechanisms of exclusion imposed through immigration 
policies and preferences of employment in labour market. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss another form of capital, i.e. sexual capital, which 
some migrants make use of in the quest for a committed relationship with a view to 
marriage in the UK. This kind of relationship may turn into intimate relationship 






NAVIGATING ROMANCE, RELATIONSHIPS AND MARRIAGE 
 
One day in September 2017, I went to my favourite Chinese restaurant near my 
university to get a takeaway for lunch. I have visited the restaurant many times and 
have known the middle-aged Chinese owner for a while, even though we have only 
ever exchanged friendly greetings. That day the small restaurant was extremely 
packed with new and returning students. Good business put the owner in an 
exceptionally good mood, and he was particularly talkative that day.  
Owner (O): I haven’t seen you for a while. I thought you have gone home! 
Yu (Y): No, I am still around. I haven’t finished my PhD yet. 
O: What do you study? 
Y: Social Anthropology. 
O: Hmm, will you work in hospital after you graduate? 
Y: Nah, I can’t be a medical doctor. But I can work in university. 
O: Do you want to stay in the UK? 
Y: Yes, I do. I think it is more comfortable to live in the UK than Hong Kong. 
O: Yes, I have lived here for many years now. I can’t live in China anymore. The 
pollution is bad. It is crowded everywhere! Edinburgh is a nice place. The air here is 
fresh. 
Y: I agree. I like living here too. But I don’t know if I can stay living in the UK. You 
know, it all depends on whether I can find a job.  
O: Oh just find a man and get married! Seriously, I know Chinese who were born 
here would love to date a Chinese who just arrived. 
Y: Haha, it’s not that easy! Having a relationship is a serious matter. Getting married 
is a big life decision!  
O: Oh yes, I know what you mean. You don’t want to just find a man and end up in 
an unhappy marriage. 
Y: That’s right. 
 
It always fascinates me how easily a conversation with another Chinese person can 
turn to a topic that is highly relevant to my own experience of migration and my 
research. In the past four years, I have had numerous similar conversations with 
strangers that I have met in Chinese restaurants and supermarkets. My identity as a 
young female student migrant from Hong Kong indeed facilitates this kind of 
conversation. Middle-aged or older Chinese migrants, regardless of their gender, 
seem to enjoy sharing their migration experiences and giving me immigration 
advice. Whenever I express my concern about staying on after graduation, they 
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often say to me that the easiest way is to marry a British citizen. I do sometimes 
wonder if they would be as enthusiastic; and whether they would give me the same 
advice, if I were not a woman, but a man.  
My positionality as a young woman certainly affects how strangers interact with me, 
and how they perceive marriage as an appropriate migration strategy for me. The 
conservation I have quoted here was clearly not the first such conversation I had 
had in the UK; it certainly was not going to be the last. It never ceases to surprise 
me how easy people think it is to get married to a British partner, and how 
acceptable this migration strategy seems to be among Chinese migrants. 
Nevertheless, no one that I spoke to in the course of this research took marriage as 
a light decision. It seems to me that while the Chinese strangers that I spoke to did 
not find this pragmatic reason to form a marriage troubling, they all acknowledged 
the importance of mutual affection and compatibility in maintaining a happy and 
thriving marriage.  
Heterosexual informants, regardless of gender, often saw marriage and family 
formation as essential life-course events that “complete” one’s life. Nearly all of the 
single heterosexual women that I talked to considered finding a marriageable 
partner a life goal to achieve; this includes those who were not actively looking, and 
those who claimed that they were not ready to start a relationship. Since I did not 
have significant numbers of homosexual and bisexual men and women in my 
interview sample, I am not able to generalise about their views of marriage. The two 
bisexual men in my sample were distinctive in their romantic experiences. While 
Ronald, in his mid-twenties, was interested in dating men and women, despite 
having a stable partner; Han, a 29-year-old PhD student, was having a long-
distance relationship at the time of interview. The only homosexual informant I had, 
David, who I have discussed in chapter 2, had been in a civil partnership for 4 years 
at the time of interview. David said he did not believe in marriage nor the idea of true 
love because of his personal experiences. Describing his partner as a “good friend”, 
David said his reason for entering into a civil partnership was mainly the benefits it 
offered in securing a mortgage.  
For some informants, the desire to look for romance went hand-in-hand with the 
wish to stay on in the UK. Others, who had no initial intention to remain in the UK, 
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had become marriage migrants and ended up staying on because of their 
transnational relationship. To my knowledge, very few informants had instrumental 
intentions in seeking a romantic relationship in the first place. Due to the limitations 
of interviewing as the main research method, and the sensitivity of the topic 
discussed, it is possible that informants who found a British or EU partner mainly for 
immigration purposes were not willing to divulge this fact to me. However, I should 
emphasise that migrants very often have multiple desires simultaneously; these 
desires are complex, and sometimes contradictory. It is equally important to bear in 
mind that not all migrants long for a committed, long-term, and stable relationship; 
some may also be willing to enter a relationship that they expect to last only 
temporarily.  
This chapter is based on and expands upon my published article “Permanence 
pending: how young Chinese temporary migrants hope to stay in the UK” (2018). In 
this chapter, I explore the romantic goals and experiences of young, well-educated, 
middle-class Chinese temporary migrants, and ask how they strategise different 
kinds of relationships, for example by making use of sexual capital and the language 
of love. 
 
THE SEARCH FOR ROMANCE AND THE SOCIAL PRESSURE TO MARRY 
 
Looking for romance is definitely a reason for me to come to the UK... I was 
a mai jing ze (literally meaning the leftover bamboo that never gets sold in 
the market) in Hong Kong.  
(Vivian, 28 years old Hong Kong Chinese woman, in a relationship with a 
British permanent resident from Hong Kong) 
 
When I first came to the UK, I was very bored. I didn’t have any friends 
apart from my four flatmates from Hong Kong, so I started to meet friends 
online. At the time, one of my flatmates used Tinder to look for a boyfriend. 
She recommended the app to me, so I started to use it too.  
(Gina, 30 years old, Hong Kong Chinese woman, in a relationship with a 
British man) 
 
Narratives like Vivian’s and Gina’s were commonly expressed by my female 
informants, who saw temporary migration to the UK as not merely a means to 
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acquire overseas qualifications and work experience, but also a chance to explore 
romantic opportunities (Ding and Ho 2008; Shah 2006), meet new friends, secure a 
life-long partner, and escape temporarily from the social stigma of their singlehood. 
Another example is Elle, a 27-year-old mainland Chinese migrant who moved to 
London with her family nearly a decade ago. She considered herself a settled 
migrant now and commented that each short trip to China was a struggle because 
of the intense familial pressure she felt in regard to marrying. She said, 
Now when I go back to China to visit my family, my grandparents always 
say to me, “you are 27 already, why don’t you get married? Look, your 
cousin is one year younger than you, and she is married!” I can only 
escape this pressure if I stay living in the UK.  
 
Although Elle could escape from the direct familial pressure to marry as long as she 
stayed living in the UK, she was also aware that her distancing from the dominant 
social opinion was a temporary measure only, and had no significant impact on her 
desired life achievements which centred on the themes of marriage and family. Elle 
said to me, 
I actually do want to get married now… But the point is I have to find 
someone that I am interested in and is suitable for me. I hope it will happen 
soon. 
 
All of the women that I interviewed were familiar with the stigmatising concepts of 
“loser dogs” (Nakano 2016; Yamaguchi 2006) and sheng nu (Fincher 2014; Ji 2015; 
To 2013) that have travelled through social media and mass media, including TV 
dramas and movies, into China (Fincher 2014) and Hong Kong (Ling 2013), making 
women feel less secure and comfortable about their singlehood. In Hong Kong, the 
issue of women’s singledom and their inability to find a man to achieve a happy 
marriage is discussed in popular reality TV shows such as Bride Wannabes19 
 
19 Bride Wannabes is a popular Hong Kong reality TV show aired in 2012, which features 
five women in their 30s. The women were coached by “love and life coaches” for six months, 
with the hopes of boosting their marriage prospects. In a newspaper article entitled “Hong 
Kong Glued to ‘Bride Wannabes’”, written by Te-Ping Chen and published by The Wall 
Street Journal on 20 April 2012, it said, “Along the way, with a documentary film crew in tow, 
they [the five women] go to cosmetic surgery clinics, get makeup tips, learn what length of 
an SMS message will keep a man tantalized and finesse their ability to keep their mouth 
shut.” 
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(2012), and TV dramas, for example Bounty Lady20 (2013). In both TV productions’, 
the Chinese phrase “盛女,” or “blossomed woman,” is used in the Chinese title. The 
phrase works as a pun on the phrase “剩女,” or leftover woman.  
The Chinese word “剩”(sheng) refers to leftover food, which must be discarded. In 
Hong Kong specifically, numerous Cantonese phrases, such as mai jing ze and luo 
di cheng (which refers to leftover oranges at the bottom of a basket), are used 
traditionally to describe women who have passed their golden time of marrying; are 
unable to get married; or are not being picked by men when their time is ripe. While 
these once old-fashioned terms are now being used again, more contemporary 
terms, such as “gong leui” (literally meaning “Hong Kong woman”) are more 
commonly used to relate women’s singlehood to their undesirable qualities, such as 
being “selfish, shallow, critical of men and demanding” (Nakano 2016, 368). Such 
catch-phrases reflect the struggles of and social pressure applied to Hong Kong 
Chinese women who remain single beyond a certain age. 
 
Fincher (2014, 6) looks at how the discourse of leftover women in China is state-
sponsored, and how such a category is produced by a state media campaign to 
“achieve its demographic goals of promoting marriage, planning population and 
maintaining social stability”. Although China’s sex ratio imbalance at birth is the 
highest observed in the world, which at its peak in 2004 was 121.2 boys to 100 girls 
(Zhou 2016), rather than promoting the shortage of marriageable-aged women, the 
Chinese government stigmatises single educated women in their late twenties, 
producing the fear that these women are doomed to stay single forever. Leftover 
men are considered more of a problem for uneducated or rural families.  
In the urban areas of China however, the discourse of marriage stigmatises single 
women, but not single men, even though both single men and women are seen as 
 
20 Bounty Lady is a 2013 Hong Kong modern drama produced by TVB, starring by Dayo 
Wong, who played the role of Heung Kwong-Nam, a relationship expert who helps single 
female clients to find love and achieve the goal of marriage. 
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potential threats to the “harmonious society” in the eyes of the state. The Chinese 
government believes that men need to get married and mould into the Chinese 
family system, as this keeps them away from political activism. The state carries out 
this scheme by pressuring single educated women into marrying to fulfil their duties 
as wives and mothers. 
Unlike their mainland Chinese counterparts, Hong Kong women in general are not 
heavily pressured by state media to get married; most women, as Nakano (2016, 
375) puts it, see marriage “as a lifestyle choice rather than a requirement”. Nakano 
(2016) argues that the widespread social acceptance of single women in Hong Kong 
can be attributed to three factors: (1) a history of marriage refusal among women in 
south China from the turn of 20th century; (2) the delayed age of first-time marriage 
among women, brought about by industrial development between the 1950s and 
1970s; and (3) the positive approach of families to delayed marriage because it 
means a continuous contribution of young women’s salaries from factory work to 
their family (see Salaff 1981).  
In fact, most of my friends in Hong Kong, both men and women, started to give part 
of their salary to their parents (usually their mothers) or to contribute to the 
household expenses and bills after they got their first job as a way to observe filial 
piety. Although unmarried women’s monthly contribution to their family is seen as a 
legitimate reason for them to receive minimal familial pressure to marry, women 
themselves may feel ambivalent about this. For example, a close friend of mine 
complained about how her mother demanded half of her monthly salary, leaving her 
with no savings to start a family with her current boyfriend. Another friend told me 
that his parents wanted him to stay living with them even after getting married so 
that his monthly contribution would continue to help with the mortgage payments, 
which he strongly refused. My general understanding of Hong Kong young people’s 
financial contribution to their family echoes to Salaff (1981) and Nakano’s (2016) 
findings.  
As for my mainland Chinese informants, including men and women, although 
making financial contributions to the family is not an unfamiliar concept, they 
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considered it more of a “dated” expectation21. Most informants said that their parents 
did not expect them to do so, and elaborated with statements to the effect “I think in 
the eyes of my parents, the best way for me to observe filial piety is not to pay them 
back for the money that they have spent on me, but to show them I am able to 
sustain myself and pursue happiness.” 
Although Hong Kong women are arguably less pressured by being single as 
compared to mainland Chinese women, it would be a mistake to assume that they 
are completely free from the social pressure and expectation to marry. My 
interviews with Hong Kong women made me realise that women could feel anxious 
about their singlehood simply by comparing themselves to their peers who had 
married and/or become mothers. One informant said that sometimes scrolling 
through her own Facebook page, which contained photos of her friends getting 
married or people attending a wedding, made her upset. In general, I did not detect 
any differences between the mainland China and Hong Kong cohorts in terms of the 
social pressure to marry. Some Hong Kong informants who worked in woman-
dominated industries back home, such as nursing and teaching, told me that their 
chance of finding a marriageable partner was small because of their profession. 
Other informants who worked in more gender-balanced jobs also found themselves 
“lacking luck” in the Hong Kong market. As compared to women in mainland China 
who are familiar with the practice of xiangqin (blind dates with a view to marriage), 
Hong Kong women are more reluctant to participate in blind dates and prefer to 
meet potential spouses through the workplace or introductions from friends (Nakano 
2016). Therefore, for those who fail to find a marriageable partner among their 
friends and colleagues or through dating apps, moving abroad, even if it is 
temporary, may provide a chance to look beyond the local marriage market. 
 
STRATEGISING ROMANCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
 
21 For studies of the reinterpretation and transformation of filial piety in modern China, see 
Qun and Devine (2018) and Tu (2016). 
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Due to a lack of social networks in the UK, Chinese temporary migrants in this study 
relied on social media, mainly dating apps, to meet potential partners. 
I tried to date a few guys using an app before. But they were all very 
strange! One of the guys was Turkish. Before meeting him, I thought he 
was a local white guy but he was not. I swear I couldn’t tell he was Turkish 
from his profile. When we met, the first thing he said to me was that he had 
already got British citizenship. He said I didn’t need to work and I could just 
stay at home and take care of the children. I was shocked! My housemate 
then advised me to try using Tinder. They said I would have less chance to 
meet weird people online. The way that Tinder works is that you and the 
person you are interested in have to “like” each other before you two can 
start talking. If you don’t “like” his profile, then there will be no further 
conversation. Then I saw my current boyfriend’s profile on Tinder.  
(Gina, 30 years old, in a relationship with a British man) 
 
I met my boyfriend for the first time in person during a conference trip to 
London. It was a very funny experience because we met through an app 
called Tinder. At the time, I was a new member. I saw all of my classmates 
were using this app on their mobile, so I thought this must be a very trendy 
social app like Facebook. I downloaded it but I didn’t know how to use it 
properly. I “liked” many profiles on Tinder and got lots of messages…Only 
after a while, I read the instructions again and realised I shouldn’t have 
“liked” everyone that I saw on the app. But this is how my boyfriend and I 
met each other. Very soon, we became boyfriend and girlfriend.  
(Rose, 28 years old, in a relationship with an English man for a year) 
 
The majority of informants who used dating apps in the UK said they had not used 
them before migration and had to learn how to build an attractive personal profile, 
flirt in English, and approach people with appropriate manners. A few informants 
were experienced users, but they too had to learn how to use dating apps in a 
different language and cultural context. Gina’s experience is interesting as it reflects 
some of the mismatches and incompatibilities in the expectations of my informants 
and their dates or partners from different cultures or class backgrounds (including 
people from mainland China and Hong Kong dating one another) about gendered 
social roles within marriage and family obligations. While Tinder was the most 
popular app among both of my heterosexual and homosexual male and female 
Chinese informants, homosexual and bisexual male informants also used other 
dating apps such as Grindr and Scruff. 
During our first interview in March 2016, Ronald, a 22-year-old student migrant, had 
already lived with his EU partner, who was twice his age, for more than a year. The 
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couple had met through a dating app. He openly admitted that his primary reason 
for using dating apps was to find a British or EU citizen who could help him to stay in 
the UK by forming a civil partnership. During the process of looking for a partner, he 
also explored his sexuality and accumulated different experiences in approaching 
and dating men and women. He said, 
It all started when my best friend Sophia in the UK went online to look for 
sugar daddies to support her life. She persuaded me to find similar 
opportunities online. She said to me, “We are still young. We shouldn’t 
worry so much about moral or ethical issues.” She gave me this inspiration 
and I was crazy about this idea. From that moment onwards, I realised that 
it is very easy to meet men. You can simply create a profile online, then 
there would be 50 to 60 men chatting with you at any given time. But if you 
try to get women’s attention, you have to spend more time on them. Men 
are relatively easy compared to women. I use many apps and one website 
called seekingarrangement.com to chat with both men and women. But the 
website I used did not help me find a potential partner because most of the 
users are married. Grindr, Tinder and Scruff are some of the apps that I 
use. I use Scruff to meet women and use others to look for men. I am very 
addicted. Of course, I want to find potential partners. But I got so addicted 
because once I am online, there would be many people chatting with me, 
and they find me attractive. It is a very good feeling. I’ve chatted with at 
least 200 people through dating apps. I used a minimum of four hours per 
day to use these apps… Some people only use these apps to chat; some 
only use them for sex; others want a real relationship. When I use these 
apps, I’ve never approached people first, but waited for them to text me. 
This way I know their intention, and I know that I am attractive to them. I 
would not waste time in figuring out who finds me attractive and who not. 
I’ve never initiated a conversation online. I am very proud of it…I think I am 
very tactical about this…When I have a conversation with a guy, I would not 
show I am very desperate to stay in the UK because I know they would not 
like it. If they are serious about having a relationship with me, they would 
keep messaging me, even if I don’t reply. I would act very cold to them 
sometimes, but I would also keep them close by. For some people whom I 
find attractive, I would have sex with them. If I don’t find them attractive, I 
would at least make friends with them. Through these apps, I’ve met 
different people and formed different relationships. You see, I have 5 types 
of relationships. The first one is that a person finds me attractive, but I 
don’t. I would keep in touch with him and give him false hope, but I would 
never actually go out and meet him. The second one is that the attraction is 
mutual, but not too strong; in this case, I would have no-strings-attached 
one-time sex with him. The third type is regular sexual partners, which 
usually develop after one sexual encounter. The fourth type is the 
friendship-only type with no sexual involvement. The fifth type is a “real” 
relationship, something like girlfriend/boyfriend, which I have now. 
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Here, Ronald gave a very detailed account of how the dating apps work, the multiple 
motivations of dating apps users, and how he was able to make use of social media 
and some sexual tactics to form different types of relationships. He continued, 
I have multiple relationships or one foot in many boats as you may say, but 
I have to stress that I’ve never told these people that we are in an exclusive 
relationship… Having said that, they wouldn’t know I go out with other 
people too. I’ve been quite clever to deceive them. It is like I have a few 
threads in my hands. I would keep trying to see which thread could lead me 
to something bigger. I also consider my own feelings of course. If I don’t 
like that person, I wouldn’t want to have a relationship with him or her, even 
though he or she may offer to help me stay here. I was really looking for 
someone I like, who was attractive to me, and was willing to help me. This 
is what I call “the trump card”. In the end, I only found one. 
Ronald, who considered each type of relationship as distinct, serving different 
purposes, seemed to know how to keep different men (and sometimes women) at 
bay. This echoes Hoang and Yeoh's (2015, 599) study on “immigrant cultures of 
sexuality”, which explores how communicative technology enables migrants to 
explore romance, love, and sexuality, and obtain practical gains; and how the 
mingling of emotional needs and pragmatic interests in different kinds of intimate 
relationships is inevitable. 
During one interview, Ronald told me that he had stopped seeing different people 
but tried to be in “an exclusive relationship” with his partner. But even “partner”, as 
one of the relationship categories, did not come naturally. Over the course of three 
interviews, he first described the man he lived with as his “flatmate”, then as his 
“special friend with benefits”, and finally as his “partner”. These categories were 
unstable and unfixed. A few months after describing his relationship as exclusive, he 
was active on dating apps again. At the same time, he told me that he had also 
stopped relying on marriage or a sexual relationship with one person as the only 
immigration strategy. As an opportunist, after completing his first degree in social 
science, Ronald decided to do a second degree in nursing; a degree that he was 
able to study with a full NHS bursary and which would guarantee a UK work visa 
upon graduation. In 2018, Ronald ended his 3-year relationship with his partner and 
moved out of their shared house. He is currently in a new relationship. 
 
ROMANCE AS A MEANS TO BUILD SOCIAL NETWORKS 
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My informants’ motivations for looking for a partner and having a romantic 
relationship varied. In some cases, they started to explore romantic opportunities 
not because they were keen to be in a relationship but because they considered 
engaging in and talking about dating as a way to establish friendships in a new 
environment. This applies to Winnie, a 23-year-old working holiday maker from 
Hong Kong. She said, 
I worked in a Chinese restaurant, and many of my colleagues were from 
mainland China, Taiwan and Malaysia. When I first introduced myself, they 
frequently asked about my plans for the future and what I would do after 
spending two years in London. Frankly, I was so new to this country and 
was not sure about my next move, but they seemed to be really keen to 
know, and the conversations would always turn to how I could stay in the 
UK. I remember my colleagues always said to me, “Just find a man!” In 
their eyes, finding a man in the UK and getting married is the most direct 
way to get permanent residency. Then a Taiwanese colleague introduced 
me to an app, and said it was fun. I then started to exchange messages 
with a few guys and had a few dates. My colleagues were always 
interested in how my date went. 
 
Winnie realised that by identifying herself as a temporary migrant with an interest in 
staying in the UK, she could quickly receive social acceptance from her colleagues. 
In a way, the temporality of her residence and her “plans for the future” affected how 
people related to her, and how much effort they made to establish a bond (or 
boundary) with her. Winne’s social experience changed when she expressed her 
desire to remain; this helped her to secure friendship among “experienced migrants” 
who had been in her position, and were willing to share their stories of success and 
their immigration advice. According to Winne, the narrative of “just find a man” was 
widely circulated and popular among her female colleagues. But romantic 
encounters and gossip about the appearance, manners, and characters of the men 
migrant women date are only part of the story. More importantly, migrant women’s 
social networks and identity are deeply entangled within this narrative.  
Migrants in this study also used different kinds of social media to build new social 
networks, before and after they arrived in the UK, which in turn helped them to settle 
in the new society, acquire local knowledge, and even find potential partners. Here, I 
will share two migrant women’s stories as examples. Ling was a 22-year-old 
mainland Chinese migrant who was married to a British citizen from Hong Kong. 
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Ling met her husband in the UK through a friend, whom she met through an app 
before departing from China. Ling said, 
After I received my master’s degree offer from the university, I was so 
happy. I spent the whole summer in 2012 in China doing pretty much 
nothing and preparing myself for studying abroad. Since I had so much free 
time, I went online to meet people who lived in Edinburgh already. I added 
two or three friends on WeChat. One of them was a guy who worked in 
Scotland at the time. I told him that I was coming to Edinburgh to study. I 
asked him about the weather; how to open a bank account; what I should 
bring with me; what kind of accommodation I should choose if I don’t want 
to live in a university dormitory etc. Although I hadn’t met him at the time, 
he helped me a lot. After I arrived Edinburgh, he was very keen to ask me 
out. He worked in Fife, Scotland. I was a bit scared because I just got here. 
I didn’t even know how to get from point A to Point B…One day in October, 
he invited me to go to Fife again. He said, “My boss has a boat, he can take 
you out to the sea if you want”. I thought this idea sounds very attractive… I 
remember thinking to myself I would go and enjoy a day out and I would 
come home before dark. I thought if I wasn’t going to spend the night there, 
it should be fine. But in the end, I cancelled on him because I didn’t feel 
well. But the week after, he invited me again, and I finally went to Fife. By 
the way, this friend is not my husband! He is the employee of my husband 
– a Chinese takeaway owner that took me on a boat trip. This is how we 
met.  
(Ling, 22 years old, married to a British citizen from Hong Kong) 
 
Another example was Belle, a young woman from Hong Kong who came to the UK 
for an arts degree and is now married to an English PhD student, Chris. Belle also 
used social media, such as Facebook, to meet friends in the UK before she arrived. 
For a period of time after her arrival in the UK, her feelings of love had swung 
between two prospective suitors – one of them was Chris, now her husband, and 
another was Oliver, a young Englishman who was one of the first contacts Belle had 
in the UK. Oliver and Belle became friends on Facebook a few months before 
Belle’s arrival in London. Oliver was also the first person that Belle turned to when 
she thought she was in trouble. Belle said, 
On the day Chris and I first met, he was just a stranger to me. We had a 
smoothie, and then he wanted to show me the city of London so we could 
hang out for a bit longer. That was fine with me. But then he said he wanted 
to have dinner with me. I didn’t really want to. I was a bit scared. I’d never 
dated anyone before. And we just met! I was not sure it would be a good 
idea so I asked my friend Oliver to come pick me up…Chris and Oliver both 
chased me for a few months and gave me time to think carefully about 
which one I wanted to be with. 
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Both Ling and Belle used social media to secure virtual friendships that helped them 
to establish social networks and settle in the UK later. As most of the informants had 
no close family members or relatives in the UK, the social networks that they formed 
in their daily lives and in the virtual world were particularly useful for providing 
practical tips about living in the UK, cultural exchange, and a route to explore 
romantic opportunities in a new country.  
Although it may seem that Ling and Belle were able to accumulate social capital 
before migration, regardless of the geographical distance and time difference 
between the UK and China/Hong Kong, their choice of communication methods was 
in fact limited. In contrast to the relatively free socio-political environment in Hong 
Kong, in the mainland, information flows and exchanges among citizens are strictly 
controlled and monitored by the Chinese government to maintain political and social 
order. Through implementing the Golden Shield Project (or commonly nicknamed 
The Great Firewall of China), one of the most sophisticated internet censorship and 
surveillance systems in the world, the Chinese government largely denies Chinese 
citizens access to popular western internet services, such as Facebook, Google, 
WhatsApp, Tinder, Twitter, Snapchat and YouTube (see Griffiths 2019). Although 
many foreigners and some Chinese citizens are able to log on to virtual private 
networks (VPNs) to access content hosted outside of China, the number of 
people who are able to “climb over” the firewall is still expected to be 
significantly small compared to the total number of internet users in China. As a 
result, it is likely that mainland Chinese migrants, such as Ling, can only gain 
access to people who live overseas who are also the users of mobile 
applications that are approved by the Chinese government, such as WeChat. It 
is therefore not a coincidence that Ling’s first contact in the UK was a mainland 
Chinese man who migrated to Scotland years ago; and Belle’s first friend was a 
white Londoner who used Facebook regularly.  
Choices of social media pre-determine and limit not only the kinds of social 
capital that to-be migrants can obtain, but also the length of time that these 
forms of capital can be kept. It is my general observation that while many of my 
mainland Chinese informants downloaded western social media, such as 
Facebook in the UK, few became frequent users. WeChat was still the main way 
for them to maintain contact with family and friends in China, and to establish 
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new contacts within the mainland Chinese community in the UK. The majority 
did, however, tend to use Facebook, Gmail and WhatsApp to keep in touch with 
non-mainland Chinese networks in the UK. Many commented that these 
networks could easily be lost, especially after their return to China. Similar 
observations can be made for the young Hong Kong migrants, who use WeChat 
to keep in touch with their mainland Chinese friends in the UK but may stop 




Ronald’s, Ling’s and Belle’s use of social media and accumulation of social 
capital helped them to strategise different kinds of relationships, and to find 
romantic, and even marriage, opportunities in the UK. In Ling’s narrative, her 
first male friend in the UK was very keen to take her out, even though Ling kept 
cancelling their dates. It was a significant friendship in Ling’s migration 
trajectory, and possibly a romance that failed to blossom. Although Ling had 
never mentioned whether she had feelings for her male friend, and it was 
unclear whether her friend had a romantic interest in her, she talked about how 
her now-husband initially hesitated to get her phone number because he 
thought she was his employee’s girlfriend. When Ling’s relationship was 
established, she moved into her husband’s house, which was shared among 
other employees who worked in the Chinese takeaway, including her male 
friend. Ling described the situation as “slightly embarrassing”.  
Belle also had a significant male friendship. In Belle’s story, Oliver was a very 
lively and vivid character – he was Belle’s first friend in London, her protector 
and suitor. According to Belle, Oliver tried to win her heart by suggesting that 
Chris was “not a sociable guy” and he and Belle were “not a good match”. In the 
end, even though Belle considered Oliver “a good guy”, she chose Chris 
because her feelings towards Oliver were just “not as strong”, and “Chris was 
more handsome”.  
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Previous studies have looked at how having different types of relationships with 
different types of men who are able to meet a specific set of needs are very 
important for migrant women who come from a low socio-economic background, 
or those who are underprivileged (see Brennan 2003; 2004; Constable 2005; Cheng 
2010; Parreñas 2011). Less attention has been paid to the different sexual 
relationships that migrant women who are considered to have more resources may 
strategise. None of my female informants admitted to me that they had multiple 
relationships at any given time. However, I heard from a Chinese friend, who was 
also a PhD student in the UK, that this practice may be more common than what my 
interview materials reveal.  
For around a year, my friend shared a flat with a Chinese couple in Scotland. 
The woman was a business master’s student in her mid-twenties. The man was 
in his mid-thirties and was a Chinese takeaway owner. While the man often 
returned home late because of the late opening hours of the takeaway business, 
my friend noticed that the woman was sometimes driven home by another man. 
My friend witnessed how her flatmate seemed to stay in the car parked 
downstairs for “a suspiciously long time”, and how she occasionally showed off 
branded hand bags that my friend suspected were bought by someone other 
than her boyfriend. Soon, my friend’s suspicions about the affair were confirmed 
not only by her flatmate’s confession, but also because this “mysterious young 
man” became an acquaintance of my friend, who often texted her and tried to 
collect information from her. In one of these messages, her flatmate’s lover 
admitted that he was aware of his role as a “spare tyre”, but he was confident 
that he would be the winner in the end because he considered himself to have 
better job prospects than his competitor; “after all, being a Chinese chef is 
simply not a high-class job”, he texted. This story that my friend shared allowed 
me to catch a glimpse of how some migrants may make use of various forms of 
social capital and relationships, including friends, lovers, and partners, to 
navigate their lives in the UK. Migrants’ involvement in multiple relationships 
cannot be solely explained by materialistic and calculative intentions; for some, 
it may be gratifying to have two (or more) relationships with men or women at a 
given time in their lives because receiving sexual attention, being desired, and 
creating jealousy among different suitors can be very empowering. Doing 
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romance, negotiating “love”, and strategising relationships through messaging, 
testing the boundaries of intimacy, and even just imagining romance, are 
important experiences of subject-making (Cheng 2010), helping migrants to achieve 
goals, and satisfy their desires. 
 
MIGRANTS’ AGENCY IN MAKING USE OF SEXUAL CAPITAL AND 
NEGOTIATING LOVE 
 
Many young Chinese temporary migrants enjoy a higher degree of sexual autonomy 
through migration and anonymity, which enable the expression of sexuality in a 
liberal and empowering way (Bech 1998; Cantú 2009; Cheng 2010; Gaetano 2008). 
Informants such as Vivian, Belle, and Kelly described how they were able, at least to 
a certain extent, to wear revealing outfits and provocative make-up without worrying 
about the gaze of others for the first time in their lives after moving to the UK. They 
commented on how such freedom was not available in Hong Kong and China, as 
they were expected to conform to conservative gender norms, especially in public 
areas. Belle was especially frustrated that she could not wear “sexy clothes” on the 
MTR in Hong Kong because of unwanted attention, not just from men but also from 
women.  
Apart from being able to express female sexuality in a relatively less restricted way, 
my informants were aware that their gender qualities and ethnic traits had a different 
value in the UK. For example, Ronald understood that his youth and masculinity 
with a relatively more feminine tendency were desirable among some people in the 
LGBT community in London. Many studies have looked at how a sensual and 
feminine Oriental body is stereotypically perceived (see Yokoyama 1986; Hu 2016), 
and associated with virtues such as tenderness, gentleness, and slenderness. The 
same physical attributes and temperaments are also often used to describe 
Chinese/Asian men (Kong 2011), which constructs a masculine discourse of a 
certain global hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), and 
affirms western superiority (Hoang 2014). When asked about how he perceived his 
sexual attractiveness in the dating market, Ronald said,  
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My (ex)partner once said to me he likes me because I’m different from 
those Thai boys he dated before, that he can actually talk to me on an 
intellectual level.  
 
Appearance and physical attributes are not the only form of sexual capital Ronald 
possesses; his cultural capital as a university graduate with good English proficiency 
and manners can also be converted into sexual capital. Here, sexual capital has a 
class element. The ability to talk intellectually is related to embodied cultural capital, 
which according to Ronald, also enhanced his sexual attractiveness. Possessing 
this sexual capital, Ronald was able to attract the right people who might be able to 
help him stay in the UK. Therefore, sexual capital is linked to intimate relationship 
capital, which can potentially be converted into temporal capital.  
Depending on ones’ sexuality, gender qualities and ethnic traits may be imagined 
and perceived by others differently. In Kelly’s case, looking less Chinese was 
considered to be an advantage in attracting sexual attention. She said, 
Sometimes I think I look more like a Thai or a Malaysian. And people here 
like women of these nationalities more than Chinese. I attracted quite a lot 
of black guys’ attention. There was a black guy who used to text me all the 
time and said he liked me. He already has a wife, but he just kept chasing 
me and said I look sexy. 
 
Migrants learn to perform their racialised femininity and masculinity in a new cultural 
and geographical context. They also adopt different tactics to negotiate sex, delay 
sex, and capitalise on the value of virginity to seek commitment through 
emphasising their Asian cultural origin. In Vivian’s example, before meeting her 
husband John, she had her first sexual encounter with a Middle Eastern man. The 
relationship lasted for a few months.  
Vivian (V): Every time we went on a date, we went to the cinema and made 
out. Sometimes when I spent a night at his house, we had oral sex. But if he 
tried to stick it in, I always stopped him. 
Yu (Y): Why did you stop him? 
V: You see…I’m a virgin. He wanted to have sex, but he wasn’t willing to 
commit. I just couldn’t give in. We’ve completely different values about sex 
and relationships. I can’t lose my virginity to a guy who doesn’t even love 
me. 
 
Vivian was in love, but she was not willing to have casual sex in a non-committed 
relationship. During the process of negotiating love and sex, Vivian hoped that the 
man she was seeing would “open up” and become committed. The man, on the 
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other hand, praised Vivian for being different to other women that he dated, and said 
that she “deserved someone better”. After migration, Vivian pushed the sexual 
boundary from “no intimacy at all”, which was strictly set by her parents, to “making 
out without losing my virginity (by having penetrative sex)”. It was through the 
processes of sexual exploration and negotiation, such as deciding which sexual acts 
were acceptable, that Vivian was transformed into a sexual subject. While acquiring 
sexual knowledge and skills in flirtation, Vivian held onto the value of virginity, which 
represents a woman’s purity and innocence, to delay further sexual advancement 
and seek commitment (Yu 2018). This echoes what Cheng (2010, 143) describes as 
“the power of virginity”: 
Claims of virginity were important for women in managing their sexuality – in 
maintaining an image of female innocence that might be “given” to the right 
man while at the same time putting off sexual advances. 
 
In Farrer's (2010, 75) sociological definition, sexual capital is “a person’s resources, 
competencies and endowments that provide status as sexual agents within a field”. 
“Status” here is a key word that shows that an individual’s resources, competencies 
and endowments cannot be separated from their own habitus. Sexual capital, in 
Farrer’s definition, does not only concern the body (e.g. appearance and physical 
attributes), but also how the body is presented and maintained, for example what 
clothes to wear, what makeup to use and what beauty services to regularly attend 
to, and the appropriate mannerisms displayed by the body. 
I argue that virginity as a form of capital is a different subtype of sexual capital, in 
that it retains its highest value by not being used, or being used in the right context 
and at the right time. Most Chinese middle-class families and young people consider 
marriage a compulsory step in life (Rocca 2017). In Hong Kong, the daughters of 
middle-class families are taught to have good moral values in sex and marriage 
from a young age (see Yu 2013). Although cohabitation and premarital sex have 
become more common in China and Hong Kong (Friedman 2006; Yu 2013), a 
woman’s virginity is still considered to be valuable and the protection of it remains a 
core subject of sexual moral education among middle-class families in East Asia to 
ensure a good lifepath for their children without it being ruined by the risk of 
unplanned pregnancy from uncommitted relationships (see Supametaporn et al. 
2010; Yu 2013).  
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In Vivian’s case, after giving up on developing her initial relationship into a 
committed one, she met John and soon they were together. This time Vivian had 
more confidence that the relationship would work. After they first had sex, Vivian 
stressed to John that her virginity had been given to “the right person”. She thus 
retained the value of virginity for negotiating power and the prospect of marrying. 
The couple first discussed marriage six months into their relationship. Vivian saw 
John’s willingness to consider marrying her, despite the brevity of their courtship, as 
an expression of his love. But for a year, John was not ready to propose to her. In 
Vivian’s opinion, this was because they were still in the process of evaluating each 
other based on how much “love” was given. She said she understood John’s 
reservation and his expectation that she shows him that her love was “non-
instrumental”. To erase John’s doubt, Vivian emphasised the good life that she had 
in Hong Kong, and how insignificant settlement in the UK was to her.  
In Ronald’s case, love was a discursively constructed category, and could be seen 
as a performance, as Brennan (2004) suggests. During our first interview, Ronald 
told me that he did not “love” his ex-partner. He said, 
I think he likes me much more than I like him. I enjoy his company. I like his 
character. But I don’t think I love him. 
 
Ronald told me that he pretended to love his ex-partner by calling him intimate 
names, and saying that he missed him when they could not see each other. He also 
expressed his ambivalence about staying in the UK so that his partner felt insecure 
in the relationship and would be more eager to help him stay. This echoes Kabeer's 
(1999, 438) observation that an individual’s agency “can take the form of bargaining 
and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion and resistance as well as 
more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis”. Even though 
Ronald used his sexual capital and the language of love to form a relationship from 
which he gained advantages, including living with his ex-partner without paying any 
rent or bills, he also reciprocated by being the type of person that his ex-partner 
wanted, satisfying his sexual demands, and giving him care and support.  
The performativity of love and “real love” are sometimes not easy to disentangle. 
Ronald admitted that his feelings had changed over a year. Not willing to name his 
feelings as “love”, however, he said that the relationship constituted mutuality and 
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reciprocity, and that he had developed “genuine feelings” towards his ex-partner. 
During an interview in early 2017, a year after I first interviewed Ronald, he said, 
I can’t say I have no feelings for him. If you spend enough time with a cat or 
dog, the feeling for the animal will grow naturally. I don’t know if I love him 
because I have never loved someone in my life. I don’t know how it is 
supposed to feel. But I care about him. I take care of him when he is sick. 
We have each other’s back. 
 
 
TEMPORARY LOVE RELATIONSHIPS 
 
While most relationships and marriages I have discussed so far are relatively 
committed or stable, not all relationships are formed with a view to marriage; some 
are temporary and short-term, and help migrants to pass time and satisfy their 
emotional or physical needs. Mike was a PhD student in his late twenties, who had 
had a few relationships in the past four years. He only dated Chinese international 
students who studied at his university. He said, 
I think having a relationship in the UK is very different compared to in 
China. Dating someone here is like you are in a vacuum (zhen kong) of 
time. Every relationship here happens and ends so quickly. The process of 
falling in love and breaking up is all intensely compressed and done 
quickly. Most relationships that I heard of ended in the airport. In my 
opinion, the airport is like the grave of love. It is the last place and the last 
time couples see each other. For a lot of young international students, 
every encounter here is just a temporary coincidence. This is the country 
where they meet and say bye. They are just transient (guo ke) in each 
other’s life. I have seen so many Chinese couples here who would never be 
together at all, had it not been for their temporary stays in the UK. If they 
were both in China, they would have never met each other in their lives. 
These couples are actually not suitable for each other. When one person in 
a relationship has to leave the UK, and the other one has to stay for longer, 
they are very likely to break up. If a couple’s visas expire at the same time, 
they will have a 10% chance of staying with each other after returning to 
China. But 90% of the time they will break up because the necessary 
conditions for them to stay together do not exist anymore. In the UK, these 
couples stay together for one or two years because they are lonely. They 
want something from each other. But once they return to China, they will 
have many more choices of partner. They don’t have to stick with that same 
person anymore.  
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The “vacuum of time” that Mike describes in his quote reflects how he sees his 
romantic experiences in the UK as a separate entity or a sidetrack to his main life-
course trajectory. Within this, relationships are formed and broken under 
circumstances very different from those that he might find himself in at home. This 
state is conditioned by migrants’ temporary status in the UK, which allows them to 
forgo their usual criteria or considerations in choosing a partner, such as the 
compatibility of class background or family opinion. This sentiment was echoed in 
another statement made by Mike in a later interview, “When we are together, we just 
enjoy the moment, and don’t think about the future”. Although the future is uncertain, 
in Mike’s perception, it is imagined as a time when things will go “back to normal”, 
when migrants will return to their socio-cultural environment, letting go of the 
relationship that they formed in the UK. 
Mike struck me as holding a romantic disposition. However, despite this and 
perhaps as a result of his cumulative experiences of unsuccessful relationships in 
the UK, in which multiple women broke up with him upon their return to China – and 
one of whom even blocked him on all social media accounts and disappeared - Mike 
resigned himself to the opinion that relationships in the UK, like migration, were 




In this chapter, I have discussed the strategies adopted by young Chinese 
temporary migrants and their agency in finding partners, experiencing romance, and 
seeking marriage and immigration opportunities in the UK. The use of social media, 
including WeChat and Facebook, and especially dating apps, such as Tinder, is one 
of the main ways in which migrants build new social networks, develop different 
kinds of relationships, and meet potential partners It is important to note that 
migrants’ desires, romantic goals, experiences, and outcomes can also be related to 
capital building. As I have demonstrated with examples of Ronald and Vivian, in the 
process of exploring and expressing their sexualities, they are also empowered by 
making use of sexual capital, cultural capital, and the language of love to do 
romance, gain intimate relationship capital and negotiate power within their 
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relationships. I have also shown that Chinese migrants’ romantic relationships are 
highly contextual choices, shaped by the inevitable mingling of emotions and 
practical interests. For example, some migrants seek to maintain a relationship for a 
longer period of time, or even to enter marriage, converting their intimate 
relationship capital into temporal capital to prolong their stays in the UK. But for 
those who may find relationships in the UK a temporary and short-term occurrence, 
such relationships are not to be seen as contributing to the capital conversion 
processes. 
By scrutinising the processes of conversion between sexual capital, intimate 
relationship capital and temporal capital, this chapter contributes to the discussion of 
middle-class sexuality. The complex nature of sexuality that could be strategic 
(Hirsch 2003) and tangled with romantic love has been discussed in the rich 
migration scholarship on sex workers or those who have low socio-economic status 
(for example, see Brennan, 2003, 2004; Chen, 2008; Cheng, 2010). Little is known, 
however, about the sexual strategies and conversion processes of sexual capital of 
migrants who consider themselves as coming from a middle-class background. In 
Ronald and Vivian’s cases, the inconvertibility of their institutionalised cultural 
capital has shifted their focus on the acquisition of social capital in the UK. Their 
stories also show that in the context of migration, when cultural capital cannot be 
easily converted into economic, symbolic and social capital, middle-class migrants 
have to be creative in their ways of building and using new forms of capital.  
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CHAPTER 5 
“THE CLOCK IS TICKING”: TIME AND TEMPORALITIES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL MARRIAGES AND MIGRANT LIVES 
 
We can grasp time in its complexity only if we seek the relations between 
time, temporality, tempo and timing, between clock time, chronology, social 
time and time-consciousness, between motion, process, change, continuity 
and the temporal modalities of past, present and future, between time as 
resource, as ordering principle and as becoming of the possible or between 
any combination of these (Adam 1990, 13). 
 
On 23 November 2016 at noon, I was waiting anxiously on a delayed train to 
London Waterloo. I was on my way to a lunch meeting in central London with an 
informant, Sophia, whom I had never met before. Sophia and I had been put in 
touch by another informant who lived in Aberdeen, Scotland. Sitting in the stationary 
train, I anticipated I would be at least 15 minutes late and texted Sophia to apologise 
in advance.  
The train starting moving again. As soon as I arrived at Waterloo station, I rushed 
down to the Underground to get on a tube. As the tube moved, the platform and the 
few people on it were all left behind. The internet signal on my mobile was lost. The 
tube was driven into a tunnel. Through the window, illuminated by the random 
strong lights in the tunnel, I saw old pipes and fuse boxes against the background of 
darkness. I heard the unpleasant sound of the high-pitched clickety-clack of the 
railcars over a stretch of track. It was in this dim light that I thought about the 
geographer David Harvey and his theory of time-space compression. Harvey's 
(1989) theory captures the ways in which modern technology, such as 
transportation, including the tube I was currently on, changes the qualities of and 
relationship between time and space, shortening distance between places, and 
enabling the acceleration of economic activities. He argues that advanced 
communication and transportation technologies facilitate the production, circulation, 
and exchange of capital at a pace faster than ever before. I thought for a second it is 
indeed this compression of social time-space that drives our globalised economies, 
and allows my informants (and me) to move geographically, temporally, socially, 
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and emotionally between two (and sometimes multiple) worlds - China/Hong Kong 
and the UK. 
A few minutes later, natural light returned to my world. I came out from Baker Street 
Underground station, looking for my way to the restaurant with the help of the 
Google maps app on my mobile. Getting on and off the London Underground, and 
meeting informants at various locations, were part of my fieldwork experience in 
London. It was the tube that carried me from place to place and connected me with 
people whom I had never known. Doing two (and sometimes three) interviews a day 
meant that I had to manage my time precisely, in order to be punctual and keep 
track of my daily schedule. At 1pm, I would be sitting in a Chinese restaurant with 
my informant who originally came from Shanghai. At 4pm, I would be having a cup 
of Earl Grey tea at Starbucks with another informant who came from Hong Kong. I 
was constantly on the move, and so were my informants. One time, I conducted an 
interview on Skype with an informant who was at London Heathrow airport waiting 
for a flight to Leeds for a short business trip. As we could not finish the interview on 
that day, we continued the rest of it the next day when she was waiting for her return 
flight to London at Leeds Bradford airport. Time structures our movement. Time 
structures our lives. 
 
TIME, TEMPORALITY, MIGRATION AND LIFE-COURSE MOVEMENT 
 
As people move, their experiences are closely related to time. Yet for a long time, 
our understanding of contemporary migration has been largely built upon 
theorisations of the spatial, with a lack of emphasis on time and temporality as a 
central analytical framework (Griffiths, Rogers, and Anderson 2013). Although the 
temporal dimensions of migration processes have not received equal attention to 
space and spatiality (May and Thrift 2001), there is a small but burgeoning 
sociological and anthropological literature focusing on the relationship between time 
and migration (e.g. Cwerner 2001; Roberts 1995; Robertson 2016; Meeus 2012). 
When analysing how time has been theorised and considered in migration studies, 
Griffiths, Rogers, and Anderson (2013) particularly look at five temporal 
conceptualisations: flows and moments; rhythms and cycles; tempos; synchronicity 
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and disjuncture; and the future. In this chapter, I attempt to employ some of these 
temporal categories to understand the youth mobilities of increasing numbers of 
well-educated and middle-class Chinese migrants to the UK. 
The British visa regime is a structuring framework within which people have to 
operate according to the “time” constructed by the Home Office. In this study, 
Chinese migrants’ first visas typically allowed them to stay in the UK for between 18 
months and 4 years, depending on the nature of the visa (study or youth mobility), 
and the length of the programme (for student-visa holders). Although young Chinese 
temporary migrants are expected to return to their country of origin or move on after 
a period of temporary residence in the UK, their intentions are tightly connected with 
the notion of an uncertain future, the looming spectre of which often entails a sense 
of precariousness, especially when combined with rhythmic changes in mobility 
(Marcu 2017). Being temporary, migrants’ duration of stay in the destination country 
changes over time (Bauböck 2011; Robertson 2018; Schrooten, Salazar, and Dias 
2015), which necessitates a considerable degree of contingency and adjustments of 
expectations. This chapter responds to the call of Parreñas (2010, 319) to study 
how “temporal restrictions qualitatively shape migrant experiences”.  
This chapter looks at the intersections between states’ disciplinary practices, 
enforced through the time constraints of the visa regime (Aybek 2014; Hammar 
1990; Parreñas 2010), and the agency of migrants in combatting structural and 
temporal constraints (Baas 2010; Khoo, Hugo, and McDonald 2008; Robertson 
2014). One of the significant means to lengthen the time remaining in the UK is 
marriage, for example by becoming: (1) a spouse/partner of a British permanent 
resident/citizen/EEA national; or (2) a dependant visa holder. Due to the nature of 
the transnational marriage market, which appears to follow the familiar logic of 
global hypergamy (Charsley and Shaw 2006; Constable 2003), and a lack of 
permanent and visa-sponsored employment opportunities in the UK (see chapter 2; 
Yu 2018), the status of ‘marriage migrant’ was realised by a greater number of 
migrant women than men following a period of temporary stay in the UK within my 
interview sample. This trend necessitates putting migrant women at the centre of 
this chapter. However, I will exceptionally include Ronald’s story to demonstrate 
how migrants’ experience of time changes as their goals in the UK change.  
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The sociological concept of time is particularly relevant to the understanding of life-
course transitions. The life stages of migrant women have great implications for the 
timing of their life-course events, such as marriage (Cole 2010; Settersten and 
Mayer 1997), and reproduction (Constable 2013). King et al. (2004, 19) state that 
“the life course framework contextualises not only individual and group decisions 
about the timing of migrations but also the formative influences and outcomes”. I am 
aware that in some extreme yet rather common cases, migrants’ reproductive time 
is regulated by state bureaucracy, such as that of their destination country. For 
example, Filipina domestic helpers in Hong Kong may risk losing their job and being 
sent home if they become pregnant (Constable 2013). In this study, the British visa 
regime determines the duration of time that a temporary migrant is allowed to stay in 
the UK; the institution of marriage facilitates a social expectation to marry; and the 
Chinese state’s sheng nu discourse (discussed in the previous chapter) stigmatises 
women’s singlehood and directs them towards the goal of marriage before the age 
of 30. This chapter looks at how life-course time is structured, gendered, and 
influenced by the institution of marriage (Lauser 2008; Martin 2018; Kringelbach 
2014; Thomas and Bailey 2009), and monitored by state bureaucracy. 
Robertson (2018, 170) criticises migration sociology, which in her view, “has yet to 
grapple with the complex relationship between migrant temporality and migrant 
mobility, beyond life-course models or studies of migrants’ social and cultural 
temporalities”. In this chapter, I aim to address Robertson’s (2018, 170) criticism 
and to follow her approach of understanding migrants’ experiences by studying the 
overlaps and intersections of multiple “timescales” – institutional, biographic, and 
everyday. I will consider the institutional time of policy and governance, the 
biographic time of life-course events, and the everyday lived time of Chinese 
migrants, particularly related to their romantic relationships. This chapter aims to 
show how time is institutionalised. Time and temporality have implications for the 
making and breaking of transnational relationships, shaping desires, decisions, and 
the timing of transnational family formation among Chinse temporary migrants in the 
UK, which, as Cwerner (2001, 7) argues, “migrate” with people. I will investigate 
how the various modalities of socially constructed “time”, such as “individual time”, 
“historical time”, “state-controlled time”, “state-sponsored time”, and “gendered 
marriage/reproduction time”, are inter-related to produce specific experiences.  
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FLOWS AND MOMENTS 
 
According to Hareven (1982), most individuals’ personal time should be understood 
in terms of their synchronisation with “historical time”, which can be referred to as a 
specific time in history when major socio-economic, political, and cultural changes 
occur in a society. In mainland China, middle-class youths’ individual time and 
family time are shaped by a particular historical time of unprecedented economic 
development and social change caused by major economic and social reforms, and 
implementation of the “one-child” birth control policy that began in the late 1970s. 
Urban women in China now enjoy a level of access to education equivalent to men’s 
(Judd 1989; Evans 2008; Obendiek 2016), and other resources that were 
inaccessible to their parents’ generation, including international migration 
opportunities. 
In the case of Hong Kong, the expansion of tertiary education, lower rates of 
marriage, and fewer offspring in each Hong Kong family means that young middle-
class children born in the post-1980s era benefit from a concentration of resources 
and investment from their family, which allows some to pursue foreign study and 
work opportunities. 










China (PRC)  95,090 91,215 89,540 87,895 
Malaysia  16,370 17,405 17,060 16,635 
United States of America  17,580 17,115 16,865 16,485 











Hong Kong (Special Administrative 
Region) 
 16,680 16,745 16,215 14,725 
Source: HESA Figure 11 - Top ten non-European Union countries of domicile in 
2016/17 for HE student enrolments 2012/13 and 2016/17 
Since migration flows are often conceptualised by academics, policymakers and 
immigration bureaucracies as sets of statistics that are collected at “snap shot” 
moments, we can only capture partial pictures of the numbers and movements of 
people at a particular period of time. As we can see from the figure above, the 
number of students coming to the UK for higher education from China and Hong 
Kong increased steadily during the period from 2013 to 2017. Although this figure 
illustrates the significant numbers of student migrants from mainland China and 
Hong Kong, despite the relatively small population size of the latter, it does not help 
to enrich our understanding of migrants’ lives in the UK. 
In Chinese migrants’ narratives, certain “snap shot” moments are particularly 
significant, for example, the moment of arrival in the UK. 
On 8th September 2012, I arrived in Edinburgh to pursue my master’s 
degree. I remember it being a very dark night. It was chilly.  
(Ling, 22 years old, married to a British citizen from Hong Kong) 
 
I arrived in London in the morning on 14th March 2015. My friend came to 
pick me up from the airport. I remember I had lots of luggage. We put it all 
on a trolley. The air was so fresh when I came out from the airport. The sky 
was grey. But the air was fresh. I was tired but excited. We got in a taxi to 
get to south London where I rented a room in a shared flat through my 
friend. I put the luggage in my room and went straight out to a bank to apply 
for a bank account. It was a very busy day!  
(Vivian, 28 years old, married to a British permanent resident from Hong 
Kong) 
 
I arrived in London on 15th September 2014. I remember it very clearly 
because I met my future husband on 18th September 2014, just a few days 
after my arrival! On that day, I was exploring the city centre on my own. My 
friend recommended I go to Leicester Square to have a look. I then walked 
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all the way from Leicester Square to Trafalgar Square. It was a sunny day. I 
was taking pictures. Just when I was about to leave and walk to Chinatown, 
my future husband appeared from nowhere and stopped me from leaving. 
He said to me, “I saw you taking pictures. You are so beautiful...would you 
like to have a smoothie with me?” And I did!  
(Belle, 24 years, married to an English PhD student) 
 
Many informants had clear memories of the specific details of their arrival day and 
regarded coming to the UK as a significant event in their lives. All informants could 
clearly state how long their visa was granted for; most remembered the exact expiry 
date of the visa. During interviews, some informants told me that when they thought 
of their old study and work lives “back home”, they felt like it was the distant past, 
even though in reality, it had not been “that long”. As they recalled their memories of 
departures, arrivals, home, and ageing parents, their travels and migration 
trajectories were packed with emotions. Certain memories were still fresh, but some 
seemed distant and blurred. In the migrants’ narratives, their experiences of time 
change as their circumstances change. Of course, time does not go faster, slower or 
stop for such people, yet their narratives suggest that they experience a powerful 
sense of time accelerating or decelerating. 
The following two pictures were taken by my informants Vivian and Winnie upon my 
request to record the day that they left the UK after a two-year working holiday. 
RHYTHMS AND CYCLES 
 
Time is constantly on our minds. At this particular moment, we could all be thinking 
about when lunch time will be, how long we must wait until Christmas, or when the 
appropriate time will be for marriage, having children, or retirement. However, I 
argue that for temporary migrants, the weight of time on their minds can sometimes 
be heavier than for non-migrants because of their state of temporariness. Due to the 
limited time they were permitted to stay in the UK, many informants were acutely 
aware of the passage of time, which shaped their present behaviours and decision-
making processes. For example, Ronald talked about how his temporal experience 
changed as his desire to stay in the UK grew. He said, 
When I first arrived in the UK, I was just enjoying my student life. I was very 
naïve and too relaxed. I didn’t think much about my future. I thought if I 
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wanted to stay, I could stay. When I was in the first year of my 
undergraduate programme, I thought I could simply find a job at 
McDonald’s to stay here after I graduated. It was after I became a second-
year student that I realised staying on in the UK wasn’t easy at all. I started 
to do lots of research. Then I learnt that it wouldn’t be easy for me to get a 
work visa with my social science degree. I panicked because I didn’t want 
to leave. I couldn’t sleep for many nights. I was under so much stress. 
Every day I thought hard to look for some ways to stay on. I knew I had to 
find a way quickly because I was running out of time and I was going to 
graduate soon. I kept thinking the clock was ticking; every moment, every 
day, I thought of this. I was very sensitive about time. I would be anxious 
when I thought to myself that another day had passed. 
 
This transformation of Ronald’s emotional trajectory from being a relaxed student 
migrant to an anxious “would-be indefinite settler” represents a change of rhythm in 
his migration journey. Although at the time of our first interview in March 2016, 
Ronald still had at least one and a half years left until his visa expired, there was a 
sense of urgency in finding a way to prolong his stay before his time in the UK ran 
out. In last chapter, I discussed how Ronald strategised his chance of achieving an 
extended stay through sexual and romantic relationships. Here I want to emphasise 
how Ronald made use of his temporal capital to try to achieve his goal. As 
discussed in chapter 2, migrants’ temporal capital is significant in determining how 
successful they would be in extending their stays in the UK.  
In chapter 4, I described how Ronald claimed that he chatted with at least 200 
people through dating apps and spent a minimum of four hours per day on these 
apps. Even though Ronald spent a lot of time using dating apps, he was very 
positive about this use of time, which allowed him to explore new sexual 
experiences and helped him to find his ex-partner, with whom he ended up living for 
more than two years and who was supportive of his quest to stay on in the UK. 
Ronald’s experience of utilising his time to explore romantic opportunities resonates 
with the stories of other informants, especially women (for examples, refer to 
chapter 4). 
GENDERING OF WOMEN’S AGE AND “MARRYING ON SCHEDULE” 
 
In many Asian societies, both men and women, but especially women, are expected 
to enter marriage. In a study of South Indian international students’ mobility. 
Yakaboski, Sheridan, and Dade (2014, 53) found that temporary migration to the US 
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helped both men and women to put a “time-stop on their marriage clocks”. In his/her 
study concerning middle-class Chinese women students in Australia, Martin (2018) 
found that a temporary stay overseas represented a “zone of suspension” within 
women’s life-courses, which helped them to delay marrying and child-bearing, and 
even potentially renegotiate normative life-course scripts. Although migration may 
allow a temporary deferral of gendered expectations, very few Chinese women that I 
interviewed perceived that marriage and motherhood could be left out of their life 
plan completely. Rather, the majority of migrant women considered international 
migration to be a significant life-course event that in itself creates “pathways” for 
them to fulfil “different [individual and family] roles sequentially or simultaneously” 
(Elder 1977). Many had hoped to achieve the goal of marriage at a time that they 
set for themselves based on pre-migration social and cultural values. However, as 
this chapter will show, restrictive British immigration regulations may sometimes 
come into conflict with migrants’ desires for family formation and the maintenance of 
transnational relations.  
In chapter 4, I discussed how young Chinese migrant women following a 
conventional feminine life script are under pressure to marry as they approach the 
age of 30. This social expectation on women to adopt a family-focused identity is 
intensified by the state-sponsored gender discourse of sheng nu, which stigmatises 
women’s singlehood. Previously I have argued that the gender discourse of sheng 
nu has travelled across borders through media, such as TV shows, and social 
media, and shape not only mainland Chinese women, but also Hong Kong women’s 
view of the right timing of marriage. Here, I will present Karmen, a 31-year-old 
former nurse from Hong Kong, to discuss how the combined forces of the social 
expectation to marry and the gendering of age work together to shape women’s 
desire for and timing of marriage during their supposedly “temporary” migration 
trajectory. In the face of running out of visa time and passing the prime age bracket 
to secure a marriage, Karmen was keen to search for a partner in the UK whom she 
could “settle down with”. She said, 
Men is definitely an issue. I am over 30 years old now. I think all the normal 
men in their 30s in Hong Kong have already married. But I can’t find 
anyone whom I can settle down with. I don’t even mind having a husband 
who is previously divorced, but still it is not easy… I know I am a bit old now 
because this is what everyone said to me. They said it is time for me to find 
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someone and settle down. In Hong Kong, it is fine for a 50-year-old man to 
date a woman in her 20s. It is not an issue at all. But what about women in 
their 30s? Where is my market? I think that in the UK, a woman’s age is 
less of a big deal. People don’t judge you so harshly here…I want to meet 
someone here and get married. I don’t have much time left.  
 
Karmen was aware that she was treated unfairly by gender double standards 
related to age and marriage. Age hypergamy is a common phenomenon observed 
in many Chinese societies (Ji 2015), which suggests the social norm of marriage 
formed between younger brides and older grooms has remained unchallenged. 
Although the average age at first marriage has risen steadily in the post-1980 era in 
both Hong Kong and cities in mainland China due to the expansion of higher 
education, and the highly competitive global environment and job market, women, 
as compared to men, continue to have a more compressed time frame to complete 
the rigidly defined normative life stages. This is especially significant because after 
spending years in tertiary (and post-graduate) education and accumulating work 
experience, single urban Chinese women in their late twenties and early thirties may 
experience great disadvantages in the marriage market. 
Lahad (2013) argues that there exists a temporal aspect in relation to societal 
timetables and age norms that women are expected to follow. This temporal aspect, 
I argue, relates to the notion of temporal capital. In the earlier stages of singlehood, 
women who are still considered as young, thus holding temporal capital, are 
admired and praised for their self-determination and personal endeavour to 
succeed. However, when marriageable age is approaching, or worse, passed, 
singlehood becomes a “problem”, a “feminized temporal crisis” (Negra 2009, cited in 
Lahad 2013, 26) for those who are perceived to be no longer having youth as capital 
or advantage on their side. As Lahad suggests, single women beyond the age of 30 
are often criticised as being too choosy, and “asking for too much”, thus bringing 
failure upon themselves. This echoes Karmen’s admission that she did not mind 
having a husband who is a divorcee; in other words, she was not choosy. Women 
like Karmen are at a socio-temporal phase where their entitlement to hold a 
selective stance is lost, and they are expected to compromise in order to achieve 
the goal of marriage. 
I argue that young migrant women’s concern about ageing in relation to the prospect 
of marriage and family formation is shaped by gendered marriage and reproduction 
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“times”. Even those who have not reached their thirties, such as Belle, may still 
hope to follow the fixed and divided chronological phases of study, post-study work, 
marriage, and reproduction in a feminine life-course model (Martin 2018). Belle’s 
decision to marry Chris, a 25-year-old PhD student from England, was shaped by 
her understanding of the “best timing” of reproduction for women. She said,  
I told Chris that I wanted to get married and give birth at a young age. My 
mum gave birth to me quite late. I don’t want to follow in her footsteps. 
Also, as an only child myself, I want to have 2 children. I think it will be 
good to give birth to my first one at the age of 28. And then maybe at the 
age of 30, I can give birth to my second one. I sometimes think of my aunt. 
I think she gave birth too late at the age of 36. Now she doesn’t have 
energy to play with her kid and looks really tired and old all the time. 
 
Belle’s view of women’s limited window of reproduction time, which should ideally be 
positioned after marriage but before the age of 30, was echoed in statements by 
many other informants, including those who had not achieved the social ideal, who 
often pointed out that having children beyond the age of 30 may entail significant 
health risks, compromised quality of nurturing time, and delayed retirement plans. 
This deeply rooted and pervasive discourse sets the timing of marriage and 
reproduction, and directs women towards the goal of what I term “marrying on 
schedule”. This is particularly significant for temporary migrant women who hope to 
follow their goal-driven normative life script, and seek committed relationships with a 
view to marriage whilst in the UK.  
TEMPO 
 
NEGOTIATING MARRIAGE IN ACCELERATED AND DECELERATED TIME 
 
Vivian met John, a 35-year-old British citizen from Hong Kong, one year after she 
moved to London. At the time of our first interview in March 2016, the couple had 
been together for several months and had started to consider marrying. But Vivian’s 
temporary residency status put a time frame on this relationship, and imposed 
challenges to planning for future. She said,  
We are running out of time because of my visa. My boyfriend is always 
worried about our future. He wonders whether I would ever return to the 
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UK again after my visa expires, and whether we would stop loving each 
other if we live apart. I sometimes think maybe we should give up now 
before we become too attached to each other. But then, another voice 
inside my heart says perhaps we should just get married so that we can 
be together forever. 
 
Vivian’s statement illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a committed relationship 
under a running-out-of-time visa situation. Soon after our first interview, Vivian 
moved in with John, shifting her life focuses from work and traveling to negotiating a 
relationship that would ultimately lead to marriage, and planning for a permanent 
future in the UK. Considering her age and her desired life script, she saw marrying 
John as a “logical” step, which on the one hand, would allow her to remain in the UK 
and the relationship to grow without worrying about disruptions; on the other hand, 
would improve her employability by attaining a more permanent residency status. 
However, Vivian also considered the costs of entering into a transnational marriage, 
for example extending a supposedly temporary separation with her family in Hong 
Kong. This internal struggle, together with the experience of negotiating the 
possibility of marriage, is what I call the “process of marriage negotiation”. 
After the expiration of her visa in early 2017, Vivian returned to Hong Kong, after 
which the couple maintained a long-distance relationship, with discussions about 
marrying in the future already having taken place. At the time, Vivian’s actions, 
plans, and considerations, including exploring job opportunities in Hong Kong, 
revolved around her romantic relationship and ongoing marriage negotiation. For 
example, she specifically found a recruitment job to build up her credentials for a 
future career in London. However, when only one month into the job the long 
working hours posed a threat to her relationship, she resigned immediately. 
Speaking over the phone at the time, she said to me, 
You know, this really is the best time to do it [leave the job]. I don’t like this 
job. I guess I’m just not recruitment agent material. My original plan was to 
visit John at Christmas this year. But we both miss each other a lot. I feel 
like I can’t take it any longer. When I can’t have a face-to-face talk with him, 
I just don’t know what he is thinking. It’s easy to have misunderstandings 
and arguments. I’d rather see him now than wait any longer. 
 
Soon afterwards, Vivian returned to the UK with tourist status, allowing her to stay in 
the country for six months without the right to work. Relying on financial support 
from John and her own family to cover her living expenses, Vivian was able to 
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completely focus on her relationship. I met the couple at an Italian restaurant in 
Edinburgh in August 2017 when they were on a trip to the Scottish Highlands. They 
appeared to be cheerful, but Vivian was still anxiously waiting for John’s marriage 
proposal. As her time in the UK drew to a close in November 2017, Vivian returned 
to Hong Kong empty-handed. Having been separated again and after several more 
serious discussions, John proposed over the phone two months later. In late 2018, 
Vivian travelled back to the UK with a spouse visa after getting married in Hong 
Kong. 
Vivian’s story highlights the intense, on-going, and time-compressed process of 
marriage negotiation between temporary migrant women and their partners in the 
UK. Since such negotiation is subjected to the temporal and spatial dynamics of 
migration regimes, often only a limited time is allowed for transnational couples to 
think and decide for their futures. This accelerated sense of time, with a desperate 
panicked rush of trying to make the “best” relationship decision, was experienced by 
many other informants. However, when individuals fail to make the quick, almost 
impulsive, decision to marry, the process of marriage negotiation is likely to continue 
across state boundaries. For nearly two years, Vivian had, as she described, “lived 
in both worlds”, traveling between two places and living with the marital status of a 
woman waiting for her partner’s marriage proposal, and facing the risk of losing 
valuable time in career building and finding another marriageable partner, if this 
relationship did not work out. In Vivian’s case, her middle-class family background 
indeed supported her travels between the UK and Hong Kong, enabling her to give 
up her job in Hong Kong and return to the UK for six months as a tourist without 
income. This demonstrates a close relationship between one’s class background 
and the amount of temporal capital that he/she owns before he/she must become 
financially self-sustained. 
For some migrants, a potentially lengthy process of cross-border marriage 
negotiation entails even more risks and uncertainties. Belle said, 
Before we decided to get married, Chris told me that he would come to 
Hong Kong once he graduates. He asked me to spend a year in Hong 
Kong to wait for him. But I felt like one year was too long, and even one 
month was too long for things to change. I have confidence in our 
relationship, but not in time. 
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Belle’s statement illustrates how time is imagined as something that is 
uncontrollable, and how the time of separation and waiting is considered as a 
“threat” to a relationship, undermining its stability. In contrast to the acceleration of 
time experienced by migrants as they seek a sense of certainty in their relationship 
before their visas expire, waiting for a relationship decision to be made, especially 
when a transnational couple lives apart, is imagined and experienced as a 
deceleration of time. Waiting is considered as a blockage of action (Gasparini 1995), 
a suspension of time that jeopardises migrants’ relationship, and puts their future in 
a negative light.  
Lin Lin met her husband Tian Qi while they were both studying for master’s degrees 
at a university in northern England. Midway through their studies, Tian Qi switched 
onto a PhD programme at the same university. Since Lin Lin’s length of study was 
now shorter than her boyfriend’s, she had to leave the UK first. She considered the 
separation to be too long for her to wait in China whilst Tian Qi pursued his degree. 
In order to join him again, and justifying her decision to herself as an opportunity to 
improve her employability in the UK, Lin Lin enrolled in a second master’s 
programme at a different British university after the first master’s degree was 
completed. When she was about to complete her second master’s degree and her 
visa was about to expire, Lin Lin and Tian Qi returned to China to register their 
marriage. After the wedding, Tian Qi completed his remaining two years of PhD 
studies in the UK, while Lin Lin was left alone in China to complete a visa 
application as a Tier 4 dependant, which unfortunately had taken 10 months, much 
longer than she had expected. She said,  
It was a very long and painful process. I had to apply for the visa twice 
during these 10 months because I failed it the first time…The first time 
when I applied, they said I had insufficient evidence to prove our 
relationship is genuine. Then I applied for an administrative review. I 
submitted our WeChat conversations and travel documents to prove that 
we have been in a long-term relationship for years. But in the review, they 
still thought that our relationship is not a genuine one, so my application 
was declined. When I applied for the second time, they said we did not 
have sufficient funding. But this was in fact a mistake because they forgot 
to count the money that my spouse had in his UK bank account. After I 




When I was waiting in China, I didn’t work for 10 months. My family and 
friends were worried. They thought I was wasting my time. They compared 
me with people similar to my age and thought that my career progress was 
a bit slow. 
 
Lin Lin felt that time was decelerated as she was stuck, unable to return to the UK, 
and unable to develop a career in either the UK or China. Like Vivian, Lin Lin could 
choose not to work for an extended period of time due to the existence of the 
middle-class family network and resources that she could fall back on. When the 
visa was finally granted, Lin Lin was only given a one-year stay in the UK because 
Tian Qi’s PhD programme was close to finishing. This loss of valuable time had 
made it difficult for Lin Lin to secure a long-term or permanent job, leaving her with 
no other options but ongoing temporary work in the UK. As a dependant equipped 
with two master’s degrees, Lin Lin failed to turn either time or cultural capital into 
advantages in the labour market. 
Time-related visa regulations have great implications for the timing of marriage of 
both newly arrived migrants and those who have lived in the UK for a long period of 
time. Cher moved to Wales from Hong Kong in 2005 to attend boarding school and 
prepare for her O-level exams. She then studied for a Fashion Design degree at a 
university in London. Despite living in the UK for more than a decade, however, 
Cher was unable to obtain British permanent residency through the ten-year 
immigration path because of too many days of absence22. At the same time, she 
was unable to secure visa-sponsored employment following graduation. This 
situation forced her to consider the option of marrying her Korean boyfriend, a Tier 2 
visa holder, with whom she had been in a relationship for three and a half years. 
This marriage allowed Cher to continue living in London as a dependent family 
member and to count the time spent in the UK towards either the five-year or the 
ten-year immigration path, which would eventually give her British permanent 
residency.  
Cher’s decision to marry was made with lots of worries in mind because she was 
never sure that her husband was a compatible partner. During their years of 
courtship, Cher was aware of her partner’s bad temper and “Korean machismo”. 
 
22 The ten-year permanent residency path requires migrants to have had continuous 
residence in the UK, with gaps of no more than 180 days at a time, and no more than 540 
days in a ten-year period (see Home Office 2019c). 
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However, her partner’s positive changes over a six-month period and her own 
concerns about her visa situation finally persuaded her to get married in January 
2016. The couple’s married life had not been as happy as Cher had hoped. Soon 
after they were married, her husband’s “bad habits and bad temper” had returned, 
and were worse than before. His visa-sponsored job in London was stressful, and 
according to Cher, her husband was “the kind of man who accumulates all his 
negative emotions during day-time work, and vents it out on his wife when he gets 
home”. Cher’s husband now thought that moving back to South Korea would be the 
best option for his career development, and expected Cher to follow. But London 
had become Cher’s home for over ten years, and she did not want to have to adapt 
to a new life in South Korea. She was worried that because of her incompetence in 
the Korean language, she would not be able to find any jobs and end up being a full-
time housewife. Cher was angry at her husband’s sudden change of plan. When 
reflecting on her decision to marry, she said, 
Moving to South Korea is not what we agreed before I said yes to his 
marriage proposal…Getting married at the time wasn’t good timing as I 





Vivian, Belle, Lin Lin, and Cher’s decisions to marry and timing of marriage were 
shaped, and often accelerated by various factors, including visa-time constraints, 
the social pressure to marry, their own understandings of the “appropriate marriage 
time”, and the desired outcomes of such marriages, such as the right to live in the 
UK. To a certain extent, Vivian’s, Belle’s, and Lin Lin’s marriages can be described 
as shanhun, a popular Chinese term that can be directly translated as “lightning 
marriage”. It is generally used to describe a couple who get married after knowing 
each other or being together for a short period of time. There is no universal 
understanding of how “short” a time a couple must have been together before the 
wedding for it to be called a “lightning marriage”. However, in general, Chinese 
marriages are viewed not only as a matter involving two individuals, but also as a 
bond formed between two families, which may take a couple of years to build.  
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In a way, “lightning marriage” is similar to the term “shotgun wedding” used in a 
western context, which also means a hurried wedding. However, while an 
unexpected pregnancy is usually involved in a “shotgun wedding”, such an event is 
only one of the reasons, but not the determining factor, contributing to a “lightning 
marriage” in the Chinese context. Rather, the gendering of ages and the social 
pressure surrounding women’s singlehood may be more likely to facilitate such 
marriages.  
Since shanhun challenges the conformist ideal that marriage should be formed after 
establishing a stable and long-term courtship, both men and women engaging in 
shanhun risk losing social respectability, with women tending to risk losing more 
than men if a shanhun turns into a divorce. 
Here, I want to introduce Ying’s story. Unlike the migrant women I have discussed 
so far, Ying was married before she came to the UK. Ying represents my other 
informants who got married in their countries of origin at a specific time for the 
purpose of bringing their spouse to the UK. This kind of marriage is considered an 
effective way for couples to obtain temporary visas and move to the UK together. It 
usually happens not long before a migrant’s designated departure time.  
Ying is now a divorcee. Ying and her ex-husband, a civil servant, were in a 
relationship for three years in China before they got married in their mid-twenties in 
July 2015. During these years, although the couple lived together for a short period 
of time, for most of the time they lived separately and only saw each other 
occasionally. Their decision to marry was triggered by Ying’s acceptance onto the 
PhD programme of a British university. Within two months of the offer being 
confirmed, Ying was married. She thought that by getting married and acquiring her 
husband a dependant visa, she was “helping him to fulfil his dream”. However, this 
goal-oriented marriage was in fact formed without adequate communication and 
mutual understanding between the couple, and bonding between the two families. 
Ying recalled the first time her ex-husband visited her family, and she said, 
In spring 2015, my ex-husband came to my house to visit my parents and 
grandparents for the first time. Even though it was such an important event, 
he didn’t bring good and expensive gifts. He brought only some cheap gifts 
and I had to take him to the local shopping mall to buy more. This left my 
family with a very bad first impression. Later on, he bought me an 
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engagement ring and wedding rings. But we didn’t wear the rings a lot. We 
just got married. We didn’t have a wedding banquet. We didn’t even take 
wedding photos. His mother wanted to buy me some gold as a wedding 
present. But I said no. I got the marriage certificate only because I wanted 
to get him a visa. If it wasn’t because of this, I wouldn’t want to get married 
at all. I was very against the idea of marriage from the bottom of my 
heart…My parents had never met his parents. I think his mum made a 
phone call to my mum once. As far as I remember, that was the only time. 
 
Ying arrived in the UK in October 2015 and was soon busy with her new life of 
study. The couple rented a small apartment in a small town in the middle of 
England. Ying expected her husband to look for jobs and study English at home, 
while she attended classes and studied in the university library. It was a stressful 
time for Ying. She said,  
I was very unhappy. I had never seen him studying. I had never seen him 
making any notes. I helped him to find lots of materials and books for 
studying English from my university library. But he didn’t even read it. He 
said to me he wanted to become an I.T. programmer in the UK and design 
something to show prospective employers what he was capable of. Since 
he arrived, he seemed to be busy designing this programme. But I didn’t 
know what exactly he was doing. He didn’t apply for any jobs. He didn’t 
study English at all. He just stayed at home. I was very upset. Every day he 
woke up very late, like after ten o’clock or something. He was not 
motivated. He was just lazy. I had to make breakfast and lunch for him. I 
did all the weekly food shopping. I did all the housework. But before we 
moved here, he said he would take care of me! I was actually not a good 
cook before I moved here, but still I made three meals for him every day. I 
left half of the lunch for him and took another half to university. The place 
we rented was very small. There was not enough space for two people. If 
he was in the flat, I would go to university to study. Sometimes when I left 
for university, he would still be in bed. 
  
After four months of living together in the UK, the couple broke up. Ying said, 
My ex-husband said to me, “I wouldn’t have wanted to get married that 
early if it wasn’t for the fact that you pushed me!” I can’t believe he blamed 
me for bringing him to the UK!  
 
For informants such as Ying and her ex-husband, getting married is a migration 
strategy that requires the least resources to achieve the best results in the fastest 
manner. Undoubtedly, Ying and her ex-husband had the choice not to rush into 
marriage just because it could open a door to transnational migration. They took the 
chance and realised that they could not carry on after moving abroad. Getting 
married for the acquisition of a dependant visa is considered to be a strategic move 
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that allows a student migrant to obtain cultural capital; and his or her partner to 
accumulate overseas work experience, and even better, to find a visa-sponsored 
job. If the dependant visa holder is able to obtain a work visa through employment, 
the student visa holder is likely to become a dependant on his or her partner’s work 
visa upon graduation. And in some cases, if a student visa holder successfully finds 
a visa-sponsored job, this will allow his or her partner to continue living in the UK as 
a dependant. Even if both migrants have no choice but to return to their countries of 
origin when their visas expire, they are still equipped with foreign study and work 
experience, which make them more valuable in the local job market. At first glance, 
there seem to be few potential losses in this migration strategy. However, Ying and 
her ex-husband’s story shows that the situation is not so simple. In Ying’s narrative, 
she had to bear greater consequences and social pressure as a divorcee. She was 
aware that her values and attractiveness in the marriage market had now 
decreased.  
Although the pace of development in a relationship and the decision to marry may 
be shaped and often accelerated by migrants’ visa-time conditions, the legitimacy of 
migrant women’s marriages in both social and immigration contexts is still largely 
determined by whether they and their partner have been together for an 
“acceptable” length of time prior to marriage. 
Many migrant women were aware that the duration of courtship influences how their 
marriage is perceived. For example, Ling Ling was a 22-year-old student-turned-
spouse migrant, who deliberately waited six months in China after the expiration of 
her student visa before marrying a British citizen from Hong Kong. She talked about 
the cautious attitude of her parents in response to her intention to marry after being 
in a short courtship. She said, 
My parents were a bit worried about me getting married after being in a 
relationship for a year only. They said to me, “Come back to China first 
after finishing your master’s degree. Let the relationship cool down a bit. 
We will see if this man still treats you the same when you two are apart.” 
 
Similarly, after a short courtship with an EU national living in the UK, Mei Mei got 
married at the age of 28, having recently completed her master’s degree. Instead of 
feeling excited to share the news of her engagement, Mei Mei was ambivalent about 
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how such news would be perceived by her family and her husband’s family, 
especially because the relationship was only a year old. She said, 
My husband first said to me that he wanted to marry me three months 
before my visa expired. I told my mum immediately. She was shocked. And 
then she said she had to come to the UK and take a look at him…I was a 
bit worried that my husband’s family may think I only married him for the 
visa. But luckily, they didn’t think like that. 
 
Time is an inextricable part of the way migrants’ marriages are evaluated by 
migrants themselves and their family and friends. For example, in Mei Mei’s case, 
she was aware of the stereotypes and social sceptics concerning transnational 
marriages, and marriages formed after a short courtship in general. Even though 
cultural understandings of marriage vary across countries, the cultural logic of time 
in evaluating and legitimising the authenticity of a marriage or relationship is deeply 
embedded not only in Chinese, but also the Euro-American cultural context. In the 
UK, in order for a non-EEA partner to qualify for a family visa under the unmarried 
partnership route, a couple needs to meet the requirement of a minimum two-year 
period of cohabitation (UK Visas and Immigration 2012). The Home Office may 
suspect that the marriage is a sham, meaning two people enter into a marriage or 
civil partnership for immigration advantage, if a couple’s conditions do not conform 
to dominant institutional and societal perceptions of a good and acceptable marriage 
(Pellander 2015; Satzewich 2014; Wray 2006). In general, couples who have spent 
insufficient time together before and after marriage will raise a red flag in the eyes of 
immigration bureaucrats. 
The dilemma of hoping for a marriage to be formed spontaneously due to long-term 
and sophisticated romantic love, which is widely expected and praised by both 
Chinese and British societies, and having to consider marrying in a hurried way due 
to visa-time constraints, often created a feeling of unease among my informants. 
Mei Mei’s story illustrates the struggles migrant women face, caught between 
different social expectations and models of “time”. 
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CONCLUSION: INTERSECTING MODELS OF TIME  
 
The main findings discussed in this chapter relate to the experiences of young, well-
educated Chinese temporary migrants in the UK whose migration trajectories, 
romantic relationships, and life-course decisions are shaped by the complex 
relations between the various modalities of socially constructed “time”, and the 
intersections of multiple “timescales” – institutional, biographic, and everyday.  
Young Chinese women’s timing and opportunity to engage in temporary migration to 
the UK is conditioned by a specific “historical time” (Hareven 1982). Due to the 
economic prosperity of China and Hong Kong in recent decades, many Chinese 
families are able to amass capital and send their offspring overseas to accumulate 
cultural capital and work experience. Whilst pursuing their study-and-work related 
goals, young single Chinese migrant women in their twenties and early thirties may 
also desire romantic opportunities, despite their limited time in the UK.  
Being at this particular life stage, some young single Chinese women from a middle-
class background explore romance, and even marriage opportunities, partly due to 
their own desires, and partly due to the long-existing age hypergamy, which has 
been further consolidated by the state-sponsored gender discourse of sheng nu 
(leftover women). This gendering of ages directs women towards the goal of 
marriage by the age of 30, a phenomenon I call “gendered marriage time”. As a 
popular Chinese saying goes, nanren sanshi yi duo hua, nuren sanshi lan zhazha 
(men at 30 are like a flower, women at 30 are wilted and rotten); women, as 
compared to men, are considered to have a much shorter window of time to remain 
desirable in the marriage market. Chinese women’s “gendered marriage time” is 
also a form of “state-sponsored time”, which gives women a rigid timeline to follow 
to complete the goals of marriage and reproduction for the purpose of achieving 
demographic targets. This puts enormous pressure on women to find a partner 
before they get “too old”, to “marry on schedule”, and to have children according to 
gendered reproduction time.  
Informants who were not influenced by this social pressure to marry were those who 
were already married before migration, such as Ying. For these migrants, the 
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biographic time of life-course events was shaped largely by their migration 
opportunity, and the advantage of bringing their spouse to the UK.  
Single migrant women’s goals in romance and their relationships in the UK may 
come into conflict with a state agenda that aims to ensure that migrants’ stays are 
only temporary through what I refer as “state-controlled time”: the institutional time 
of policy and governance that limits the length of legally permitted stays. The 
temporal reality and visa-time constraints (Robertson and Runganaikaloo 2013) 
shape the everyday lived time of Chinese migrants, and contribute to the difficulty of 
maintaining relationships, especially when their futures are highly uncertain. Many 
informants in a committed relationship felt that they had to start the “marriage talk” 
early and enter the process of marriage negotiation in a time-compressed situation. 
This accelerated sense of time is experienced by migrants who urgently hope to 
make a relationship decision before the expiration of visas. In some cases, such 
negotiations may continue across borders when transnational couples live apart. If 
this happens, maintaining a long-distance relationship that leads to marriage, and 
preparing for return to the UK, including building career credentials that may be 
useful in the British labour market, become the focus of migrants’ lives. However, 
due to their relationship commitment and frequent travel to the UK, these women 
may risk losing jobs and income stability, and valuable time in finding another 
marriageable partner, if the prospect of marriage cannot be materialised. 
Due to the interplay of visa-time restrictions and the pressure to marry in the 
Chinese social context, “lightning marriages” may be formed between migrant 
women and their partners in the UK. The duration of time that a couple has been 
together before entering marriage shapes the way the relationship is perceived in 
social and immigration contexts. “Lightning marriages” arouse social concerns 
because they entail a sense of a lack of maturity and sophistication. Chinese 
temporary migrant women who marry a partner in the UK without spending 
adequate time together as a couple may be perceived with further social suspicion, 
and be subjected to stereotyping by immigration bureaucrats and women’s own 
social networks, including their husband’s family. In the next chapter, I will discuss 
Chinese migrant women’s empowerment, which they achieve through maintaining 
their class identity and their quest for respectable femininity, despite the perceived 
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negative connotations of transnational, and particularly interracial marriage by my 
informants. 
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CHAPTER 6  
BECOMING RESPECTABLE 
 
It was a cold winter afternoon in 2016 when I first met Kelly, whose wedding was 
described in the prologue of this thesis. We had arranged to have lunch at a Thai 
restaurant in Edinburgh. As I arrived early and had never met her before, I chose 
the seats facing the window so that I could see each person walking past the 
restaurant. I saw a girl who walked past; she wore a red hat, a dark green dress with 
black leggings, and a black coat. The girl immediately caught my attention because 
her outfit seemed to be a bit out of place. To my mind, this girl was definitely not a 
local in Edinburgh. Winter outfits in Scotland are generally dark in colour; her red 
and green seemed to be too colourful. She was, indeed, my informant Kelly, a 
Chinese student migrant in her early twenties. After we became friends, I asked her 
out of curiosity about her outfit on that day. She said, “I used to wear something 
even more colourful because I think colourful branded clothes are classy in China”. 
She reflected that after she came to the UK, she became “humbler” and “less 
extravagant”. She told me she was “learning the British way”. Kelly’s statement 
seems to resonate with David’s observation, noted in chapter 2, about the British 
class system, which in his eyes, is completely different from the one he comes from 
because it is based not only on income but also on manners. As a new migrant, 
Kelly hoped to be considered as belonging to a respectable class in the UK. This is 
indeed not a straightforward and easy process, as it requires migrants to review, 
question, challenge, and give new meanings to their own ideas about class and 
respectability; and to adjust their class position according to their place of residence 
and stage in the life cycle. 
As one of the most ubiquitous signifiers of class, respectability is “usually the 
concern of those who are not seen to have it” Skeggs (2002, 2). It is one of the 
primary aspects of what it means “to belong, to be worthy and to be an individual” 
(ibid., 3). Skeggs discusses an English notion of “respectability”, which she sees as 
a property of the middle-class. Respectable femininity is a form of symbolic capital 
that women seek in order to gain symbolic profit and class status. Normative 
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conceptions of respectable femininity in Chinese societies involve women identifying 
themselves through domesticity and caring roles, and “traditional” feminine virtues 
[for example Heng and Devan’s (1995) work on Singaporean Chinese women). 
Respectable masculinity and respectable femininity are relational concepts. John 
Osburg’s (2013) book describes how wealthy men in mainland China pursue 
respectability by having a “proper” wife at home, who is from a good family 
background and confined to the domestic sphere, and keeping unofficial “second 
wives” (bao ernai), mistresses or lovers, who are considered as more attractive, 
having the social graces and cultural sophistication to accompany the wealthy men 
while entertaining, but not from a good background. Osburg also explains while 
“proper” wives criticise the women who their husbands have sexual relationships 
with as lacking quality (suzhi), these women claims respectability by showing off 
their beauty and ability to secure material comfort. Suzhi here forms a moral 
distinction. Women from good family background own cultural capital that they use 
to distance themselves from women from the lower classes, whom they perceive as 
reduced to pure materialism. I will return to this point of moral distinction later. 
Women’s ever-increasing participation in education and the labour force, and the 
normalisation of dual-income households, has contributed to an additional burden 
on women to negotiate status and power within the household and society at large. 
Women’s life choices are complicated by new models of successful femininity and 
contradictory role demands in which women today are required to carefully manage 
their own biographies and simultaneously achieve professional and personal 
successes, particularly in marriage and parenthood [see Ang 2016; and also 
Purushotam 1998 for a discussion of how middle-class Singaporean women are 
expected by the state to be “working mothers” – both reproductive (of children) and 
economically productive]. 
This chapter explores women’s struggle in navigating respectable femininity as an 
individual and a family member in both their countries of origin and destination. It 
looks at the tensions experienced by migrants in the process of negotiating 
respectable femininity in the UK. One set of tensions involves middle-class migrants’ 
acquisition of different forms of capital that they believe are related to their 
respectability, such as institutionalised cultural capital, i.e. a postgraduate degree 
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from a British university; economic capital, such as a house in the UK; and symbolic 
capital, for example a work visa or a job at a transnational company (see chapter 2 
for a discussion of class and capital). All these different forms of capital may be 
coded and valued differently in the UK, mainland China and Hong Kong. A second 
set of tensions concerns the ways in which my informants think that their 
acquisitions or aspirations will be interpreted by their parents, friends, and society at 
large. 
Despite Chinese middle-class women’s desire to achieve both respectability and 
security through marriage, marriage itself is often a two-edged weapon in their 
transnational lives. All the women in this chapter were either engaged or married at 
the time of the research. They had chosen to marry in part because of pressures 
(and personal desires) not to remain single, in part because of affection for their 
partner, and in part because they wanted access to the assets, respectability and 
security that marriage can (potentially) bring. 
To begin with, it is important to understand the paradoxes that transnational 
marriage migrants find themselves in, and how these paradoxes are further 
complicated by migrants’ own contradictory perceptions of marriage immigration as 
a migration strategy. Transnational marriage migration is often imagined as an old-
fashioned way for migrants, particularly women, to achieve upward mobility or 
“marry up” (Constable 2003; 2005; Lauser 2008). The term “global hypergamy” 
(Constable 2005) describes a hierarchical order of countries in the aspect of 
transnational marriage. For example, a bride hailing from a developing country could 
be considered as “lower” on the scale than her husband who hails from a developed 
country. The bride could consequently be seen as “marrying up” based solely on her 
country of origin. However, according to Lauser (2008, 102), the notion of “marrying 
up” entails a number of paradoxes. She notes, 
We need to look precisely how, for whom and in what sense such 
marriages represent upward mobility. The fact that social mobility in a 
transnational marriage is based on the economic disparities between the 
countries of the bride and groom and do not always correspond to the 
social position or education of the individuals involved, patterns of marital 
mobility entail a number of dynamics between different categories including 
those of nationality, ethnicity, gender, geography and class. In Germany, 
for example, a middle-class household with only one (male) breadwinner 
normally cannot afford a housekeeper whereas in the Philippines, the 
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corresponding situation is unthinkable without several domestic helpers. 
Assuming that such marriages are simply upward mobility for the Filipina 
means overlooking different kinds of contradictory social and economic 
patterns between the origin and destination countries. 
 
These paradoxes can also be observed in the marriages of young Chinese migrant 
women in the UK. In particular, I look at such women’s marriages to two types of 
men: (1) a British partner with a Chinese background (for example, a British-born 
Chinese, or a British citizen from China or Hong Kong, who is a relatively new 
migrant); and (2) a non-Chinese partner. I explore how women’s self-perceived 
class identities shape these marriage choices, and how they negotiate power and 
adjust expectations within their marriages. The interplay of class, ethnicity, and 
gender forms interlocking systems of power that impact those who marry a non-
Chinese partner. For Chinese women who marry a British partner with a Chinese or 
Hong Kong background, although they share the same ethnicity as their partner, 
they are aware of the power dynamics and tensions in spousal relationships due to 
cultural differences and inequalities created by the web of gender, class, and 
immigration systems, which puts them in an inferior position in terms of employment 
opportunities, residency status, and social networks, compared to their partner in 
the UK. Two of my mainland Chinese informants who were marrying Hong Kong 
citizens told me that they thought their in-laws from Hong Kong looked down upon 
them because of their mainland origin. 
Class, marriage, and family are interrelated. Class is not just about individuals’ 
social attributes but also their family resources. Class is embedded in migrants’ 
choices in marriage and family formation, in which migrants’ existing family has a 
role to play, for example to approve or disapprove of such relationships, and to 
provide or not provide practical help or financial assistance to the young couple. 
Traditionally, compatible family backgrounds between the bride and the groom is 
considered a major principle of marriage formation in Chinese societies. In fact, it is 
not only Chinese people who tend to meet and identify with a potential spouse of the 
same class. In capitalist societies, such as the UK and the US, the different forms of 
capital and resources that a singleton possesses or values are also important in 
shaping who and where potential couples meet, and what they think they have in 
common or can offer each other.  
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Most of the women in this study were born into a middle-class or a relatively 
privileged family in China or Hong Kong. When these women form a transnational 
relationship or marriage in the UK, especially with a non-Chinese, they may find it 
hard to evaluate how “compatible” they are in terms of their respective social and 
economic positions due to the “contradictory social and economic patterns” that 
Lauser (2008) describes, between the women’s country of origin and that of their 
British or EU partner.  
The migrant women in this study often experienced emotional dilemmas in 
negotiating their own and their family’s expectations, especially when these 
expectations are entangled with the dynamic of marital mobility that is created by 
the interrelations of nationality, ethnicity, gender, geography, and class. Class and 
respectability, and their relation to marital mobility, are the main focus of this 
chapter.  
Why does being a “compatible” couple in terms of social and economic standing 
matter to the young Chinese migrant women? Hypergamy may work as an 
advantage for women, but why was the transnational relationship or marriage of the 
women in this study not always approved of by their family? How does family 
capital, especially in the forms of the purchase of property and the provision of 
financial assistance, empower migrant women but at the same time harm their 
respectability? I ask these questions only in this last chapter of the thesis because in 
order to answer them, it is necessary to refer back to the individual chapters which 
examine migrants’ motivations and expectations, and how they navigate their lives 
in the UK. As my other chapters have shown so far, young Chinese migrants are 
often expected by their parents to become “successful” through the achievement of 
educational and career goals. At the same time, the majority of middle-class women 
informants, who were in their early twenties to early thirties, considered having a 
“good” marriage as an integral part of being a successful individual. This chapter will 
examine the ways middle-class Chinese women negotiate respectability through 
marriage. 
CLASS, MARRIAGEABILITY AND RESPECTABILITY 
 
 182 
The interplay between class, education, and marriageability is key to understanding 
the intricacies of Chinese temporary migrant women forming romantic relationships 
with a view to marriage in the UK. Sociological and anthropological research has 
long studied the role that education plays in enhancing women’s spatial and social 
mobility, as well as their marriageability. For example, Kringelbach (2014) argues 
that in the case of West African students in France, marriage to a French citizen 
gives them longer residence or citizenship which helps them to achieve educational 
goals. Tuxen (2018) looks at the interrelationships between class identity, 
international education, and marriageability through the case of Indian students. She 
finds that Indian students from different socio-economic backgrounds capitalise 
international education differently. For the “super elites” who come from a family 
business background, international education helps to maintain their existing class 
status and privileges, and they tend to return to India soon after graduating for a 
good marriage. As Kringelbach (2014, 298) states, “understanding the 
transformative effect of education abroad requires a focus on students as family 
members, which may include the roles of spouse and parents, rather than as 
autonomous individuals”. In this sense, educational trajectories are very often part of 
the broader aspirations and life-course events of not only individuals, but also their 
family, who may have an expectation of what their life should be. 
In China today, family background is not as salient as it was in the past (see chapter 
2). However, China as a patriarchal society continues to protect the interests of the 
patrilineal family by valuing the marriages of people with men dang hu dui 
(compatible family backgrounds). Men dang hu dui literally refers to matching or 
pairing the “decorations on the top and bottom of the gates that indicated a family’s 
socioeconomic status in the feudal era” (Ji 2015, 1067). Similarly, a popular Chinese 
phrase, “bamboo doors match bamboo doors, wooden doors match wooden doors” 
(zhu men dui zhu men, mu men dui mu men) is still commonly used today to 
express the cultural ideal that marriage should be formed between couples of similar 
social standing. Although this preference is sometimes seen as feudal and 
backward in post-reform socialist China, due to the rise of individualisation and the 
normalisation of “romantic love” (Yan 2003; 2006; 2010; 2013; Wang and Nehring 
2014), it is still a widely accepted among young people, who have given this social 
norm new, individualist meanings (Ji 2015).  
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In China, hukou status (“rural” or “urban”; local or non-local) is important, along with 
education and income, in creating a social hierarchy favourable to urban people, 
who are more desirable in the marriage market (Wang and Nehring 2014; Wang and 
Schwartz 2018; Wei and Zhang 2016). Hukou-based gender systems shape 
people’s intermarriage preferences and opportunities (Lui 2016; 2017). Generally 
speaking, men who hold an urban hukou have higher economic privileges and 
power compared to their rural counterparts. For urban men, marrying a rural woman 
may imply that they are incapable of finding an urban wife, which may damage their 
social honour. Women who hold an urban hukou are also less likely to accept 
marriage proposals from rural men because of the expectation that women marry up 
but not down (Gao and Zhang 2011).  
Hukou segregation, as Lui (2016) argues, limits rural-urban intimate relationships 
and marriages, resulting in a small number of inter-hukou marriages in China; the 
majority of which are marriages formed between urban men and rural women, who 
successfully compensate their inferior social status with education, beauty, and 
urban mannerisms. While higher education helps to increase rural women’s 
marriageability in China (Sier 2017), the double-standard gender systems work 
unfairly for the “over-achieving” urban women (see chapter 4). For example, Sarah 
was a 26-year-old PhD student from mainland China who told me that her mother 
was concerned about her marriage prospects. Worrying that Sarah would become a 
sheng nu after the completion of her PhD as her education level would be “too high” 
and her age “too old”, Sarah’s mother only agreed to support her study after she 
and her then boyfriend got engaged. 
 
RICH LADY, POOR MAN: LOUIS VUITTON BAGS AND  
BRITISH RESIDENCY STATUS 
 
When I first met Kelly, she was recently engaged to a mainland Chinese who at the 
time was about to apply for permanent residency in the UK. Her then fiancé Sam 
was 35 years old; their age gap was 13 years. Kelly was a rich girl from an upper 
middle-class background in China. Sam, on the other hand, was described by Kelly 
as a man who “had endured hardship”. Sam’s father died when he was an 
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undergraduate in China. He studied hard at university, whilst at the same time 
working in various part-time jobs to send money home for his two younger brothers 
who needed it for tuition and living expenses. It was not until his brothers had gone 
to university that Sam stopped taking up part-time jobs. Just like Sam, his brothers 
now live overseas. Sam obtained a PhD in China. In spite of having no educational 
qualification obtained from the UK, he was able to move to the UK as a skilled 
worker. He now works in an energy firm in Edinburgh with a Tier 2 visa. Kelly was 
aware of the class difference in this relationship. She said, 
His (Sam’s) family was poor and even struggled to live sometimes. But 
mine was very different. I have never worried about food or money since I 
was born. I have never eaten bitterness in life. I am always the little 
princess of my family. That’s why Sam and I have different values in 
consumption sometimes. I can buy a lot! Sometimes when I buy branded 
things, people are curious about me. One time I said to a salesperson that I 
am a master’s student here, she was shocked. Due to my family’s networks 
in business and politics, our family has never missed anything in life. We 
are middle-class people. My granddad also did business. He opened 
supermarket chains in China. My granddad is very rich. Perhaps we belong 
to the upper middle-class… but Sam and I uphold similar moral values and 
are able to overcome our class differences. 
 
Although Kelly perceived herself as having a higher-class status than Sam, her 
socio-economic position did not guarantee a sense of security in the UK. She said,  
I know that if I go back to China, I will have good job opportunities. Staying 
here means my career prospects are a bit uncertain…I think I am a bit lost 
because I don’t know what I can do after graduation. After all, I don’t have 
any job experience before coming to the UK for my degree. 
 
Although anxious about the future, Kelly was also excited about her weddings in 
both China and the UK. Kelly wanted to have a big reception in China. She said 
proudly, 
There is no need for my husband and his family to worry [about the 
wedding expenses]. My family will handle everything. They will invite lots of 
guests in China. My parents do not ask [Sam] for much [for marrying me]. If 
Sam and I happened to be in trouble financially in the UK, they could also 
help us.  
 
Kelly was a young Chinese girl who owned a few Louis Vuitton bags, an expensive 
laptop and “things that are of limited edition”. Sam, on the contrary, according to 
Kelly, “would only go to Primark to buy clothes” and “would only throw a shirt away 
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when it is completely unusable”. She commented, “the cheapest item I have in my 
wardrobe is still more expensive than the most expensive item that he has…way 
more expensive”. From the text messages that Kelly voluntarily showed me during 
our interview, Sam was aware of and also felt insecure about their class and 
economic disparities. In one particular message, Sam texted, “I just wish I could 
give you a good life. You have suffered just by marrying me.” Despite the different 
standards of material life that they were accustomed to, Sam was considered by 
Kelly’s friends in China to be “a good catch”. Kelly said,   
I think some of my friends in China are jealous of me. They think that I must 
be quite manipulative to find a husband here…my friends that I met in the 
UK are happy for me, but at the same time they want to have the same 
thing that I have – a spouse visa and the capability to stay here. Some may 
think spouse visa holders are in a much better position than those poor 
students who need to work their way up to try to stay here. Recently, one of 
my friends in China also got married. We used to be close friends. But after 
she learnt that I was getting married to a guy over here, she didn’t want to 
speak to me anymore. She thinks that I don’t deserve this luck… I don’t 
know. 
 
In Kelly and Sam’s example, the possession of British permanent residency or 
citizenship is transformed into a form of symbolic capital that acts as class/status 
currency, which helps Sam make up for his lower socio-economic background, as 
compared to Kelly’s. Moreover, traditional gender discourse is at play here, which 
constructs all women’s upward mobility as facilitated by transnational marriage. 
Kelly also suffered from one of the common stereotypical views of transnational 
marriage that portrays her as a “manipulative” woman, who seduced and exploited 
Sam for his British permanent residency. She was also regarded as “lucky” to be 
able to stay on in the UK without having to seek visa-sponsored employment. The 
acquisition of a work visa symbolises the hard work and dedication of graduate 
workers, whereas spouse visa holders, such as Kelly, are seen as dependants who 
lack symbolic capital to legitimately claim individual success.  
 
RESPECTABILITY, HOME OWNERSHIP AND GENDER EXPECTATIONS 
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In both urban China and Hong Kong, ownership of a house (and a car) has become 
an element of social distinction (Rocca 2017). In China, to be considered eligible for 
marriage, men are usually expected to buy or at least pay for the mortgage deposit 
on a house: “build a nest to attract a phoenix” (zhu chao yin feng) (see Guilford and 
Wong 2013). As an article in The Economist entitled “Married to the mortgage” 
(2013) puts it, marriage in China is bound up with a bourgeois institution - property - 
within which unmarried men and their families have to work to improve their position 
in the marriage market. The article quotes the findings of a recent survey conducted 
by Horizon China, a Beijing-based market research firm, that three-quarters of 
young female participants who live in coastal cities will choose a husband based on 
his ability to provide a home. In Hong Kong, although home ownership is a common 
aspiration, most women consider it neither essential before marriage, nor a 
necessary criterion to define a man’s marriageability due to the unaffordable 
property prices in Hong Kong. 
Moreover, in urban cities like Shanghai and Hong Kong, grooms typically pay their 
would-be wives a “bride price”. Traditionally, a “bride price” or a monetary gift (li jin) 
is given to the bride and her aging parents as part of the wedding exchanges, based 
on the assumption that married daughters do not to provide labour to the natal 
family after marriage. Li jin and the value of other wedding gifts offered by the groom 
are important because people are regarded as “losing face” if they present a gift that 
does not match their social status, or that of the receiver (Yau, Chan, and Lau 
1999). Despite the transformation in gender ideologies and familial relationships, a 
man’s marriageability (and masculinity) is still determined by his financial ability. In 
fact, if a man takes up a wife without first offering her a house, a car, or a thick wad 
of banknotes, it is known as a “naked marriage” (Nylander 2015; Ford 2011) in 
urban China. While it is common for the groom’s family to offer a house, the bride’s 
family is also often expected to offer a new car. Since house ownership is closely 
related to masculinity and men’s respectability in the Chinese social context, Sam 
felt that he had to meet such expectations, even if a little later than usual. Kelly said, 
My parents have a factory and many properties in China. It would be easy 
for them to sell one property in order for us to buy a house in the UK. But 
then, my husband doesn’t want it. He wants to be a man who can afford a 
house on his own. I think it is good that my husband thinks like this. 
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Since the idea of men taking care of home-buying (or at least the payment of the 
deposit) is deeply rooted in mainland China, mainland Chinese women who date or 
marry a British permanent resident or citizen from a Chinese or non-Chinese 
background may still hold onto this expectation in the UK. For instance, Rose, a 28-
year-old PhD student was dating an Englishman for a year at the time of interview. 
She said, 
My boyfriend’s family is very rich. My boyfriend has already got a house! 
When you don’t need to think about housing, everything else is simple. So I 
have to hold onto my boyfriend! (laughs). If I had to do it on my own, I don’t 
know when I could actually buy a house! 
 
Although home ownership is perceived as more important to Chinese men than 
women in terms of increasing their marriageability, in reality Chinese women and 
their families do contribute to home purchases in China. Fincher (2014) observes 
that it is not uncommon for both the bride and the groom to pool their resources 
together, especially if they want to afford one of coastal China’s pricey homes. In 
Hong Kong, apart from the bride and groom’s dual income, joint financial help from 
their respective families in the purchase of property is also largely the norm. Young 
people in Hong Kong may delay marriage to save up for a down payment, especially 
those who do not have adequate financial support from their family. 
In the process of helping their children to fulfil their goals abroad, middle-class 
Chinese parents transfer “transnational family money” regularly (Tu 2019, 571), 
which manifests as a form of subsides or contributions. This money acts as “the 
medium of care and belonging across the physical and cultural distance of national 
borders” (Singh, Robertson, and Cabraal 2012, 487, cited in Tu 2019, 571). This 
one-way flow of economic capital from middle-class parents to their children has to 
be understood as an upfront investment to help position the children for future 
success (see also Louie and Qin 2019 in their study of Chinese international 
students buying automobiles in Michigan). In my study, I found cases from both the 
mainland China and Hong Kong cohorts where this money was given to migrant 
daughters by their middle-class parents to buy (or contribute to the deposit for) a 
house in the UK, especially when the cultural expectation that the groom should buy 
a house for their daughter could not be fulfilled. It is also important to note that this 
money is particularly important among couples in which the Chinese groom cannot 
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get a mortgage or faces a higher interest rate because of his non-resident status. 
For Chinese middle-class parents, this money for a home purchase is a form of 
physical and economic security that they can give their migrant daughters who are 
now married and away from the immediate protection from home. 
When financial help is needed by the Chinese brides’ family, tensions may be 
observed. Having said that, these tensions may not have the same impact on British 
grooms as on Chinese grooms, especially if the British grooms are less aware of the 
social expectation for a man to provide “the nest” in the context of marriage in 
mainland China. After all, a new house is usually not included in the package of a 
British wedding; indeed, traditionally the bride’s family is expected to shoulder most 
of the costs of the wedding, including the reception and ceremony. Nevertheless, in 
recent years, it has become a more common wedding trend that young British 
couples opt to forgo certain traditional elements and to share costs among members 
of the wedding party. For example, the couple’s parents may split the costs evenly, 
or the costs may be split three ways between the parents and the bride and groom. 
Mei Mei was a 26-year-old graduate from China who was married to a British man. 
Her parents purchased a house outright in London to “give them a smooth start after 
the wedding”. She said, 
I think my husband doesn’t think too much about this. But of course, I 
wouldn’t tell people that the house was actually paid for by my family. 
 
Since I did not interview Chinese women’s partners in this study, I had no way of 
directly eliciting Mei Mei’s husband’s opinion about this arrangement. However, Mei 
Mei was reluctant to tell others, including her friends, about her family’s contribution 
of the house not just because it was a personal issue, but also because it was 
considered to be undesirable in the context of Chinese marriages. A traditional 
Cantonese phrase tip daai cong could be used to describe this wedding 
arrangement. Daai cong means a big bed, which here refers to the bed of the 
newlyweds, but can also mean other material goods, including a house; tip is a verb 
that is used only when a person pays for the keeping of an unprofitable business or 
event. The phrase describes the financial loss of a bride’s family when they do not 
receive a bride price (li jin), but still have to pay for a new bed for the newlyweds; 
thus, it also represents a loss of face and respectability. 
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Differences in cultural expectations about who is to finance a wedding and how to 
split costs can create tensions between the Chinese bride and the British groom, 
between the bride and her family, and between the bride’s family and other 
extended family members and friends, who also have opinions on the matter. The 
Chinese migrant women that I interviewed negotiated dating, wedding, and 
household expenses based on the knowledge, customs, and practices about 
“appropriate” gender roles and relationships that they learnt and had been 
accustomed to throughout their lives. For instance, Fangfei was a 27-year-old PhD 
student from China, who was in a relationship with a British-born Chinese who was 
more accustomed to splitting bills evenly when dating. She said, 
There are some issues that we have to negotiate and compromise on to 
make the relationship work. For example, here in the UK, people split the 
bill. I wasn’t very happy about this. And I’m still not. My friends in China are 
surprised to know that my boyfriend and I split the costs of rent and bills 
evenly. Usually in China, it would be the guy who pays for everything. For 
example, my friend told me her boyfriend pays for the rent, it is about RMB 
20,000 (about £2,000) a month. 
 
Although Fangfei’s boyfriend was also a PhD student who was unlikely to have an 
adequate income to fulfil her expectation, Fangfei did not rationalise their financial 
arrangements by her boyfriend’s financial status, but instead chose to make sense 
of it with the logics of cultural difference (wenhua chayi). In a way, the different 
earning capability of her boyfriend and her friend’s partner in China did not matter to 
Fangfei, nor did the different living standards between China and the UK. Fangfei 
perceived the differences between her situation in the UK and her friend’s situation 
in China as a matter of difference between things that are done “here” and things 
that are done “back home”. “Cultural difference” (wenhua chayi) is not just a logic for 
migrants to understand their current situation or to make sense of their own 
disappointment when expectations cannot be met; it is also used to justify their 




PROPERTY, STATUS AND WOMEN 
 
Rocca (2017: 23) argues that consumerism gives rise to urban middle level 
consumers, who “enjoy small prosperity (xiaokang) and a modest degree of 
comfort”. Comfort is a core element of being xiaokang. For the first generation of 
middle-class people who were raised in the socialist era, a house is a symbol and 
embodiment of this aspiration to comfort. Chinese middle-class parents transmit to 
their children the love of property, so much so that in urban China, owning a flat is a 
prerequisite for marriage. Moreover, as Rocca notes (2017: 133) quoting Judith 
Audin’s PhD thesis, we can observe how property is related to status and 
respectability in China: 
The standard requires one to live in a new residential estate or new 
huayuan (garden), that is, a vast compound surrounded with walls, 
protected around the clock by security guards, with a garden, parking and 
sometimes shops and a leisure centre. 
In chapter 2, I also briefly discussed how property connected to respectability in the 
UK by listing a few criteria of evaluation. The significance of housing as a source of 
wealth and status is that it generates a powerful categorical divide between those 
who rent and those who own. Among homeowners, status is defined by the 
geography and value of the property owned. Indeed, housing wealth is critically 
associated with location. In general, properties in more desirable areas will have 
higher values than similar ones in less attractive areas. In the UK, the metropolis of 
London has some of the most expensive districts, for example, the mean value of 
properties in Kensington and Chelsea was £1.5 million, nearly 20 times more 
expensive than housing in the cheapest areas (Savage 2015), reflecting the status 
of the property owners as part of the “global elite". 
Due to the correlations between home ownership, status and security, mainland 
Chinese women commonly see a man who can provide a home as more 
marriageable. However, there is often a risk that their name will not be added to the 
title certificate, due to bureaucratic and social obstacles to joint registration of 
property in China. This situation also applies to women who contribute to the 
purchase of their marital home. Fincher (2014, 5) states that one of the 
 191 
consequences of this phenomenon is that “Chinese women have largely missed out 
on what is arguably the biggest accumulation of residential real-estate wealth in 
history”. In order to solve property rights disputes in marital cases, the Supreme 
Court of China issued its latest interpretation in 2011, which specifies that marital 
property essentially belongs to the person whose name is on the deed of the home, 
unless legally contested (Zeldin 2011). In urban cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, that person is usually a man. It is worth noting that 
some scholars, such as Shen (2014), have questioned Fincher’s argument and the 
credibility of the reports she used to build the argument. Yet what my informants 
said about their marriage and property rights in the UK, and their concerns, relates 
to Fincher’s (2014) observations in urban China. 
According to Fincher, although the law entitles a divorced woman to compensation 
for her mortgage contributions even if the family home was not registered in her 
name, it may not be easy for women to prove their contributions, especially if they 
do not document their mortgage payments properly. Also, women may pay a 
substantial amount of money towards household expenses, including the fittings and 
furnishings, even if their contribution towards a mortgage is minimal.  
Davis (2010, 481) finds that when a marriage breaks down, instead of simply 
applying the law, mainland Chinese in urban cities (re)negotiate property rights by 
using a “set of normalizing practices” and moral reasoning to divide conjugal 
property. Here, I take a conventional view of morality as a codified system of 
principles and norms regarding right and wrong, good and bad. In fact, although 
divorce has become very common in China, with 4.2 million couples divorcing in 
2016, an 8.3 per cent increase from the year before (Zhou 2017), research has 
shown that instead of taking a case to court, ordinary Chinese sill largely rely on 
informal, local mediation based on moral discourse, the principles of reciprocity, and 
the rule of relationships to solve their disputes (Avenarius and Zhao 2012; Davis 
2010). As a result, while recognising individual property rights, ordinary Chinese 
may also draw on their own experience and moral justification to divide conjugal 
property unequally, to punish the guilty party and provide for the weak (Davis 2010).  
In general, migrant women who were married to a British partner from a Chinese 
background expressed more concern about the division of property acquired before 
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marriage, compared to those who were married to a non-Chinese British or EU 
partner, due to differences in Chinese and European marriage-divorce culture. 
Although the former often did not need to worry about having a home after marriage 
because their husband from a Chinese background already owned one, had been 
paying the mortgage for a premarital home, or had received a house as a gift from 
his parents, these women sometimes conceptualised this home as a double-edged 
sword after moving in.  
Qing was a mainland Chinese who was married to a British citizen from Hong Kong. 
After their marriage, Qing moved into her husband’s premarital home, which was 
given to him as a gift by his father, also a British and Hong Kong citizen. Although 
the apartment was registered under his son’s name, Qing’s father-in-law considered 
that as it was paid for with his own money, he was the real owner, and he could 
therefore use the apartment anytime he wished. She said, 
I was not happy when my father-in-law came to London and stayed with us 
without giving us any notice. Recently, he brought some relatives with him 
who came here for vacation. My husband and I had to sleep on the floor. It 
wasn’t comfortable and we had to go to work without adequate sleep. This 
had continued for like a month…I also suffered very bad allergy during that 
time. I was very tired every day. I think the biggest lesson I have learnt from 
this incident was that I don’t actually own a place…I have no say to stop my 
husband’s family from coming to stay with us, even if I am the one who 
actually lives there. Because they think I have no say at all in this matter, 
they don’t need to ask for my permission and they don’t need to have any 
communication with me. This situation will continue until we finally have our 
own place. But even if we have our own place, can we say no to my father-
in-law and my husband’s relatives, if they want to stay with us? 
Traditionally, we can’t because if my father-in-law wants to come, he can 
come anytime he wants; all we can do is to accept. 
 
The tension here originates from the different interpretations of the concept of 
“ownership”; one is based on patriarchal familial tradition and the other is based on 
individualistic modern value. Many of my Chinese informants aspired to have a 
husband who could provide a home, for the stability and security it supposedly 
brings. But when this aspiration is finally achieved, home ownership and “fair” 
household contribution may become issues. In another case, Vivian, who originally 
came to the UK as a working holiday maker from Hong Kong in her late twenties, 
lived in an apartment owned by her husband John, a British citizen who also 
immigrated from Hong Kong. Before marrying, the couple lived together for a few 
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months before Vivian’s visa expired. Vivian contributed to all of the expenses for 
groceries and to restaurant bills. Although she wanted to add her name to some of 
the utility accounts, John thought it was too “troublesome”. While Vivian considered 
this arrangement of household expenses “reasonable” at the time as they were not 
engaged, but she expected her name to be put on the property registration and the 
utility bills after their marriage. They discussed the matter before marrying and it 
turned into a big argument. She said, 
He (John) told me that when he bought this newly-built flat, he bought it 
with insurance. Basically, the insurance ensures that if he dies, the 
remaining mortgage will be fully paid for. And he made his mother and two 
sisters who live in Hong Kong the beneficiaries. He told me this was his 
original idea when he bought this place. And he isn’t ready to change it. But 
I said to him, ‘I can’t continue to pay for all the food, groceries and stuff 
without having my name on this home and household bills after we get 
married.’ This is like I am an invisible helper who helps him to pay the 
mortgage and adds value to his property by contributing to some of the 
expenses. But the expenses will always be expenses only. They don’t add 
any value to anything. 
 
Interviews with several women who were married to Chinese men who owned 
premarital property in the UK reveal how the Chinese patriarchal system may 
continue to work in favour of men in terms of property ownership, especially when 
the Chinese parents attempt to keep their son’s solely owned property as capital 
accumulated within their side of the family. 
Young Chinese husbands often have to rely on their family’s financial assistance to 
purchase a premarital property in the UK; their parents may have their own 
interpretation of home “ownership” and opinions about whether their wife should 
become a joint owner of the property. Husbands themselves may have little say on 
the matter due to their minimal contribution. Men who are currently paying 
mortgages may see the money that they have contributed to the house as their own, 
and thus be unwilling to add their wife’s name to the deed in case they have to split 
the property wealth in divorce. A discriminatory gender discourse portrays women 
who have such demands as greedy, dangerous, and calculative wives who look for 
advantages from marriage, which creates an enormous pressure on them to give up 
negotiating with their husband or future husband. Women who have no ownership of 
the property that they live in with their husband may feel that their home does not 
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actually belong to them. An informant explicitly said to me, “my husband is like my 
landlord. Instead of paying rent to someone else, I pay him rent.”  
In the end, Vivian felt overwhelmed and succumbed to the tremendous pressure to 
abandon the idea of adding her name to the deed. But she was still worried that if it 
came to a divorce, she would get nothing. Indeed, Vivian was right to have such 
concerns. In the UK, spouses who are the sole owners of property have more rights 
than non-owning spouses. This applies to both England and Scotland.23 According 
to Standley (2010, 153ff): 
Spouses who are sole owners have the right of encumbrance of the home 
without consulting their non-owning spouse; they do not have to register 
their home rights, which non-owning partners need to do to secure their 
legal rights; and the sole-owning spouse has the freedom to bequest the 
home to somebody other than the surviving non-owning spouse. 
 
It is advised by the Ministry of Justice (2019) that after a marriage breakdown, a 
partner who lives in a house which is in the sole name of his or her spouse should 
act quickly to prevent the property from being sold without the knowledge or consent 
of the partner concerned, for example by entering a Notice of Home Rights against 
the property with the Land Registry. In the case of a divorce, the court may still have 
some power to make orders against any property, regardless of how it is owned. 
However, in the case of a separation between non-married cohabiting partners, 
legal protection for cohabitants who do not own a share in the home is very limited. 
Very rarely can cohabiting partners with no legal title claim a beneficial interest in 
the home after separation (Lersch and Vidal 2016).  
When I raised the fact that Vivian may still be able to get a share of the property 
after divorce, even if her name was not registered on the deed, she said to me that 
she still did not feel secure because pursuing such rights could lead to conflict with 
her husband’s family. “And what if a property dispute is caused by my husband’s 
 
23 In Scotland, a partner who is not a joint owner has no right to remain in the home if the 
owner withdraws permission for them to stay. They can apply to the court for the right to 
remain in the home. A partner who is not the owner cannot stop the sale of the house but 
may apply for limited right to remain in the home. They are not entitled to a share of the 
proceeds unless they are a joint owner or can show they made a financial contribution (see 
Citizens Advice Scotland’s webpage, 2020). 
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accidental death? How can I fight over a home that belongs to someone’s dead 
son?” Vivian asked. In this imagined scenario, Vivian said she would only try to 
protect her own property rights, if she had a child to feed. If she remained childless, 
then she would consider the financial need of her mother-in-law in her old age, and 
thus would be more willing to give up her rights. Instead of using the English law as 
the only guidelines to determine who should be entitled to the house in the case of 
divorce or death, migrant women, such as Vivian, may apply their own cultural logic, 
moral reasoning, and normalising practices to understand their rights.  
 
GLOBAL HYPERGAMY, SACRIFICES AND WOMEN STRIVING FOR 
INDIVIDUAL SUCCESS 
 
Regardless of their partner’s ethnicity or property ownership status, most of the 
women in this study claimed that they earned less than their partner in the UK. This 
reality further complicates the map of class identity, gender, and power in Chinese 
migrant women’s marriages. Mei Mei, who I have mentioned previously, said, 
My husband earns a lot more than me. He told me that he wouldn’t mind 
being a house husband one day…Sometimes I feel quite jealous towards 
my husband. I am a foreigner; that’s why I am not earning as well as he 
does. If I returned to China, I think my salary would be quite good because I 
have an overseas master’s degree. Here, my husband is a local with a 
good English accent; that’s why his starting point is better than mine. I 
would say he is very intelligent and hard-working but sometimes I also 
wonder why he can get a job promotion easily and earn so much more than 
me. You know, I don’t think my ability is a lot worse than his. 
 
Mei Mei continued, 
Had it not been for my marriage, I wouldn’t have considered staying in the 
UK because my parents and my family all live in China…Whenever I argue 
with my husband, I always say I have to sacrifice a lot. 
 
Mei Mei made sense of her hindered career prospects and the wage difference 
between her and her husband by virtue of her immigrant status and English ability. 
Here, English ability refers to the ability not only to communicate, but also to master 
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a good accent that allows people to manoeuvre into more promising career tracks in 
the UK (see the discussion of embodied cultural capital in chapter 3.  
The interlocking hierarchical system of gender, ethnicity, and class may create 
double disadvantages for Chinese migrant women like Mei Mei, who understood the 
hidden mechanisms that propel their husbands forward as something that they no 
longer have access to after migrating to the UK. This is what Mei Mei understood as 
“sacrifices” and prices that she paid for her marriage and settlement in the UK. 
Indeed, in my informants’ narratives, the notion of sacrifice is very powerful, and is 
used (un)consciously by female spouses to negotiate power in their relationships. 
Mei Mei’s statement reveals how she understood her life choices: to return to China, 
a habitus or cultural and economic environment where she, as a privileged urban 
woman, could fit in and flourish or to remain in the UK, a country where she found 
herself in a disadvantageous position due to a lack of the right social and cultural 
capital. Here, we get a glimpse of the paradox of global hypergamy; being a 
Chinese migrant woman, Mei Mei’s transnational marriage in the UK is supposed to 
bring her marital mobility and a better life. While marrying a British person brought a 
sense of achievement, as if she had “married up”, in reality, it did not necessarily 
help advance her career development in the UK or her social mobility in general. 
This paradox is further entangled with the expectations of migrants’ parents. 
Chinese parents play a great role in motivating their children to pursue international 
education, and in manoeuvring them into a standardised “successful” life script. For 
migrant women, parents’ opinion of their transnational relationship or marriage is 
pivotal in shaping their relationship decisions. For example, Mei Mei’s parents were 
initially unsupportive of her decision to marry a lao wai (foreigner, often specifically 
refering to white Euro-Americans. The term is usually neutral but can be pejorative 
in some circumstances). She said,  
My parents were quite angry because they thought they only sent me to the 
UK to study, not to find a man! They had the impression that women who 
are married to a lao wai become housewives. They were angry that they 
had invested so much in me, and now I wanted to become someone’s 
housewife. 
  
Financing children’s overseas study is perceived by Chinese parents as an 
“investment” that supposedly brings high returns. However, Mei Mei’s personal 
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choice in marrying a non-Chinese partner, in her parents’ eyes, entailed a risk that 
she would stay in the domestic domain, making her education a wasted investment 
and endangering her respectability. The attitude of Mei Mei’s parents also shows 
their concern about the stigma of transnational, particularly interracial marriage, 
which relates to Chinese women’s perceived inferior racial and sexual positions, as 
compared to their British or European husband. In Nemoto’s (2004) PhD thesis, she 
examines the operation of several culturally embedded imaginary discourses that 
permeate gender and racial inequalities in relationships between Asian women and 
White American men. First, the immigration discourse portrays immigrant women as 
either commodities or object of protection; second, popular stereotypes portray 
Asian women as overly sexual and feminine; and third, the discourse of romantic 
love in the context of colonialism and neo-colonialism results in power imbalance in 
inter-racial relationships. Nemoto’s findings can also help explain Chinese middle-
class parents’ ambivalence about their daughters forming interracial relationships in 
the UK, putting their respectability at risk. 
Perhaps not in the same context, but in a separate example, Fangfei also described 
her parents as “scared” when they heard about her transnational relationship with a 
British-born Chinese. She said,  
My parents are worried that because I am dating a BBC (British-born 
Chinese) now, I will never return to China. They are scared, I can tell…they 
are also concerned about whether my boyfriend can provide. They asked 
me what kind of job he has, and I said he is only a student. 
 
Similarly, Ling Ling, who also initially came to the UK as a student, said that her 
parents were not particularly pleased about her relationship in the UK. She said, 
When my visa was about to run out, my parents were a bit worried because 
if I decided to marry him, I would be so far away from home. If this man 
bullied me or if I was not happy, my parents would not know. They would 
be too far away to protect me. Also, as I am the only child, they really don’t 
want me to move so far away. 
 
Although informants’ parents did not speak to me directly, these statements show 
informants’ own perceptions of their parents’ major concerns regarding their 
intention to remain in the UK, and their partner’s imagined financial status, virtue, 
and temperament. “Angry”, “concerned” and “scared” are the feelings that migrants 
thought their parents experienced when they learnt about their relationship in the 
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UK. It seems to me that my informants’ parents, who were from a middle-class 
background in China or Hong Kong, did not anticipate that transnational or 
interracial marriage would necessarily benefit their daughter or advance her social 
mobility. 
Nowadays, Chinese middle-class parents commonly pin all their hope on their only 
child, regardless of the child’s gender. Middle-class families’ devoutness and 
investment in their daughter’s education are based on the belief that education is 
the only way to advance up the social ladder and increase one’s potential of 
becoming successful (Bai 2006; Fong 2011). Moreover, supporting a daughter’s 
higher education is now seen as an investment for the parents to be financially, 
emotionally and even physically taken care of in their old age, based on the belief 
that daughters, rather than sons, are more likely to take care of their natal family 
even after marriage (Evans 2008; Judd 1989; Obendiek 2016). Despite the rise in 
overseas tuition fees, and an increase in employment insecurity after graduation 
since the late 1990s which means that some families’ investment in their offspring’s 
higher education may never pay off, many middle-class mainland Chinese and 
Hong Kong families remain determined to equip their children with a foreign degree, 
in the hope that their children will return home after graduation for career 
development. This may explain parents’ negative feelings about their child’s 
relationship and decision to remain in the UK. 
In chapter 4, I discussed how the financial contributions of Hong Kong informants to 
their natal family is the main way for them to observe filial piety – a virtue of respect 
for one’s parents in Chinese Confucian philosophy - and how single women may 
receive less familial pressure to marry as a result. However, for those who hope to 
stay abroad with a low-income job, or to marry a foreign partner who is largely 
ambivalent towards this alien concept of remittance, it may not be possible to 
contribute money to their family “back home”. This may also explain Hong Kong 
parents’ hesitancy towards migrant daughters’ transnational relationship or 
marriage.  
Finally, some informants explained that a close parental-child relationship may also 
make parents feel reluctant to support their transnational relationship initially, due to 
the fear that they would leave China or Hong Kong permanently.   
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Chinese parents’ expectations of their migrant daughters, and ambivalence towards 
their daughters’ transnational or interracial relationship or marriage point to the 
struggles experienced by young Chinese migrant women, who find themselves in 
the “age of ambition” (Osnos 2014). Individuals are expected to strive for individual 
success, wealth, and power as much as they can, and to meet new social, gender, 
and familial expectations (Rofel 2007; Yan 2003; 2013). The women in this study 
embarked on a journey to the UK, hoping to gain cultural, social economic and 
symbolic capital by obtaining an overseas education, accumulating foreign work 
experience, and finding a partner. The ultimate goal is to join a global elite, fulfilling 
their own and their parents’ expectations. In the face of the difficulties of securing 
visa-sponsored employment and obstacles to their transnational pursuits created by 
the immigration and visa regime, Chinese migrant women were constantly torn 
between different, contradictory goals. Marriage immigration was, on the one hand, 
perceived to be one of the easiest ways to remain in the UK; but on the other hand, 
perceived as a kind of “reliance on men” that puts middling women’s respectability 
at risk, rather than as a marker of individual success. For instance, Sofia was in a 
relationship with an EU national during her master’s study in the UK. They were 
together for nearly a year before they broke up. She said, 
My ex-boyfriend once said to me, “If you want to stay in the UK, we could 
get married.” It sounds easy, and I wouldn’t need to find a visa-sponsored 
job…But if I manage to stay here, I hope it is because of my own ability, not 
by relying on someone else. 
 
Migrant women, such as Sofia, faced the dilemmas of fulfilling parental expectations 
to excel in life through their own means, and achieving their life goals and 
transnational aspirations through forming a transnational marriage – a path that 
migrants were not necessarily pleased to take due to the associated gender and 
racial stereotypes and the fear of being seen as a woman involved in a sham 
marriage or sex-for-visa arrangement (Hoang and Yeoh 2015). 
Women who were involved in a transnational relationship or marriage talked about 
how sexism, racism, and other discriminatory gender and cultural discourses 
harmed their relationship and hurt their feelings. These discourses are further 
consolidated and reproduced by the structural inequality of residency statuses 
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between a UK resident and a foreign spouse in the visa system, making a Chinese 
wife “dependent” on her British husband. 
Qiana, originally a student migrant, now a Tier 2 work visa holder said, 
My ex-boyfriend once said to me, “you are with me just because of my 
British passport”. Even though he said it in a joking way, I just didn’t like it. 
It became a thorn in my heart. When I confronted him, he said it was just a 
joke and apologised. But there was no use…he had already hurt me. It is a 
kind of power inequality, you know. Why do I need to rely on you to stay 
here? I think white superiority definitely exists…my ex-boyfriend earned 
less than me, but in his mind, he was still superior to me. 
 
Ying Men, a 32-year-old EEA family permit holder, also talked about how her 
transnational marriage was commonly perceived through the lens of sexism. She 
recalled an incident which happened shortly after her marriage in the UK. She said,  
I remember my landlord said to me, “he (Ying Men’s husband) is now your 
boss because he sponsors your visa so that you can stay here.” I said to 
him, “he is not my boss. I can also find some other people to sponsor me. I 
can still look for other people to help me if I want.” When the landlord said 
this, my husband was right next to me. When he heard my reply, he went 
“hey!” Then I explained to him that I meant to say I could find an employer 
to sponsor me a work visa, not another man to sponsor me a spouse visa.  
 
Chinese migrant women fought against these discriminatory cultural discourses and 
gender stereotypes by emphasising that they are capable and non-calculative, and 
that they are not taking advantage of their British partner. At the same time, women 
undermined, challenged, and delegitimised their partner’s supposedly “superior” 
position by pointing out that their success is not based on their own efforts alone, 
but is propelled by the profound advantages (gender, racial, and class backgrounds) 
that they have enjoyed. For example, immediately after making the aforementioned 
statement, Ying Men said, 
The thing is I don’t think I need to obey him (her husband) just because he 
sponsors me a visa. He doesn’t need a visa to live in the UK because he 
was born in the EU. This is nothing but luck. 
 
Similarly to Mei Mei, Ying Men empowered herself through the notions of choice and 
sacrifice. She continued, 
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I don’t think I owe my husband anything. Helping me to stay is just one 
thing my husband needs to do or sacrifice. I also have to give up a lot to 
make the relationship work. This is not a matter of who owes the other 
more. That’s why I think our relationship is equal…I have many options. I 
could get a tier 2 visa to stay here. If no company sponsored me with a 
visa, I could go to Hong Kong, USA or China for work. I chose to stay here 
because my husband and I love each other. That’s why he chose to help 
me stay. If you don’t love me, you don’t need to help me. I think you have to 
be confident, otherwise your husband would not respect you. What I did 
was to talk to my husband to let him know that he actually had a choice. He 
could choose not to help me. I said to him, “but if you choose to help me 
stay, then don’t be so nosey to your friends about this and don’t remind me 
over and over again how you have done me a favour or something.” 
Although transnational marriages are ethicised, gendered, and hierarchical 
according to cultural perceptions (Collins 1998; Nagel 2003) and structural systems, 
such as the immigration system, power relations between migrant women and their 
partner are contextual, relative, dynamic, and constantly shifting. The class 
background of these women empowers them; through the notions of sacrifice and 
choice, they emphasise that they are the “good women” who, regardless of their 
privileged background and educational qualifications, make a choice to stay in the 
UK for love, and make sacrifices for marriage, including giving up career 
opportunities and good life chances in China or Hong Kong. Women’s making of an 
“equal relationship” is important because this is a way by which they can become a 
respectable and worthy individual whose sexuality is moral. Consider Sofia’s 
comments about her past relationship: 
I don’t want my boyfriend to think that I am in love with him just because of 
his residency status. I am very serious about our relationship. I don’t want 
to do exchange. I only want to be with someone because of love. I don’t 
want to be one of those women who seduces a man just for his citizenship. 
I know some Chinese women are like that, but I am different.  
 
Also, consider what Kelly said about her husband Sam, 
Sam doesn’t need to have a house or a car first before marrying me. I don’t 
demand gifts. I don’t need a man to please me with material goods, which 
makes me quite different from those lower-class women in China… I write 
my husband love letters and give him gifts.  
Apart from using the discourse of love (see also chapter 4) and emphasising the 
non-pragmatic nature of the relationship, Sofia also maintained her respectability 
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and middle-classness by drawing class and moral boundaries, differentiating herself 
from other women “who seduce a man just for his citizenship” (see Xiao 2011; Ang 
2016 on the relational concept of respectable femininity). Kelly distinguished herself 
from “lower-class women” in China by claiming that she was not materialistic. From 
her perspective, a house, a car or materials goods were not perceived as important 
when it came to developing relationships with men. When considering Kelly’s class 
background, one can imagine part of the reason that she said she did not need a 
man to please her with material goods was because she was confident that she 
could buy whatever she wanted herself. More importantly, she emphasised that in 
her romantic relationship with Sam, she did not “demand” from him but “gave”. In 
this way, being a giver (not being selfish or manipulative) in romantic relationships 
or marriages is considered as moral. Morality here concerns a moral gender attitude 
and behaviour, or the quality of being in accord with standards of right or good 
gender conduct. While female sexuality is celebrated when romantic love is 
involved, women’s instrumentalism in heterosexual relationships tends to be held in 
contempt. The social belief that love is entirely ethical and that pragmatic greed is 
always immoral remains strong. In both Sofia and Kelly’s example, they both 
claimed a higher moral ground by distancing themselves from women who would 





In this chapter, I have explored women’s self-fashioning as respectable Chinese 
marriage migrants in the UK. I have argued that the differences between migrant 
women and their partner in terms of class, gender, culture, and in some cases, race 
and ethnicity, and women’s expectations in transnational relationships and marriage 
foreground the tensions of negotiating respectable femininity. I have discussed the 
paradoxes of global hypergamy, and how middle-class Chinese women are torn 
between contradictory aspirations to fulfil the expectations of becoming an 
independent and achieving individual, and to be seen as a woman who has 
accomplished marital mobility. I have shown that although global hypergamy may 
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work as an advantage for some women, for middling migrant women who consider 
themselves as coming from a privileged background in their country of origin, the 
expectation that they should “marry up” creates intense pressure to marry to 
someone who has a higher class background or is able to provide them with a life 
that signifies their upward marital mobility. 
I have also discussed the tensions between respectability and security, marriage 
and self-achievement, in migrant women’s transnational lives. Most of the women 
from both mainland China and Hong Kong in this study wished for the stability and 
security brought by home ownership and marriage, and were content to have a 
partner who could provide that in the UK. Although this aspiration to own a home is 
not necessarily class-related, women’s practices in negotiating it with their Chinese 
or non-Chinese partner, and their natal family, are defined by their class. For some 
wealthy brides, when their Chinese or non-Chinese groom cannot afford to buy a 
house or pay for the deposit on a property in the UK, their family may provide 
financial assistance. However, this practice does not conform to the traditional 
gender ideal and cultural expectations, and may suggest that the bride is not 
marrying up, thus creating tensions. “Cultural difference” (wenhua chayi) becomes a 
logic through which migrant women comprehend their disappointment when their 
expectations of their Chinese or non-Chinese partner in the UK to buy a home or 
take full responsibility for restaurant bills and household expenses cannot be 
fulfilled.  
Simultaneously, most of the women that I interviewed were willing to share living 
costs with their partner and to ensure that the contributions of both parties are more 
or less “fair” to create a sense that their relationship or marriage is “equal”. 
Contradiction lies at the heart of women’s complex aspirations related to 
transnational marriage. On the one hand, they wish to show that they are able to 
“marry up”, but on the other hand, they hope to have an “equal” relationship to 
demonstrate that they are not relying upon or taking advantage of their partner. 
They also (re)construct and (re)negotiate their respectability through the notions of 
choice and sacrifice. Finally, by distancing themselves from women whom they 
perceived as materialistic, manipulative, or having qualities that they associate with 




This thesis has presented a study of a middle-class migration pattern that is a 
relatively new but also increasingly normalised part of a career-life strategy in both 
mainland China and Hong Kong. It reveals how temporary migration to the UK has 
become an important and common resource for middle-class Chinese, not only for 
young migrants themselves, but also for their sponsors, such as their parents; a 
reality that is almost unimaginable for the previous Chinese generations.  
At the same time, the UK’s immigration policies have become increasingly stringent 
over the past decade, directly shaping people’s experiences of migration and life 
transitions, including marriage. The UK Immigration Rules set minimum income 
thresholds both for professional migrant workers to be considered eligible for a work 
visa, and for settled UK-based individuals to qualify as a visa sponsor for their non-
EEA spouse. In doing so, UK immigration policy filters potential migrants wishing to 
take either the employment or marriage immigration route, and creates a 
homogenous middle-class migrant population from mainland China and Hong Kong. 
The population of skilled migrant workers already belongs to the middle-class, and 
the population of marriage migrants, if not already hailing from a middle-class 
background, will at least marry a UK-based sponsor whose income bracket could 
reasonably be considered to position them as middle-class, and they will 
consequently form a middle-class family unit.  
Migrants who are able to meet the strict financial requirements are not out of the 
water yet. As they and/or their partner are very often young career-starters, whose 
mobility between jobs tends to be high, being tied to the visa system means that 
they must continue to comply with the Home Office’s ongoing requirements. This 
can limit their options and have a fundamental effect on the choices they make for 
themselves and their families. This qualitative study examines the lived experiences 
and struggles of young Chinese middle-class temporary migrants in the UK, and 
provides rich contextual analysis of their agency, dilemmas, and choices.  
The dominant discourses on Chinese middle-class transnationalism in migration 
studies generalise migrants’ experiences as instrumental hypermobility. Examples 
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include Ong's (1999) concept of “flexible citizenship”, and literature that examines 
family strategies to accumulate capital utilising concepts such as “astronaut fathers” 
(Waters 2002) and “parachute kids” (Zhou 1998). According to Lin (2011, 138), 
studies of Chinese middling migrants seem to be “overly preoccupied with the 
conduct of flexibility”. Although flexibility in mobility is often celebrated as a positive 
quality or condition that allows people to become adaptative to the global 
environment and attain the status of global citizen, the young migrants in this study 
narrated migration stories that reveal the contingency of temporary mobility, which 
may result in unexpected (and sometimes undesired) outcomes that require them to 
reconfigure their expectations and make compromises. 
The new middle-class temporary migrants, who are younger than previous waves of 
migrants from China and Hong Kong, and arguably have limited capital and unfixed 
immigration goals, are subjected to institutional temporalities that make their futures 
uncertain. This has implications for the way migrants negotiate their desires and 
goals in their career and personal life, and their relationships, including but not 
limited to their relationships with their partner and parents. Even these relatively 
well-resourced individuals often experience a sense of loss of control over their 
present and future, the rhythms of daily social life, and their desired normative life 
trajectories due to the complexities of visa-induced temporalities. 
 
YOUNG MIDDLE-CLASS CHINESE MIGRANTS 
 
My research has demonstrated that although young Chinese migrants initially 
entered the UK under specific visa categories, such as student and youth mobility 
scheme, their goals are multiple and often contradictory. Interviews with 67 
informants have shown that temporary migration to the UK is not just about the 
acquisition of cultural capital and overseas work experience, but also what migrants 
hope to become and achieve through embarking on such a journey. Kipnis (2011) 
argues that higher education should be understood less as a means to an end and 
more as an object of desire in itself. The same could be argued for studying abroad 
or simply going abroad. There exists a strong imaginative link between transnational 
migration (even if it is only temporary) and the promise of life change (Fong 2011). 
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Young migrants often expect to experience profound personal change that will lead 
to the achievement of success, and this expectation is shared by their peers and 
family (Thøgersen 2012). Focusing on young, well-educated, middle-class Chinese 
migrants who live in the UK temporarily, this thesis has examined the aspirations 
and constraints associated with efforts to live a transnational life, and the different 
sets of tensions and dilemmas experienced in attempting to meet familial, societal, 
and self-expectations in career and marriage.  
In the face of the highly stratified and intensely competitive Asian job market (Hao 
and Welch 2012), and the overseas credential inflation in the job market of urban 
China and Hong Kong, my informants were aware that studying abroad may no 
longer guarantee a “successful” career path. Having benefited from resources 
provided by their middle-class families, young migrants felt ambitious about getting 
ahead, but even more anxious about falling behind. Although many saw the 
acquisition of a British work visa as a form of “success”, in reality, very few Chinese 
migrants in my study successfully transitioned into the British employment market. 
As for the working holiday makers from Hong Kong, many could only seek 
temporary and low-paid jobs that they often perceived as beneath them.  
Pursuing transnational goals and establishing a life overseas takes time, which 
migrants in this study lacked due to the limited duration of their visas. However, 
coming from a more privileged background enabled some to (re)negotiate migration 
opportunities, for example prolonging their stays by switching from one visa to 
another, or returning to the UK after their visa expired when circumstances allowed. 
By examining such patterns of behaviour, this thesis contributes to the discussion of 
transnationality and temporality in contemporary migration, which scholars no longer 
see as temporally linear and spatially unidirectional from home to host country. 
My analysis of the development and deployment of personal and family capital 
contributes to understanding of the formation of an immensely important new 
Chinese middle-class. The increase of its number is significant in the eyes of the 
Chinese government, as well as social theorists, who view the development of a 
middle-class society as a force for socio-political stability, good governance, and 
economic and democratic progress in China (Rocca 2008; Li 2010; Li 2013). In 
2009, Chunling Li, a sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
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conducted a content analysis by using a database of major academic journals and 
periodicals in China, which looks at the surging number of journal articles with 
“middle-class” in the title (2009, 48). The figure rose from below 5 in 1979 to nearly 
60 in 2007. These studies, along with research conducted by non-Chinese scholars 
or published outside of China, examine various aspects of the emerging Chinese 
middle-class, for example the formation of a middle-class society as a national 
project and aspiration (Goodman 2014); the social meanings of being middle class 
(Rocca 2017), consumption behaviours of the middle-class (Jaffrelot and Veer 
2008); and their attitudes toward democracy (Chen 2013; Miao 2016). Currently, 
most of this type of research looks at what happens in the country of origin, but my 
research shows that what takes place in temporary migration destinations like the 
UK is not peripheral but rather is thoroughly integrated into the new transnational 
spaces of personal and family strategies. Through this thesis, I also seek to make 
an empirical contribution to Chinese transnational migration literature and studies of 
social change in China today. 
Driven by the growing interest in the changing social structure in China among 
Chinese and foreign scholars and the Chinese government, most recent research 
looks at what is happening within China, for example, observing and debating the 
existence, trends, and implications of the Chinese middle-class. The smaller body of 
research that studies young middle-class Chinese in a transnational migration 
context tends to focus on migrants’ journey to achieve social reproduction through 
international education (see Tsang 2013; Tu 2016).  
My thesis examines the lives of young Chinese middle-class migrants, who on the 
one hand, struggle to extend their stays in the UK, and on the other hand seek to 
build a middle-class identity that is recognised both in their home countries and the 
UK, where the cultures of class and ways of attaining status are different. This focus 
highlights the particular processes that my informants go through and the tensions 
that they face, that is different from previous similar research, for example: Rocca’s 
(2017) study of the making of middle class in China; Tu’s (2018) research on 
Chinese migrants who succeed in settling in the UK and their families in China; and 
Hu’s (2018) book about British-Chinese interethnic marriages. While my thesis 
shares similar ground with Kajanus’s (2015) work on Chinese student migrants and 
their gendered expectations, it also sets itself apart by emphasising migrants’ 
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temporal urgency to obtain British residency rights and their investment in and 
conversion of different forms of capital.  
Inspired by Rocca’s (2017) work on the social meanings of being middle class in 
China, this thesis however is different as it investigates what it means to be a 
Chinese middle-class person in a transnational context. Wright and Shin (1988) 
argue that class is an embodiment of both the past and possible future in the 
present. This temporal element of class intersects with the temporality of migration, 
shaping temporary migrants’ understanding of class, present class position, and 
aspirations to attain a certain class status in a particular country in the future. By 
looking at class as an unfixed, undefined and ever-changing entity rather than as 
rigid, definable category, it is possible to see class positions as something that 
migrants need to negotiate through looking backward and forward, and undergoing 
a process of learning in a new cultural environment. Linking temporality to class 
analysis in migration studies also changes the way we understand migrants’ class 
experiences and life choices in relation to class and respectability. 
In contrast to Tu’s (2018) book Education, Migration and Family Relations between 
China and the UK: The Transnational One-Child Generation, which looks at both the 
one-child generation of Chinese migrants who succeeded in settling in the UK, and 
their parents in China, my research looks at people seeking to remain in the UK. 
This draws attention to different challenges and dilemmas faced by migrants, whose 
lives are shaped by their desire to pursue respectability, the effects of temporal 
pressures of gendered expectations, and the timescales of UK immigration system.  
With regards to interethnic intimate relationships, Hu’s (2016) Chinese-British 
Intermarriage: Disentangling Gender and Ethnicity gives me insights into the lived 
experiences of ethnic intermarriage in Chinese-British families in the UK. While 
undoubtedly important and also inspiring for my own research, Hu’s work focuses 
more on the multiple identities as migrant, member of an ethnic minority, intimate 
partner, and gendered individual, but less so as part of the transnational middle 
class that my thesis addresses.  
Through analysing the processes of capital conversion, showing the varieties of 
cultural capital, such as suzhi, morality and respectable sexuality, and 
demonstrating the significance of temporal capital and different subtypes of social 
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capital, i.e. family capital and intimate relationship capital, of Chinese middle-class 
migrants in the UK, this thesis generates new empirical and theoretical insights. 
Coming from different political, socio-economic and social-cultural systems, Chinese 
migrants have to go through processes of adaptation as they seek to position 
themselves within the social class “hierarchy” operating in British society. While the 
possession of cultural capital remains a central identity marker, the experiences of 
my informants who have shown that the conversions between cultural capital and 
the other three forms of capital – social, economic and symbolic – are often not 
easy. For migrants hoping to stay on in the UK, the goal is to possess or accumulate 
as much temporal capital as possible, whilst building a middle-class identity in the 
UK. I argue that family capital in the forms of financial subsidy is vital to allow young 
migrants to enjoy middle-class consumption and lifestyles, including owning a 
property, even if their current income or savings cannot meet such desires. For 
some, Chinese parents’ temporary provision of childcare to their migrant daughter or 
son also enables the young migrant, who is at an early career stage, to focus on 
career development in the UK. By shedding light on migrants’ self-fashioning 
processes in negotiating their class identity and capital conversion processes in a 
new country where different rules of attaining class status may be observed, it 
changes the way we understand migrants’ class experiences and life choices in 
relation to class and respectability.  
 
NEGOTIATING CHINESE RESPECTABLE FEMININITY 
 
In the process of conducting this research, I realised that I was investigating a highly 
gendered field. There exist some ethnographies that look more specifically at young 
Chinese women’s gendered experiences and aspirations in international education. 
Noteworthy here is Kajanus’s (2015) Chinese Student Migration, Gender and 
Family. Kajanus (2015) concludes that despite familial investment in young Chinese 
women to pursue international education, gender expectations and norms continue 
to shape both the kind of support that is given and the receiver’s obligations. 
Kajanus points out that “women as daughters are supported to success, but as 
wives and mothers, they are not” (p.1). Women are expected to become wives and 
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mothers, but achieving these goals is often not celebrated as a form of success, but 
rather a gendered requirement that one must fulfil.  
Kaianus’s observation resonates with my own finding, which shows that in spite of 
being supported in their overseas education pursuits, young migrant women are still 
expected to find their place in marriage and job markets that are highly gendered, 
and they have to ensure their education or transnational goals do not jeopardise 
their chance of getting married. 
Seeking to build capital or achieve goals and respectability through marriage, 
marriage immigration is especially pertinent to women in Chinese culture. My study 
has shown that educational or working holiday migration is often a trajectory for 
women to achieve broader aspirations in life. In general, the main pressure on the 
Chinese men in my interview sample was to secure post-study employment and 
achieve career goals. Many male migrants considered the possibility of returning to 
their home country one day and thought that an accumulation of years of overseas 
work experience would be beneficial to their career development “back home”. 
While they did seek romance, and wished to form relationships in the UK, they felt 
less pressure to get married and settle down than the women did. I have highlighted 
such gender specificities at play throughout this thesis.  
I have argued that migrant women’s strategies and struggles in negotiating marriage 
and class status should be viewed as connected to the notion of Chinese feminine 
respectability in the early 21st century. Critical scholarship on individualism and 
neoliberalism has emphasised that while the entrepreneurial, self-governing subject 
(Rose 1999; Rose and Miller 1992) is praised, the subject is also increasingly held 
responsible for determining his or her success. For women, one of the effects of 
individualisation is the emergence of the feminisation of success, which generates 
an expectation for women to achieve success by relying on themselves, but not on 
men.  
The young Chinese middle-class women in this study are endowed with a set of 
meanings under the contemporary interpretations of respectable femininity: they 
should be attractive, educated, independent and liberal, but still conform to the 
expected gendered duty to marry and reproduce. I argue that Chinese migrant 
women lived in the “confused settings” described by Lahad (2013: 24) in which they 
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are required to construct their own successful portfolios in both professional and 
personal lives, and to constantly adjust their goals, expectations, desires and 
priorities in order to gain respectability. 
Young middle-class Chinese women find themselves standing at a crossroads, 
being pulled in different directions by the forces of traditional Chinese culture that 
ties women to their domestic, caring, and social roles; modern Chinese culture that 
promotes dual-income families and the making of professional “new women”; and 
individualistic British culture that supports the idea that individuals should make their 
own life decisions with minimal familial influence or intervention. At the same time, 
the popular Chinese state-sponsored gender discourse of sheng nu (leftover 
women) pressures urban Chinese single women to follow a maternal 
heteronormative life track by making them feel they are not being responsible to 
themselves, their family and society if they do not marry at a certain age. This study 
provides evidence of clashes between individualism and familism in a transnational 
setting, and of the changing patterns of migration and familial systems in China. 
I argue that even after marrying, these women continue to struggle to fulfil different 
sets of expectations in career and family life, and face dilemmas in achieving 
respectability. Although migrant women may be able to navigate immigration 
constraints and escape from the social stigma surrounding women’s singlehood by 
marrying, the deployment of marriage as an immigration strategy is very often a 
double-edged sword. Young women’s major struggle, as I explained in the last 
chapter, is related to the new and old modalities of feminine subjectivity, and the 
contradictory images that “middle-class woman” and “marriage migrant” entail.  
On the one hand, marrying someone who can sponsor a visa is a manifestation of 
migrants’ capability and agency in managing their personal life and creating a 
pathway to continue their pursuit of transnational goals. On the other hand, 
transnational, and especially interracial, marriage and the norm of global hypergamy 
bring different sets of stigmas concerning Chinese women’s sexuality and 
instrumentality. Migrant women’s reliance on men (the UK-based partners) to 
acquire a British visa and extend their stay in the UK provokes a sense of insecurity 
among themselves and their family “back home”, due to the culturally embedded 
imagination and stereotypes that tie these women to the ideas of domesticity and 
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dependence. This is in contrast to women who stay on through securing a skilled job 
and a work visa. They are perceived as respectable due to their success in 
converting cultural capital into economic and temporal capital in the UK. Those who 
form a transnational marriage after a short courtship are often subjected to further 
cultural stereotypes and social suspicion concerning the authenticity and maturity of 
their relationship.  
Chinese marriage migrants in this study faced dilemmas in fulfilling of their own and 
their family’s expectations to become powerful, successful, self-sustained, married 
women, and becoming marriage migrants who have to depend on their spouse for 
residency status and even financial support. None of the women that I interviewed 
hoped to become a full-time housewife after marrying, considering this domestic role 
a “waste” of their talent and education, and their family’s investment in them. At the 
same time, most married women claimed that they earned a lot less than their 
partner, who sponsored their visa, and admitted feeling disappointed and frustrated 
at times.  
Most migrant women (and their parents) embraced the new modern feminist 
discourse which values women’s independence and self-reliance, largely in financial 
terms through employment. Yet such values did not seem to conflict with their 
preference to have partner who was a higher-earner than them or could provide a 
home and a sense of security. This is especially the case for women who formed a 
relationship in the UK with a view to marriage, as they often expected, and were 
expected by their peers and family, to “marry up” due to the norm of global 
hypergamy. I have examined these contradictory demands and desires, as well as 
the tensions they constitute.  
At the same time, Chinese middle-class migrant women sought to establish 
respectability by emphasising their love and sacrifice in their marriage, and 
distancing themselves from lower-class or other women whom they perceive as 
manipulative, materialistic, or not respectable, for example exchanging love for a 
visa. Middle-class women rhetorically asserted their cultural and moral ascendancy 
over those who they are not. The dichotomous perception of “love” and “sacrifice” as 
middle-class properties; and instrumentality in relationships as a lower-class 
attribute, was used by my informants to reaffirm their class identity. This 
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stereotypical perception of the lower class or other women by their middle-class 
counterparts, and the widening gulf between the two groups, is described by Hu 
(2016: 231) in his study of Chinese-British families as an “Ethnic War”.  
Despite middle-class Chinese women’s claim to a higher sexual moral ground, this 
study reveals that interest and emotion are entangled within their own marriage 
strategies and love relationships. Although scholars have long studied marriage as a 
prime institution for the middle-class to conflate different kinds of capital, ensure the 
safe transmission of privilege, and strengthen transnational social networks (see 
Charsley 2005; Sabur 2014), few studies have analysed how the middle-class 
individuals negotiate interest and emotion when considering relationships or 
marriage. This thesis has explored why and how marriage with someone who can 
sponsor a UK visa may be an attractive option for Chinese middle-class migrants. It 
discusses their strategic sexuality, and how they make sense of and justify their 
decision to marry, knowing that they can obtain economic benefits, social mobility, 
pleasure, and immigration opportunities by doing so. 
 
TIME, TEMPORARY MIGRATION AND MARRIAGE 
 
Neither ethical love nor pragmatism alone can fully explain middle-class Chinese 
women’s engagement in romantic relationships during their temporary migration to 
the UK. In chapter 5, I have argued that women’s relationship and marriage 
decisions are shaped by the visa regime, migrants’ state of temporariness, and their 
personal timing and societal expectation of “marrying on schedule” in the Chinese 
social context. 
According to ageist and patriarchal social scripts, younger women have an 
advantage of beauty and fertility over older women, and enjoy higher marriageability 
(Lahad 2013). Age marks the temporal boundaries that determine whether an 
individual gets to enjoy the privilege to be praised for remaining single; this privilege 
is often short-lived and dependent upon one’s age and gender. For example, 
women over the age of thirty are widely considered in Chinese societies to have 
 214 
passed the normative stage preceding marriage and parenthood. Women in their 
twenties are therefore expected to conform to the norm before it is too late. 
I have explored how this intense social scrutiny and visa-induced temporalities have 
psychological impacts on migrant women and their partners in the UK. Since the 
expiration of temporary visas is inevitable, my informants and their partners were 
often stressed and worried about the future of their relationship, which in some 
cases required cross-border maintenance, a quick marriage decision, or a 
potentially lengthy marriage negotiation. It was very common for couples to break up 
before or soon after the expiration of the migrant’s visa. It was also not unusual for 
migrants to temporarily return to their home country whilst waiting for further clarity 
in the relationship and switching onto a new British visa. During this period of 
waiting and separation, migrants’ opportunity to secure permanent jobs and their 
upward social mobility either at home or abroad may be denied and delayed, and 
the well-being of transnational couples may be hindered. For women who are 
approaching or have passed the age of thirty, and are keen to get married soon, this 
period of waiting may create greater anxiety. This is because time and youth are 
considered valuable resources, which could be lost and wasted if a committed 
relationship fails to lead to marriage.  
In this thesis, I have argued that temporary migrants’ life-course decisions and their 
timing should be understood as a complex entanglement of institutional and 
individual framings of time (see also King et al. 2006; Parreñas 2010). I have 
theorised the complex relations between various forms of time - “historical time”, 
“gendered marriage time”, “gendered reproduction time”, “state-sponsored time”, 
and “state-controlled time” - to study how time forms part of the top-down 
institutional infrastructures that regulate transnational mobility and the progression 
of individuals through roles and stages of the life-course. I argue that young Chinese 
migrant women’s life transitions are not free from the influence of social expectation, 
the gendering of time, and state intervention.  
This study contributes to recent theorisation of the temporalities of migration by 
discussing how the overlapping and intersecting layers of social, cultural, and 
political-temporal orderings (see also Robertson 2018) shapes migrants’ 
experiences of lived time in the present, and their imaginaries of the future. I have 
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argued that it is not only migrants themselves who are affected by the temporal 
dynamics of migration, but also their partners and families, whose lives are inter-
dependent with migrants’. 
Two years after conducting my research interviews, some of my key informants still 
kept me updated about their lives. Vivian had started her first job with a permanent 
contract in a completely English-speaking workplace in London after marrying, and 
had been struggling to deal with the pressure from work. Qing, who always wanted 
her own home and did not have a sense of ownership and belonging to the flat that 
was purchased by her father-in-law, put up with a job which she did not enjoy as an 
educational adviser for prospective Chinese students for a year, and secured a 
mortgage for a house just outside of London with her husband. Soon afterwards, 
Qing left the job, and now plans to become self-employed by setting up a nail salon 
at home, catering to Asian customers. After struggling to find a stable and well-paid 
job in the UK, Lin Lin decided to return to China to re-prioritise her life goals from 
focusing on marriage to building her career, whilst her husband remained in the UK 
to pursue his own career. Although they are still married, the couple has no plan to 
reunite in either China or the UK. The last time I contacted Lin Lin, she told me that 
she recently suspected her husband was having an affair in London.  
Cher and her Korean husband, despite considering and arguing about moving to 
Seoul, decided to stay in London. Belle and her husband Chris are now happily 
married. Belle keeps her close ties to Hong Kong by returning once a year; Belle’s 
mother also flies to London occasionally to visit her daughter. The last time I spoke 
to Ronald, he was in his final year of a nursing programme and was happy in his 
new relationship. After failing to prolong their stay in the UK, Yi Fung and his wife 
had moved to Germany. The developments in my informants’ lives highlight their 
resilience, resourcefulness, and flexibility in creating “contingent, multi-directional 
and multi-stage mobility pathways” (Robertson 2018: 3). These new experiences 
add value to their capital portfolios, giving them agency in navigating what is now a 
global arena.  
In concluding, I would note that this research is not without limitations. First, due to 
the nature of qualitative research, it is not possible to generalise the findings to the 
population of young Chinese temporary migrants in the UK as a whole. This 
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research nevertheless offers valuable insights into Chinese middling migrants’ 
migration motivations, class experiences, and struggles in meeting their 
transnational goals, such as obtaining visa-sponsored employment opportunities, 
earning a decent income, and achieving prolonged stays, despite their ambitions 
and socio-economic backgrounds. Second, since I did not interview my informants’ 
partners in the UK, I had no direct means with which to either understand their 
perspectives, or validate or challenge my informants’ narratives. Nonetheless, these 
narratives respond to the key research purpose of this thesis: to examine how 
migrants navigate lives in the UK, particularly in the aspects of employment, 
romance, marriage, class, and respectability. Third, the perspectives of Chinese 
migrant men fall within the scope of this study, but the data analysed throughout this 
thesis has largely related to the construction of modern Chinese feminine 
respectability, rather than Chinese masculinity. Moreover, this study does not 
attempt to address the experiences of women who choose to remain of their own 
accord, especially professional women who live in the UK temporarily on a work 
visa, which could be a valuable subject for future research.  
My thesis also points to several areas for future research. I propose that the 
tensions and dilemmas that I have discussed in this thesis are not exclusive to 
Chinese women, and can be explored in studies of women’s negotiation of familial 
duties, career goals, and class status all over the world. An interesting avenue for 
future research with Chinese migrant women is their decision to have children (or 
not), the timing of such reproduction, and the new dilemmas that they face in 
negotiating respectability and “successful” womanhood.  
My aim in carrying out this study was to develop an initial understanding of the 
formation of a new Chinese middle-class living overseas temporarily, whose 
intention to return to their home country is uncertain. I cannot help but wonder 
whether these young individuals will acquire flexible citizenship or become 
“astronaut parents” as their migration trajectories continue and as they grow older. It 
is my hope that my research will stimulate further investigation into these important 
contemporary topics. 
At the time of writing, Hong Kong has seen months of anti-government protests, 
which were initiated in response to changes to a law that would allow extradition to 
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mainland China. Protesters worry that this bill would expose people from Hong Kong 
to unfair trials and violent treatment, and could be used to target activists, 
journalists, or anyone considered by the authorities to be criminal suspects. Clashes 
between police and protesters have become increasingly violent with police using 
tear gas and rubber bullets, and protesters storming the parliament building (BBC 
News 2019). The situation shows no sign of dying down, despite widespread rumour 
among the general public that the Chinese authorities are ready to send in troops to 
end the protests (Branigan 2019).  
In the midst of the protests, I spoke to some of my Hong Kong informants, such as 
Vivian and Ronald, who had expressed their political concerns about Hong Kong 
during the interviews I conducted two to three years ago. Our recent conversations 
made me realise that despite being migrants in the UK, they are far from indifferent 
towards Hong Kong politics. These young migrants enjoy a privileged life, which 
enables them to maintain close ties to Hong Kong by paying regular visits. Their 
circumstances are vastly different from the early settlers and Hong Kong Chinese 
immigrants of previous generations, which I have discussed in chapter 3, who 
lacked the resources or initiative to make return journeys. Compared to these older 
migrants and members of the new middle-class who never leave Hong Kong, the 
migrants in this study are likely to have different impacts on the socio-political 
situation “back home”. The same could be argued for young mainland Chinese 
migrants in the UK, who now live in a society where the exchange and acquisition of 
information are not controlled by the state, which may challenge their old 
worldviews, and generate a desire for political change in China24. Such forms of 
political transnationalism could warrant further research.  
Students and working holiday makers are only two groups in the UK’s points-based 
immigration system. Different categories and sub-groups of temporary migrants may 
represent different transnational mobility dynamics, thus resulting in different 
experiences and struggles relating to marriage and migration, which require 
academic attention. Advancing such research will help to give voice to the people 
 
24 There has been intense research interest in Indian citizens who have settled abroad but 
maintained a strong interest in politics and cultural influences in India (see Naujoks 2013; 
Raj 2015). Such migrants also bring back new attitudes that feed into and shape 
expectations in their home society. The example of overseas Indians may provide insights 
into the evolution of the Chinese middle-class.  
 218 
affected, and to promote understanding of non-EEA migrants’ lives, class 
experiences, and decisions to return to their home country, migrate to another 













Background of Informant 
 
1. When and why did you move to the UK? 
2. What do you want to achieve by moving to the UK? 
3. What kind of visa do you hold? 
4. How long will you stay in the UK for? 
5. What is your highest education level? Did you obtain any educational 
qualification outside of the UK? 
6. Did you have a full-time job before your migration to the UK? 
7. How do you perceive your social class status in your country of origin 
(China/Hong Kong)? Why do you consider yourself as belonging to a certain 
social class? 
8. How would you describe your cultural identity? Do you have a strong sense 
of belonging to your place of origin? 
9. What do you seek to escape/avoid by leaving China/Hong Kong? 







11. Can you briefly describe your family? How many family members do you 
have?  
12. Are your parents still in employment? How would you describe the economic 
situation of your family? What “class” does your family belong to, and why? 
13. How would you describe your relationships with your immediate family 
members? Do they support your decision of moving to the UK? 
14. Do you have any family member in the UK? If so, are you close to them? 
Have you received any support or assistance from your family member(s) in 
the UK? 
15. Do you have any family member living abroad? If so, do you think you are 
aspired by your family member(s) to live abroad? 
16. Do you receive any financial assistance from your family to move to the UK? 
Is there any financial arrangement made to make this move to the UK 
possible? 
17. Do you think you have your familial obligations and responsibilities back 
home? If so, how do you justify your decision of moving to the UK, knowing 
that your obligations and responsibilities to the family cannot be fulfilled at 
least temporarily, if not permanently? 
18. How do you feel being away from your family, friends or community? 
19. How often do you return to your country of origin for a visit? 
20. Does your family come to the UK to visit you?  
21. How do you maintain contact with your family or friends? How often do you 
talk or write to them? 
 
Life in the UK 
 
22. How do you see your current life in the UK? Do you like living here? Why? 
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23. Being a Chinese migrant in the UK, have you encountered any difficulties or 
discriminations? How do you perceive these challenges? 
24. How do you perceive your social class status in the UK? Is there any change 
in your social class status after the migration to the UK? Do you think 
upward social mobility in the UK is available for you? How would you 
anticipate your social class status, if you continue to stay in the UK in the 
future? 
25. Have you made new friends or established new social network after moving 
to the UK? 
26. Do you usually hang out with other Chinese migrants in the UK? Do you 
make friends from other countries? 
27. How do you socialise with your new friends in the UK? Is there any 
difference in the ways you hang out with your Chinese friends back home? 
28. If you are a student in the UK, how do you see studying here? How would 
you compare your study life in the UK to the ways you study at home? 
29. If you are a working holiday maker, how do you see working here? What 
kind of job do you have? Is this a desirable job for you? Do you see any 
career prospect of your current employment? During job hunting, what kinds 
of job have you applied? Do you think your education background and skills 
are recognised by your current or prospective employer? What is the ratio of 
Chinese and non-Chinese employees in your company? How is your 
relationship with your boss or manager? How is your relationship with your 
colleagues?  
30.  How often do you travel to other European countries? 
31. Is travelling part of your lifestyle being a temporary migrant in the UK? 
32. Why do you want to prolong your stay in the UK? 
33. Do you wish to obtain permanent residency and/or British citizenship? Why 
or why not? What are the possibilities and constraints in obtaining 
permanent residency in the UK? 
34. How does migration to the UK shape your cultural identity? Does your sense 
of belonging to your place of origin grow stronger, weaker, or remain 
unchanged? 
35. Have you developed a sense of belonging to the UK? Do you consider the 
UK as your home? 
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36. Do you think your goals have achieved since you moved to the UK?  
37. Have your goals changed after moving to the UK? If so, why? 
38. Do you think you are given (or will be given) opportunities to develop your 
career in the UK? Why or why not? 
39. Do you think you have already (or will) “fit in” the British society? Why or why 
not? 
40. If you settle down in the UK, will you consider moving your parents to the 
country? Why or why not? 
41. Would you imagine yourself to re-migrate again in the future? Why or why 
not? 
 
Relationship (for those who have a partner in the UK) 
 
42. Do you have a partner in the UK? How did you meet him/her? 
43. How long have you been together for? 
44. Can you briefly describe your partner? How old is he/she? Is he/she a 
permanent resident in the UK? What is his/her occupation?  
45. How would you describe your relationship with your partner? 
46. What do you think about the cultural, ethnic and language differences 
between you and your partner? How do you (or seek to) overcome these 
difficulties? 
47. Do you anticipate a future that involves your partner? What kind of future is 
that? In that future, where will be your chosen place of residence? 
48. If the current relationship is stable, will you consider having your own family 
in the UK? Why or why not? 
49. Do you think your relationship is affected by the temporary status on your 
visa? Are there any decisions or planning you have to make because of your 
limited time remaining in this country? 
50. If you are in a relationship with a permanent resident, do you hope to stay in 
the UK through marriage or obtaining a partnership visa? Why or why not? 
51. How do you feel about staying in the UK through the help of your partner? 
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52. Have you talked to your partner about your temporary status in the UK? How 
does he/she think about it in relation to your relationship? 
53. What do you think your partner will do when you are running out of time on 
your visa? 
54. Do you think your relationship with a partner in the UK shapes your sense of 
belonging to this country and your place of origin? 
55. Have you told your family and friends about your relationship in the UK? 
Why or why not? If yes, how do they think of the relationship? If no, how 
would you imagine your relationship to be perceived by your family and 
friends? 
56. Are your family and friends’ perceptions and opinions about your partner or 
the relationship important to you? How so? 
57. Have you been in other relationships in the past? Can you briefly describe 
your past relationship(s) to me?  
58. In what ways, do your past relationship(s) shape your perceptions of 
romantic relationship and ideal partner? How are they different from, or 
similar to your current relationship in the UK? 
  
Relationship (for those who do not have a partner in the UK) 
 
59. How would you describe your relationship status?  
60. Do you intend to find a partner in the UK? Why or why not? If yes, what are 
your aspirations of finding a partner in the UK? And, how do you intend to 
meet potential partners? What kind of relationship do you hope to have? 
How would you imagine it? 
61. Have you met anyone you find attractive in the UK? 
62. What are the criteria of your potential partner? 
63. Will your potential partner’s residency status be a concern for you? 
64. Being a Chinese temporary migrant in the UK, do you think you have any 
advantages or disadvantages in the dating market? 
65. Have you been in relationship(s) in the past? Can you briefly describe your 
past relationship(s) to me?  
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66. In what ways, do your past relationship(s) shape your perceptions of 
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